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Preface
Thismonograph investigates interactions among deep regional economic integration,
activities of global firms, and international spillovers of technological knowledge.
Each of these three and their interactions are significant factors that have a strong
influence on the currentworld economy. In particular, the relationship between global
firms and international technology spillovers and the impact of deep integration on
the spillovers are very interesting issues from both academic and practical points of
view. In each chapter of this monograph, we address some specific issues in the broad
theme of the book. Therefore, depending on readers’ interest, each chapter can be
read separately without worrying about the order of reading the chapters. However,
the entire book has a structure, and the reading order is arranged to properly explore
the broad theme of the book.
This is an output of our collaborative research for more than 10 years. When our
joint research project started, we were colleagues at Okayama University. The first
research topic was technology spillovers. Specifically, we tried to investigate the
relationship between the trade specialization of countries/economies and technology
spillovers across countries/economies in Asia. At that time Zhang was working on
empirical studies of innovation using patent data. He had just started employing
patent citation data as a proxy of spillovers of knowledge and technology. Haruna
mainly engaged in theoretical analysis of research and development spillovers in the
industrial organization literature.As Jinji’s specialtywas international economics,we
considered that the three of us could tackle the above topic through working together.
Our first paper was published in 2010. By that time Jinji had already moved to Kyoto
University, but our collaborative project still continues. The focus of our research
has been extended to the globalized activities of firms, regional trade agreements,
and their relationships with international technology spillovers. The outputs of our
collaborative research on these issues have been published in a number of journal
articles.
Some of the chapters in this monograph are closely related to the papers that were
published before, but none of them is a reprint of the published paper. Chapters 3 and
4 extend our research published in the North American Journal of Economics and
Finance in 2019 by investigating the relationship between a firm’s choice of global-
izationmode and various measures of firm performance including labor productivity,
v
vi Preface
total factor productivity, and intangible asset intensity, as well as Tobin’s q. We also
employ a number of different estimation techniques to cope with particular char-
acteristics of our data. Chapter 5 examines the relationship between bilateral trade
patterns and technology spillovers, which is the main topic of our paper published in
Review of World Economics in 2015. In Chap. 5 we conduct theoretical analysis to
derive testable hypotheses, which is not included in the published paper. In addition,
we extend our previous empirical analysis by employing additional data at Japanese
and European patent offices. Finally, Chap. 7 provides an extended analysis of the
paper published in the World Economy in 2019. The issue in Chap. 7 is the impact
of deep regional integration on international technology spillovers. We extend the
coverage of countries/economies and the period targeted in the analysis. Moreover,
we enrich the measurement of deep regional trade agreements.
Research funding was provided by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
under Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) 23330081, 16H03619, 19H01481,
and 20H01507, the Japan Center for Economic Research, and the Murata Science
Foundation.The analysis inChaps. 3 and4usesfirm-level data extracted fromsurveys
conducted by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). We thank the
Research and StatisticsDepartment of theMETI for granting permission to access the
surveys’ firm-level data. Part of Chap. 6 is based on the research conducted through
a research project at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
We are grateful to Xin Cen, Rinki Ito, and Shunya Ozawa for their excellent research
assistance. They also read the entire manuscript of this book and gave comments.
In addition, we have benefited a great deal from discussion and/or comments from
a large number of colleagues and participants at numerous conferences, workshops,
and seminars.
We would like to thank Prof. Kazuo Mino for recommending that our work be
published by Springer andMs. JunoKawakami for her editorial assistance.Wewould
like to express our sincere gratitude to Prof. Ryuzo Sato, the Editor in Chief of the
Advances in Japanese Business and Economics book series, and the editorial board
members for accepting our book into the series. Finally, we would like to express
our deepest gratitude to the late Prof. Keizo Nagatani, who had provided intellectual
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Overview
The world economy was severely hit by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. It was
estimated that the annual growth in the world’s real gross domestic product (GDP)
in 2020 would be −3.3% (International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2021). World trade
simultaneously contracted sharply. It was estimated that the growth in the world’s
trade volume of goods and services would be−8.5% in 2020 (IMF 2021). According
to the statistics released by the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, by the
end of 2020 the cumulative number of infected people worldwide is over 83 million
and the cumulative number of worldwide deaths is over 1.81 million. However, the
decline in global manufacturing was short-lived and both advanced and emerging
economies showed V-shaped recoveries in manufacturing output in the second half
of 2020 (IMF 2021, Fig. 1.1.1). Moreover, thanks to vaccines and various policy
supports, the world economy is projected to grow at 6% in 2021 (IMF 2021), but
still faces great uncertainty. Its recovery depends on the path of the health crisis.
Although the COVID-19 pandemic proved that the world economy is vulnerable
to health risks, at the same time it shows its good adaptability. The size of the
COVID-19 recession is expected to be smaller than the 2008 Global Financial Crisis
(IMF 2021). Its influences are different from one country to another. Low income
countries with limited capacity for policy support were hit relatively harder than
advanced economies. Furthermore, countries that rely on tourism and commodity
exports were particularly severely damaged. Those countries are expected to suffer
more significant medium-term losses. Using the pandemic vulnerability index (PVI),
which is calculated by national data on COVID-19 morbidity and mortality rates and
other related information, Shrestha et al. (2020) show that certain countries are more
vulnerable to the COVID-19 pandemic than others. According to their analysis, the
top 10 highly vulnerable countries include Brazil, India, the United States, Russia,
South Africa, Chile, Mexico, Iran, Peru, and Pakistan.
It is argued that globalization was a major driving force behind the fast spread
of COVID-19 from China to the rest of the world. For example, Farzanegan et al.
(2021) show that countries with higher levels of socio-economic globalization are
exposed to a higher case fatality rate due to COVID-19, according to the KOF
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Globalization Index (the ratio of confirmed deaths to confirmed cases), covering
more than 150 countries in July 2020. Shrestha et al. (2020) argue that “trade
and travel, essential components of globalization, are significant contributors to
the spread of infectious diseases” (p. 1). Historically, pandemics have repeatedly
emerged together with human activities and movements.1 By reviewing the history
of pandemic influenza, Saunders-Hastings and Krewski (2016) argue that pandemic
influenza is a consequence of human development and that globalization in relation
to human behavior, demographics, and mobility has enhanced the threat of pandemic
emergence and accelerated the spread of novel viruses. Conversely, they point out
that globalization has also facilitated international cooperation in disease prevention,
control, and treatment by promoting advances in disease research and surveillance.
In this book we pay attention to the proliferation of regionalism from the mid-
1990s and the globalized activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) as important
elements of recent globalization and explore interactions between these two elements
of globalization and diffusion of knowledge in the world. Diffusion of knowledge
across countries is important because it affects the speed at which the world’s tech-
nology frontier expands. For example, Eaton and Kortum (1996) show that more
than 50% of the economic growth in 19 advanced countries in the 1980s derived
from innovation in the United States, Japan, and Germany. Moreover, diffusion of
knowledge contributes to income convergence across countries (Keller 2004).
This chapter starts by presenting the background of the study in this book and
then provides an overview of the book.
1.1 Background of the Study
1.1.1 Globalization and the Proliferation of Regionalism
The term “globalization” is commonly used, but it means different things to differ-
ent people. Globalization in the economic sense means the “integration of national
economies into international economy” (Bhagwati 2004, p. 3) through international
trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and international flows of workers and tech-
nology. Alternatively, economic globalization can be defined as “the increased inter-
dependence of national economies, and the trend towards greater integration of goods
and factor markets” (Neary 2003, p. 246). There has been a heated debate about the
pros and cons of globalization among economists (e.g., Bhagwati 2004; Rodrik 1997,
2011, 2018; Samuelson 2004; Stiglitz 2002, 2006, 2018). For example, Samuelson
(2004) uses a Ricardian model and numerical examples to illustrate the possibility
of a country suffering a welfare loss from a trading partner’s productivity growth in
the country’s export good sector. But he supports globalization by arguing that “free
trade may turn out pragmatically to be still best for each region in comparison with
1 See Diamond (1997) for the relationship between human activities and viruses in history.
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lobbyist-induced tariffs and quotas which involve both perversion of democracy and
nonsubtle dead-weight distortion losses” (p. 143).Whereas Bhagwati (2004) defends
globalization by answering many criticisms from the anti-globalism side over the
issues of its impacts on poverty, child labor, culture, labor standards, and the envi-
ronment, Stiglitz (2002, 2018) emphasizes that globalization has been mismanaged
and argues what should be done to make globalization more equitable.
The current wave of globalization is not the first. The world economy reached a
peak of globalization just before World War I, when trade and FDI attained for then
unprecedented levels (Deardorff and Stern 2002). Baldwin (2006, 2011, 2016a)
explains the waves of globalization by the theory of “unbundling.” According to
him, the first unbundling, which is the unbundling of production and consumption
across national borders, occurred when the transportation revolution—railroads and
steamships—dramatically lowered transport costs in the first half of the nineteenth
century. Since then, until around 1990, countries engagedmainly in trade in final con-
sumption goods, according to their comparative advantage as traditional international
trade theory such as the Ricardian model and Heckscher-Ohlin model predicted, and
experienced gains from international trade.2 Baldwin calls the first unbundling “old
globalization.” Then, the second unbundling, which is the “spatial unbundling of
production stages previously clustered in factories and offices” (Baldwin 2011, p. 5),
was derived from the information and communication technology (ICT) revolution
around 1990. Not only transport costs but also communication costs were substan-
tially reduced, so that stages of production that previously had to be performed in
close proximity could be performed in geographically distant locations. Due to the
second unbundling, production processes were fragmented, FDI in production facil-
ities increased, and trade in parts and intermediate goods was greatly expanded.
A theory of fragmentation developed by Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) explains
these changes in production and trade.3 Baldwin calls the second unbundling “new
globalization.” Moreover, the third unbundling, which is the unbundling of tasks to
individuals located in different countries due to a reduction in face-to-face commu-
nication (Baldwin 2016a, 2019), may have already started. Further advances in both
information technology (IT) and communication technology (CT) will lead to this
third unbundling. “Telemigration” (i.e., virtual presence of foreign workers through
the advancement of CT) and “globotics” (i.e., a combination of globalization and
a new form of robotics by the advancement of IT such as artificial intelligence)
characterize the third unbundling (Baldwin 2019). Baldwin (2016a) calls the third
unbundling “future globalization.”
The trend of globalization after 2000 can be seen by comparing bilateral trade
in the world between 2000 and a recent year (2017). Figures1.1 and 1.2 show the
amount of bilateral trade in 2000 and 2017, respectively (Ministry of Economy,
Trade, and Industry (METI) 2019). Comparing these two figures, the changes in the
2 For details of traditional international trade theory, see the standard textbooks on international
economics such as Dixit and Norman (1980) and Feenstra (2016).
3 Venables (1999) and Deardorff (2001) also analyze fragmentation theoretically. Kimura and Ando
(2003, 2005) provide empirical evidence on fragmentation.
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Fig. 1.1 Bilateral trade accounting for over 0.1% of the value of global trade (2000). Notes: This
figure is created from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. Trade between Hong Kong and other
countries is excluded. Source: METI (2019), Fig. II–1–1–1–9
Fig. 1.2 Bilateral trade accounting for over 0.1% of the value of global trade (2017). Notes: This
figure is created from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. Trade between Hong Kong and other
countries is excluded. Source: METI (2019), Fig. II–1–1–1–10
hub countries of bilateral trade within eighteen years are significant. In the figures,
countries in a blue and red circle are a developed and an emerging/developing country,
respectively. A red-filled circle represents bilateral trade that accounts for over 0.1%
of global trade, and it exceeds $1 trillion in total. A blue-filled circle represents
bilateral trade, and it exceeds $500 billion in total, and a green-filled circle represents
bilateral trade, and it exceeds $100 billion. Blue lines indicate ties between developed
countries, red lines represent ties between emerging/developing countries, and green
lines ties between developed and emerging developing countries. The thickness of
lines between two countries represents the size of the total trade amount on a scale,
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from the thickest to the thinnest, of (1) over $200 billion, (2) over $100 billion, (3)
over $50 billion, and (4) below $50 billion.
From the figures we can observe the following five transitions (METI 2019):
(1) The number of large-scale bilateral trades between emerging and developing
countries around China expanded, and the trade in itself greatly increased in
amount.
(2) The network of bilateral trade in the East Asian region became dense, and the
trade simultaneously increased in amount. Particularly, Vietnam was a rising
country in trade.
(3) The number of large-scale trade and the amount of trade within the European
Union (EU) expanded.
(4) The center of trade in the East Asian region moved from Japan to China.
(5) Economic linkage between the East Asian region and the North American region
strengthened.
We next turn to the issue of trade policy in the progress of globalization. Deardorff
and Stern (2002) argue that both steady increases in international trade and inter-
national capital flows in the second half of the twentieth century, which are much
of what has come to be called globalization, were caused by technology and policy.
Baldwin’s theory of unbundling mainly focuses on changes in technology. On the
other hand, policies that have enhanced both trade and investment are multilateral
trade liberalization through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/the
World Trade Organization (WTO) after World War II and the recent proliferation of
regional trade agreements (RTAs) from the mid-1990s.4
Baldwin (2016b) illustrates how countries have succeeded in liberalizing trade
through the GATT rounds of negotiations after World War II.5 Mainly, advanced
countries, such as the United States,Western European countries, and Japan, reduced
their import tariffs and non-tariff barriers until the start of the WTO in 1995. By
contrast, the trade negotiation at the Doha Round that started in 2001 has been dead-
locked. For the last two decades, little progress has been made on multilateral trade
liberalization at the WTO. Baldwin (2016b) argues that the most commonly cited
cause of the WTO’s difficulties is “the lost dominance of the advanced economies”
(p. 106). The share of major advanced countries in world imports declined due to the
rapid growth of emerging economies. At the same time, the sheer number of devel-
oping country members has shifted power in the WTO and made negotiations more
difficult. In addition, Baldwin argues that regionalism and unilateral tariff-cutting
by developing countries also created challenges to multilateral trade liberalization
4 The world trading rules under the GATT/WTO are mainly characterized by the principles of
reciprocity andnon-discrimination (Bagwell andStaiger 2002).A series of researchbyKyleBagwell
and Robert W. Staiger (e.g., Bagwell and Staiger 1999, 2002, 2005, 2010) illustrate how world
trade is governed by the rules of GATT/WTO. Whereas the formation of RTAs is permitted under
the GATTArticle XXIV, it essentially violates the non-discrimination principle of the GATT/WTO.
5 Eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations were held between 1947 and 1994: Geneva (1947),
Annecy (1949), Torquay (1950–1951), Geneva (1956), theDillonRound (1960–1961), theKennedy
Round (1964–1967), the Tokyo Round (1973–1979), and the Uruguay Round (1986–1994).
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through the WTO. RTAs involve tariff cutting that would otherwise have had to be
achieved through the WTO. Moreover, many of the new RTAs are “deep” in the
sense that “they went beyond tariff-cutting and included legally binding assurances
aimed at making signatories more business-friendly to trade and investment flows
from other signatories” (Baldwin 2016b, p. 107). On the other hand, an expansion
in offshoring from advanced economies opened a new pathway to industrialization
through joining an international production network and expanding the amount and
range of tasks performed (Baldwin 2016b). Since tariffs hinder rather than help
industrialization in this new development model, developing countries started to cut
their import tariffs unilaterally, independently of the WTO negotiations.
Because of the malfunctioning of the WTO in the 2000s for trade liberalization
and rule setting, RTAs have been playing amore important role in the world economy
than before.6 With regard to the impact of RTAs on bilateral trade, existing studies
have obtained very different estimates. Cipollina and Salvatici (2010) investigate
by a meta-analysis why the ex post measurements of the trade impact of RTAs are
volatile. For this research, they use 1,827 point estimates of the impact of RTAs on
bilateral trade from 85 studies (38 published journal articles and 47 working papers)
and runmeta-analysis regressions. After filtering out the publication impact and other
biases, they find a robust, positive trade impact of RTAs equivalent to an increase
in trade of around 40%. Since the estimates tend to become larger for more recent
years, they argue that the tendency could be a consequence of the recent evolution
from “shallow” to “deep” integration.
1.1.2 Global Firms and Production Networks in the East
Asian Region
For the last two decades, empirical studies on international trade have provided
evidence of firm heterogeneity in trade, as Melitz (2003) demonstrates theoretically
(e.g., Bernard and Jensen 1995, 1999; Bernard et al. 2007, 2009, 2012, 2018). A
6 There has been much debate over the issue of regionalism versus multilateralism. Originally, the
classic work by Viner (1950) demonstrates that, using the concepts of trade creation and trade
diversion, the formation of a customs union (CU) is not necessarily welfare-improving not only for
world welfare but also for member countries of the CU. Ohyama (1972) and Kemp andWan (1976)
show the possibility of forming a Pareto-improving CU by adjusting external tariffs and making
internal transfers—the Kemp-Wan-Ohyama theorem. Then, since the early 1990s the question of
the dynamic time-path has attracted great attention (Bhagwati 1992; Panagariya 1999). That is,
scholars have investigated whether RTAs under regionalism are, in the terminology of Bhagwati
(1991), “building blocks” or “stumbling blocks” to global free trade. Studies on this issue include
Aghion et al. (2007), Baldwin (1995), Freund (2000), Furusawa andKonishi (2007), Krishna (1998),
Mukunoki and Tachi (2006), Ornelas (2005), and Saggi and Yildiz (2010). However, because of the
stagnant negotiation at the WTO and the “deepened” nature of the recent RTAs, it seems that the
direction of the debate over the issue of regionalism versus multilateralism has changed, so that the
focus of research is on the more active role of RTAs. See Panagariya (2000), Freund and Ornelas
(2010), Maggi (2014), and Limão (2016) for surveys of the literature.
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large number of studies that employ micro data in many different countries have
suggested that “global firms” play a dominant role in each market. Bernard et al.
(2018) define “global firms” as “firms that participate in the international economy
alongmultiple margins and account for substantial share of aggregate trade” (p. 566).
Bernard et al. (2018) use US firm and trade transactions data and show that only
a subset of firms participate in international markets. These trading firms indicate
superior performance characteristics: they are larger and more productive than other
non-trading firms. Moreover, a large fraction of firms that export or import actually
engage in both exporting and importing. “More successful firms export more of each
product to each market, export more products to each market, export to more mar-
kets, import more of each product from each source country, import more products
from each source country, and import from more source countries” (Bernard et al.
2018, p. 607). Global firms are likely to be MNEs. Bernard et al. (2009) report that
US-based MNEs mediate more than 90% of US trade. Consistent with the model of
heterogeneous firms (Helpman et al. 2004), Yeaple (2009) shows that more produc-
tive US firms tend to own affiliates in a larger number of countries and that these
affiliates generate greater revenue from sales in their host economies.
Studies of Japanese firms have also provided evidence consistent with theories
of heterogeneous firms (e.g., Head and Ries 2003; Kimura and Kiyota 2006; Todo
2011; Wakasugi 2014; Wakasugi and Tanaka 2010, 2012). Thus, global firms are
likely to hold a dominant position in the globalized activities of Japanese firms. In
some of the chapters in this book, we employ micro data on Japanese firms and
focus on their globalized activities. Since Japanese MNEs play an important role in
production networks in East Asia, it is worth looking at the situation of the supply
networks in this region, as the background of the study.
According to METI (2019), about two thirds of annual intra-regional exports (of
raw materials, intermediate goods, and final goods) in East Asia from 2011 to 2017
were shared by intermediate goods, whereas their export ratios in the 1990s were a
little over one half. Annual intra-regional exports amounted to $1,400–1,600 billion
in 2011–2017, while they ranged between $170 and $400 billion in the 1990s.7
Both amount and ratio of intra-regional exports have increased greatly for the 1990–
2017 period. If we focus on the machinery industry in East Asia, in which the
international division of labor is most developed,8 the ratio of intermediate goods in
its intra-regional export during 1998–2017 was at 60–65% except for 2012, while its
ratio in 1990 was less than 50% (METI 2019).9 In contrast, the amount of its trade
increased rapidly from$40 billion in 1990 to about $830 billion in 2017. These results
unambiguously substantiate that the production network is formed in the machinery
industry in East Asia.
The system of typical international division of labor between the United States
(developed country) and Mexico (developing country) focusing on intra-firm trans-
7 See Fig. II–1–1–1–15 in METI (2019).
8 Machinery industry includes general machinery, electric machinery, electric householdmachinery
and equipment, transportation machinery, and precision machinery.
9 See Fig. II–1–1–1–15 in METI (2019).
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actions was established by around the year 1990 (Ando andKimura 2014). Later, this
system developed into the one including East Asia in the machinery industry (mainly
electrical and electronic sectors): parts and intermediated goods are exported from
East Asia to Mexico, and then final goods and parts that are manufactured in Mexico
are exported to theUnited States and Canada. After the Central and Eastern European
countries—such as Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania—
became EU members in the fifth enlargement of the EU, industrial clusters were
accelerated in these countries. As a result, the supply of machinery parts and inter-
mediates from East Asia rapidly expanded (Ando and Kimura 2013). Among others,
the import of electrical and electronic parts and intermediates increased remarkably.
The production network between the EU and East Asia was consolidated via the Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries (Ando and Kimura 2013). These countries have
an active role as a catalyst, like Mexico in North America. The fact that East Asia is
deeply related to the other two global production networks attracts our interest.
The enlargement of production networks in a region makes it possible to supply
goods efficiently, while it may make the supply of goods vulnerable to shocks. In
fact, it has been shown that production networks in East Asia are relatively resilient
to severe shocks (Ando and Kimura 2012; Obashi 2011; Todo et al. 2015).10 Specifi-
cally,Ando andKimura (2012) analyze the impact of the 2008–2009Global Financial
Crisis and of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake on Japanese exports, focusing
on the characteristics of domestic/international production networks in machinery
industries. They show that these two massive shocks generated common and differ-
ent adjustments in production networks and trade. In the face of such severe shocks,
trade within the production networks of machinery final products and other prod-
ucts demonstrates distinctive stability and resiliency. However, the magnitude and
duration of the shocks were fairly different: the impact of the Financial Crisis was
huge and prolonged, whereas that of the Japan Earthquake was much smaller and
more temporary. They argue that the cause of such a difference is that the Financial
Crisis was primarily a demand shock in the US and EU markets, while the Japan
Earthquake was a supply shock due to the destruction of production plants in the
impacted area.
The effects of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake on supply chain networks
within Japan are examined by Todo et al. (2015).11 Using firm-level data, they show
that extensive supply chain networks are not always harmful to disaster recovery.
10 The production networks in East Asia may also be resilient to shocks caused by pandemics.
Early assessments of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on international production networks
and global value chains include Ando (2021), Espitia et al. (2021), and Hayakawa and Mukunoki
(2021).
11 With regard to the macroeconomic impact of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, see, for
example, Carvalho et al. (2021). They quantify the role of input-output linkages as a mechanism for
the propagation and amplification of shocks. According to their estimates, the earthquake resulted
in a 3.8% point decline in the growth rate of firms with disaster-hit suppliers and a 3.1% point
decline in that of firms with disaster-hit customers. Then, using a general equilibrium model of
production networks, they estimate that the disaster resulted in a 0.47% point decline in Japan’s
real GDP growth in the year after the earthquake.
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More specifically, they find that having more suppliers and customers outside of the
disaster area tends to shorten the recovery time, though it affects sales growth in
the medium term only weakly. By contrast, having more suppliers and customers in
the disaster area has no effect on the recovery time but tends to improve medium-
term sales growth. In addition, they identify a negative effect from supply chains
on recovery through the disruption of supply and demand and two positive effects
through support and substitution. Overall, they conclude that the positive effects from
extensive supply networks typically outweigh the negative effects, resulting in a net
positive effect. Moreover, Obashi (2011) investigates the resilience of international
production network in the Asian region to the 1997–1998 Asian Currency Crisis.
She conducts a series of survival analyses and finds that transactions of machinery
parts and components within the production network are more likely to be stable and
resilient to a temporary disruption, compared to transactions of finished products.
More specifically, during theAsianCurrencyCrisis,machinery parts and components
were more likely to be traded through long-lived trade relationships than finished
products. Besides, many of the trade relationships for machinery parts and compo-
nents were restored shortly after the break caused by the Asian Currency Crisis, as
compared to those for finished products.
1.1.3 Innovation and Diffusion of Knowledge
It is Joseph A. Schumpeter (1883–1950) who first asserted the importance of inno-
vation for economic development in industrial society. These days, it is well rec-
ognized that innovation has a significant influence on the rise and fall of an enter-
prise. After his assertion, it has been extensively investigated and discussed in the
literature whether firm size and market power have an effect on firm innovation.
Schumpeter (1942) argued that a large-scale establishment is the most powerful
engine of progress and that firms in concentrated markets have a stronger incentive
to invest in innovation. Many theoretical and empirical studies have explored the
relationship between market structure and innovation. Specifically, the Schumpete-
rian endogenous growth models, the pioneering work of which is Aghion and Howitt
(1992), formalize Schumpeter’s argument. In contrast to the Schumpeterian theory,
Arrow (1962) argues that a firm’s gains from innovation at the margin are larger
in an industry that is more competitive ex ante. Assuming that property rights over
invention are fully protected, he shows that a monopolist that is not exposed to com-
petition under both old and new technologies has less incentive to invest in research
and development (R&D) for a process innovation than does a firm in a competitive
sector. Blundell et al. (1999) examine the relationship between a firm’s ex antemarket
power and innovation and find that the market share has a positive effect on innova-
tion, whereas that of overall market concentration is negative, suggesting that, while
a higher market share stimulates innovation, concentrated industries may innovate
less. Many other empirical studies find a positive relationship between competition
10 1 Introduction and Overview
and innovation.12 To reconcile the Schumpeterian theory with empirical evidence,
Aghion et al. (2005) develop a simple model in which competition discourages lag-
gard firms from innovating but encourages neck-and-neck firms in innovating and
derive an inverted-U shaped relationship between competition and innovation. They
provide strong empirical support for their theory using data on publicly listed man-
ufacturing firms in the United Kingdom. In contrast, Hashmi (2013) finds evidence
of a mildly negative relationship between competition and innovation from the US
data. He modifies the model of Aghion et al. (2005) in such a way that the aver-
age technology gap is higher in the country where the relationship is negative and
then show that the modified model can explain both negative and inverted-U shaped
relationships. Some empirical studies provide evidence to support the Schumpeter’s
hypothesis more strongly. For example, focusing on publicly traded US industrial
firms in the 1910s and 1920s, Nicholas (2003) finds that both firm size and market
power have significantly positive effects on patenting and, moreover, that financial
markets reward firms for their innovative behavior with increasing their market val-
ues. He shows that all of these effects worked strongly during the 1920s.
Innovation is one of the important sources of competitive advantage for global
firms (e.g., Aw et al. 2011; Atkeson and Burstein 2010; Costantini and Melitz 2008).
Those firms make enormous investments in R&D. Then, both global firms and
other firms benefit from diffusion of knowledge (Keller and Yeaple 2013; Sampson
2016). A large number of existing studies have shown that even for highly advanced
economies like the United States, the outcomes of R&D in foreign countries play an
important role in its own technical progress. Most of the other countries in the world
are far more dependent on foreign R&D (Sveikauskas 2007). Therefore, innovation
and diffusion of knowledge are both strongly related to globalization.
A commonmeasure of the state of innovation is the number of patent applications.
Patent applications worldwide were 3.224 million in 2019 (World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization (WIPO) 2020). A breakdown of the total applications by country
is as follows: China was top-ranked, with 1.4 million applications and a 43.4% share
of the world total, followed by the United States (0.621 million, 19.3%), and Japan
(0.308 million, 9.6%). China’s share has increased considerably over the last decade
from 17% in 2009 to 43.4% in 2019. Although Japan’s share has decreased from
18.8% in 2009 to 9.6% in 2019, Japan is still ranked in the top three.
In terms of the share of patent applications by region, Asia accounts for 65.0%
(50.9%) in 2019 (2009), followed by North America 20.4% (26.6%), and Europe
11.3% (17.4%) (WIPO, 2020). Over the past 10 years, Asia’s share increased greatly
by 14% points, whereas those of North America and Europe decreased by 6.2%
points and 6% points, respectively. The main factor in the increase in Asia is an
increase in the number of the applications in China in this period.
Furthermore, among 35 technology fields the largest share in the total of published
patent applications worldwide in 2017 (3.199 million) was computer technology
(7.3%), followed by electrical machinery/apparatus/energy (6.7%), measurement
12 See Gilbert (2006) and Cohen (2010) for detailed surveys of the literature.
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technology (5.1%), and medical technology (4.6%): the first two of these are in the
field of electrical engineering and the other two are in the field of instruments.
The effects of R&D on firms themselves and on the economy in general can be
measured by the returns onR&D.There have beenmany empirical studies to estimate
the private and social returns on R&D. Sveikauskas (2007) reviews the estimates of
the private and social returns on R&D shown in the previous studies. The private
return on R&D has generally been estimated by comparing productivity growth or
profitability in different firms with R&D expenditures or the growth of the research
stock within these firms (Sveikauskas 2007). On the other hand, in order to estimate
the returns to an industry or a national economy or even the returns to the world
economy, the spillover effects of R&D and complementary investments have to be
taken into account (Sveikauskas 2007). An example of complementary investment is
that when a new computer is introduced, purchasing firms must deploy considerable
resources to use the new equipment effectively. According to Sveikauskas (2007),
the estimates of the private return on R&D in the previous studies range from 10% to
43%, whereas those of the social return range from 11% to 147%. He concludes that
the private returns of 25% and the social returns of 65% seem reasonable. Since the
social rates of returns include returns due to spillovers of knowledge in addition to
private returns, the estimates become two or three times as large as the private rates
of returns.13
Spillover channels of R&D performance are various. They are, for example, dis-
closure of patents, reverse engineering of newly developed products, movements of
researchers and technical experts among organizations, research exchanges among
them, industrial espionage, outsourcing, FDI, and so on.14
Twomajor channels of international diffusion of knowledge are international trade
and FDI (Keller 2004, 2010). A number of studies confirm significant spillovers of
knowledge through trade, but the empirical findings on spillover effects through
FDI vary substantially. Spillovers of knowledge from foreign investors to local firms
in the same sector are called horizontal spillovers, while knowledge spillovers from
foreign investors to local firms in upstream and downstream sectors are called vertical
spillovers. A large number of existing studies show that vertical spillovers from FDI
tend to be positive and large, whereas horizontal ones from FDI are almost negligible
(Keller 2004). However, the results vary substantially across countries, sectors, and
estimation methods.15 Therefore, spillovers from FDI have attracted great attention
from economists, and a number of studies using meta-analysis approaches have been
13 Two recent studies (Neves and Sequeira 2018; Ugur et al. 2020), both of which conduct meta-
analysis regressions, provide somewhat conflicting results. The former finds that the average
spillover effect is high (less than but close to one) and highly significant, whereas the latter shows
that the average spillover effect is positive but heterogeneous and usually smaller than the own-
R&D effect. Thus, it seems that the magnitude and significance of the spillover effect should be
investigated.
14 Patents excluding secret patents disclose their technology information after their application:
although secret patents have already been introduced in many developed countries, their contents
are not disclosed within a certain period of time to keep their technology information secret.
15 See Murakami and Otsuka (2020) for a recent survey of the literature on spillovers from FDI.
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conducted to figure out what factors cause differences in estimates (Görg and Strobl
2001; Havránek and Iršová 2011; Iršová and Havránek 2013; Meyer and Sinani
2009). With regard to horizontal spillovers, Iršová and Havránek (2013) find that
investments through joint ventures between foreign investors and domestic firms
tend to bring more positive spillovers than full foreign-ownership ones. The degree
of technology gap is also important. They find that spillovers get smaller when the
technology gap between foreign investors and domestic firms is too large. Moreover,
Meyer and Sinani (2009) show that horizontal spillovers are related to a U-shaped
form to the host economy’s level of development in terms of income, institutional
framework, and human capital. As for vertical spillovers, Havránek and Iršová (2011)
find that spillovers tend to be larger for host economies open to international trade
and underdeveloped financial systems. In addition, greater spillovers seem to be
generated by FDI from more distant countries with slight technological advantages
over domestic firms.
The majority of the existing empirical studies on international diffusion of knowl-
edge have analyzed the spillover effects of foreign knowledge on the productivity
of domestic firms, but there is another type of equally important spillover effect.
That is, the R&D activities of some firms or researchers may benefit from spillovers
of knowledge that originated from innovation or the outcomes of R&D by other
firms or researchers. To distinguish these two types of spillover effects, we call the
former type “international productivity spillovers” and the latter type “international
technology spillovers.”16 Although both types of spillovers capture flows of knowl-
edge across countries, the exact effects differ. In this book we focus on the latter
type. In the industrial organization literature, there are a large number of theoreti-
cal studies on the latter type of spillover among firms located in the same country
(e.g., d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988; Haruna and Goel 2017; Kamien et al. 1992;
Leahy and Neary 1997; Suzumura 1992). Moreover, theoretical studies on interna-
tional technology spillovers and policies to address these spillovers include Goel and
Haruna (2011), Haruna and Goel (2015), Leahy and Neary (1999), Neary and Leahy
(2000), Neary and O’Sullivan (1999), and Qiu and Tao (1998). As we will explain
in Chaps. 5–7, there are a number of existing empirical studies that investigate inter-
national technology spillovers, such as Branstetter (2006), Cappelli and Montobbio
(2020), Haruna et al. (2010), Hu and Jaffe (2003), Jinji et al. (2013, 2015, 2019a),
Li (2014), MacGarvie (2006), Mancusi (2008), Peri (2005), and Singh (2007).
1.2 Overview of the Book
In this book we explore interactions among deep integration, global firms, and tech-
nology spillovers. The structure of the book is as follows. In Chap. 2 we illustrate
16 In the literature the latter type is often called international R&D spillovers, but sometimes the
same term is used for the former type as well. Therefore, we use the term “international technology
spillovers” rather than international R&D spillovers for the latter type.
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the trend of regional trade integration by distinguishing deep integration from shal-
low one. We clarify what deep regional integration means and discuss how we can
measure shallow and deep integration.
In Chaps. 3 and 4 we focus on the behavior of global firms using micro data
on Japanese MNEs. Specifically, we empirically investigate how firm performance,
such as productivity and Tobin’s q, affects the choice of globalization mode. As for
the modes of globalization, we consider export, FDI, and foreign outsourcing (FO).
In Chaps. 5 and 6, we examine the relationship between global firms and technol-
ogy spillovers. Specifically, we consider how trade patterns influence technology
spillovers among countries/regions in Chap.5. First of all, trade patterns can be clas-
sified into one-way trade (OWT or inter-industry trade) and two-way trade (or intra-
industry trade: IIT). IIT is, furthermore, decomposed into horizontal intra-industry
trade (HIIT) and vertical intra-industry trade (VIIT). These trade patterns arise from
the behavior of heterogeneous firms. On the other hand, technology spillovers among
countries/regions aremeasured by citations of patents. Aswewill explain later, patent
citation data are used as a direct measure of technology spillovers (Hall et al. 2001).
Chapter 6 is devoted to the analysis of how FDI promotes technology spillovers.
Employing detailed data on Japanese MNEs and their foreign affiliates, we measure
the types of FDI (i.e., vertical and horizontal FDI). Then,we examine howdifferences
in the types of FDI affect the degree of technology spillovers between JapaneseMNEs
and their host economies. Again, we utilize patent citation data.
Finally, we analyze the relationship between deep integration and technology
spillovers in Chap.7. Deep RTAs include a number of provisions that may directly
affect flows of knowledge among countries/regions. We examine which aspects of
deep integration contribute to enhance technology spillovers among members of
RTAs.
To consider how deep integration facilitates technology spillovers, we need to take
various channels of technology spillovers into consideration. Deep integration stim-
ulates globalized activities of firms in a number of ways, which facilitates technology
spillovers through various channels. For example, as for international trade, firms can
obtain the necessary technology information from imported goods by dismantling
them and making imitations. Moreover, when enterprises establish their operations
overseas, this causes the transfer of production and business management technol-
ogy to local enterprises in the host country. Experts, employees, and managers that
are locally hired by the enterprises make their technologies, know-how, and knowl-
edge with respect to their production and process management diffuse through their
movements. In contrast, offshoring creates more direct diffusion of technological
information. A representative example of offshoring is electronics manufacturing
services (EMS) in Taiwan. In recent years, the number of firms without fabrica-
tion facilities (“fabless companies”) has increased. They specialize their activities in
the design, development, and sales of products, and outsource their manufacturing.
Apple Inc., which commissions themanufacturing of iPhone to enterprises in Taiwan
and China, is one of the well-known fabless enterprises. Local enterprises overseas
can acquire and accumulate information on the content and ways of manufacturing
products through such commissioning.
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Chapter 8 concludes and provides policy implications. Furthermore, it discusses
some issues for future research in connection with this book.
Let us now look at each of these chapters in more detail.
Chapter 2 “The Trend of Deep Regional Integration”
The main purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the current trend of regional trade
integration by distinguishing deep integration from shallow one and to shed light on
the causes and impacts of recent deep regional integration. We explain what shallow
and deep RTAs mean and why countries have recently pursued deep integration.
Next, we argue how we can measure the degree of deep RTAs and what data are
available to analyze the content and effects of deep RTAs. Moreover, we examine the
state of deep RTAs in the world generally and in the Asia-Pacific region specifically.
The concept of shallow and deep integration is originally proposed by Lawrence
(1996). Shallow integration is simply trade liberalization involving the removal of
trade barriers. By contrast, deep integration “moves beyond the removal of border
barriers” (Lawrence 1996, p. 8). Deep RTAs contain a variety of provisions including
those on investment, labor, the environment, and intellectual property rights (IPR).
Horn et al. (2010) identify 52 policy areas covered by RTAs and classify them
into two groups, i.e., WTO-plus (WTO+) and WTO-extra (WTO–X). The WTO+
group includes 14 provisions and theWTO-X group includes 38 ones. Limão (2016)
recategorizes the WTO+ and WTO–X policy areas from the viewpoints of the depth
and breadth of RTAs. The depth of RTAs measures the degree of bilateral economic
cooperation. As for the definition of the depth of an RTA, he proposes that the depth
of RTAs is measured by four categories of policy areas in the WTO+ and WTO–
X groups: (a) import tariffs, (b) non-tariff barriers (NTBs), (c) behind-the-border
policies (BBPs), and (d) other policies (OPs). On the other hand, the breadth of RTAs
measures how wide the coverage of policy areas is. Policy areas are classified by (i)
the type of trade (goods/services), (ii) technology (innovation/spillovers/IPR), and
(iii) factors of production (capital/labor). As the definition of the breadth of an RTA,
he proposes that the breadth of RTAs is measured by five categories: (a) services, (b)
technology, (c) investment/capital, (d) labor, and (e) non-economic policies (NEPs).
We examine the characteristics of deep RTAs in the Asia-Pacific region. The
contents of RTAs signed by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries, China and Japan are fairly different in their depth and breadth. Specifically,
there are significant differences in the NTB and BBP areas in the depth measure and
in the investment/capital and labor provisions in the breadth one. The degree of deep
RTAs in the Asia-Pacific region is still not so high in both the OPs in the depth
measure and the NEPs in the breadth one, compared with those in OP areas.
Chapter 3 “Which Aspect of Firm Performance is Important for the Choice of
Globalization Mode?”
In this chapter we attempt to compare the effects of various measures of firm per-
formance on firms’ globalization activities. Japanese firm-level data (covering the
period 1994–1999) are used. Information on corporate balance sheets and patent
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applications are included in the data. Then, following Jinji et al. (2019b), we esti-
mate the degree of engagement in each globalization mode by calculating the ratio of
amode of globalization activities such as export, FDI, and FO to the domestic sales of
headquarters companies. Besides, we estimate the relative choice of the globalization
mode by taking the ratio of the volume of direct export by the headquarters company
to FDI (i.e., sales of foreign affiliates) and the ratio of costs of FO to FDI. As the
measures of firm performance, we use three variables. First, labor productivity (LP)
is used as a measure of productivity. Further, we employ two measures to capture the
importance of the knowledge-capital intensity: one measure, as the second variable,
is Tobin’s q (Tobin 1969) estimated by a simple approximation version; and the other,
as the third variable, is the intangible asset intensity, which is the ratio of intangible
to tangible assets. Intangible assets include patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade
names, goodwill, and other items that lack physical substance and provide long-term
benefits to the company. By using the stock of patent applications as a direct measure
of intangible assets we regress the indexes of a firm’s choice of globalization mode
on these variables.
By using Japanese firm-level data, we investigate empirically which measure of
performance is important when a firm chooses one from various modes of globaliza-
tion activity. As a result, it is found that an increase in LP or Tobin’s q motivates a
firm to engage in export and FDI more, but does not enhance the engagement in FO.
Secondly, it is found by using quantile regression that a difference in LP is important
to a choice between exporting and FDI, but not to a choice between FDI and FO. In
contrast, a difference in Tobin’s q is important to a choice between FDI and FO, but
not to the one between exporting and FDI. Interestingly, a difference in the intangible
asset intensity is important to a choice between exporting and FDI as well as to the
one between FDI and FO.
Chapter 4 “Does Tobin’s qMatter for a Firm Choice of Globalization Mode?”
Previous theoretical research on the relationship between the productivities of firms
and their globalization modes includes, for example, the following: Melitz (2003)
presents a model in which the most productive firms export goods to foreign mar-
kets, whereas less productive firms supply goods only to their domestic market; and
Helpman et al. (2004) extend the framework of Melitz and predict that only the most
productive firms find it profitable to serve foreign markets via FDI and that medium
productivity firms serve foreign markets through exports (the HMY prediction).
We attempt to sort firms into three modes of globalization by Tobin’s q (Tobin
1969). Our study is motivated by a theoretical analysis by Chen et al. (2012), who
examine how the relative importance of knowledge capital over physical capital
affects a firm’s choice between FDI and FO for offshore production. They then show
that firms with a higher physical-capital intensity tend to choose FO, whereas firms
with a higher knowledge-capital intensity tend to conduct FDI.An interesting testable
hypothesis is obtained from this result: firms with a high Tobin’s q tend to conduct
FDI, whereas firms with a low Tobin’s q tend to choose FO (the CHM hypothesis).
Given that the book value of capital reflects only physical assets, a firm with a higher
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knowledge-capital intensity will have a higher Tobin’s q, because the firm’s market
value reflects both knowledge-based and physical assets.
We employ detailed Japanese firm-level data (covering the period 1994–1999) to
sort firms into threemodes of globalization byTobin’sq. The data include information
on sales, employment, capital, R&Dexpenditure, direct exports, the costs of domestic
production and FO of the companies headquartered in Japan, and the sales of their
foreign affiliates. Corporate balance sheet data are also included. The advantage
of the data over previous studies allows us to recognize not only whether a firm
engages in a particular globalization activity among exports, FDI, and FO, but also
the extent to which it is involved in that activity. By utilizing the feature of the data,
we construct indexes to measure the relative choice of globalization mode through
calculating both ratios of the costs of FO to the total FDI and of the volume of
direct exports by the headquarters company to horizontal FDI. We then regress these
indexes of globalization activity on Tobin’s q, of which measurement is based on the
simple approximation proposed. To demonstrate how sorted patterns by Tobin’s q are
different from those by a firm’s productivity, we regress the indexes of globalization
activity on the total factor productivity (TFP) of each individual firm. Our analysis
focuses mainly on firms engaging in multiple globalization modes and attempts to
reveal whether Tobin’s q (and TFP) motivates the firms to select more FDI relative
to FO or exports.
The main findings are as follows. Both quantile and endogenous quantile regres-
sions indicate that an increase in Tobin’s q significantly reduces the ratio of FO to the
total FDI across different quantiles, which strongly supports the CHM hypothesis
that an MNE reduces its ratio of FO to FDI, as Tobin’s q increases. Besides, Tobin’s
q has a positive effect on the ratio of exports to horizontal FDI at some quantiles,
but is not strong. This implies that the imperfect contractibility of knowledge cap-
ital and a higher cost of technology transfer actually matter for knowledge-capital
intensive firms. These effects of Tobin’s q on a firm’s choice of globalization mode
are apparently different from those of TFP. An increase in TFP motivates a firm to
enhance its engagement in horizontal FDI relative to exports, which supports the
HMY prediction and concurs with existing empirical findings, but a difference in
TFP does not significantly affect the choice of a firm between FDI and outsourcing.
Chapter 5 “Trade Patterns and International Technology Spillovers: Theory
and Evidence from Japanese and European Patent Citations”
The international trade of goods and services is considered to be a major channel
of technology spillovers. A simple explanation for this is that firms in an importing
country can obtain information on advanced technology by, for example, reverse
engineering of imported goods, patent information, and the movement of business
persons. However, the relationship between bilateral trade patterns (such as inter-
industry and intra-industry trade) and international technology spillovers has received
little attention in the literature. It is intuitively conceivable that the flow of interna-
tional knowledge could be different, depending on whether a good is only imported,
exported, or both imported and exported. We have a look at the relationship between
trade patterns and technology spillovers. It is worth considering the relationship from
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a theoretical point of view. To address this issue, we develop a two-country model
of monopolistic competition with quality differentiation, in which inter- and intra-
industry trade patterns endogenously arise. Our model is an extension of Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008). It is assumed that firms randomly draw their product quality and
hence are heterogeneous in product quality even if their productivity is identical. We
investigate how technology spillovers are associated with trade patterns.
One theoretical feature of our model is that it can explain OWT, HIIT, and VIIT in
a unified framework. Then our framework can provide the three testable hypotheses:
the first hypothesis is that technology spillovers are larger when the trade pattern
between the two countries is HIIT than when it is VIIT; the second one is whether
or not technology spillovers from the country exporting higher quality products to
that exporting lower quality ones are larger than those in the opposite direction
is ambiguous when the trade pattern is VIIT; and the third one is that technology
spillovers are lower when the trade pattern is inter-industry trade (i.e., OWT) than
when it is VIIT.
Secondly, we empirically examine whether the three hypotheses theoretically
derived hold. Our empirical analysis in this chapter complements Jinji et al. (2015):
we use patent citation data at Japanese and European patent offices, whereas Jinji
et al. (2015) employ US patent data. Our estimation results basically confirm the
predictions of our theoretical model. An increase in the shares of HIIT and VIIT
has a significantly positive effect on international technology spillovers. In addition,
HIIT has a larger effect on them than VIIT does. In contrast, the relative magnitudes
of technology spillovers between the country exporting high quality products and
the country exporting low quality ones under VIIT are generally ambiguous. It is
derived that the effect of OWT on technology spillovers tends to be much weaker
than that of other trade patterns. Finally, we concluded that intra-industry trade plays
a significant role in technology spillovers.
Chapter 6 “Vertical versus Horizontal Foreign Direct Investment and Technol-
ogy Spillovers”
In this chapter we attempt to identify how MNEs’ activities in terms of horizontal
and vertical FDI affect technology spillovers between themselves and host countries.
Then, we combine the Japanese firm-level data on the business activities of Japanese
MNEs’ foreign affiliates and the data on the patent citations at the US patent office
betweenMNEs and their host countries.We nowdefine ameasure of “pure horizontal
FDI” as the extent to which affiliates’ purchases of intermediate inputs and sales of
final goods are concentrated in the local market and a measure of “pure vertical FDI”
as the extent to which their purchases of intermediate inputs and sales of final goods
are linked to the home country. We then estimate how the two types of FDI affect
both technology spillovers from Japanese MNEs to the host country and from the
host country to them by utilizing a negative binomial model. Moreover, to deal with
a potential endogeneity problem we employ an endogenous switching model.
We obtain interesting results concerning technology spillovers under vertical and
horizontal FDI through empirical analysis. First, an increase in the degree of pure
vertical FDI has significantly positive effects on technology spillovers captured by
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patent citations when technologically advanced economies host Japanese MNEs
(call this “result V”). Technology spillovers occur in both directions between the
MNEs and their host countries. These positive effects of pure vertical FDI on them
are robust for different specifications, and partially vertical FDI has significantly
positive effects on technology spillovers from the (high-income) host countries to
the MNEs. By contrast, an increase in the degree of pure horizontal FDI has no
significant effects or significantly negative effects on technology spillovers between
the MNEs and their host countries (call this “result H”). Partially horizontal FDI
has significantly positive effects on them from the MNEs to the (high-income) host
countries, but this result is not robust for different estimations. It is concluded from
these results that pure vertical FDI plays a dominant role in the technology spillovers
in both directions between the MNEs and the high-income host countries.
To explain the observed results between the structure of FDI and technology
spillovers, we develop a simple partial-equilibrium model of FDI and technology
spillovers among developed countries, in which differentiated goods are produced in
three stages. The market is characterized by monopolistic competition. Depending
on parameter values, firms may have an incentive to engage in horizontal or vertical
FDI.Given the same factor costs in the two countries, there is no possibility of vertical
FDI in the usual sense. However, vertical FDI does occur if there are technology gaps
in some production stages between the countries and if firms can take advantage of
the superior technology of the foreign country by fragmenting its production process
and conducting some intermediate production in the foreign country. This explains
result V observed in the empirical analysis. The technology gaps are the source of
technology spillovers through FDI. Technology spillovers may occur in one way or
two ways if firms engage in vertical FDI, depending on how the three production
stages are located in the two countries. It is also shown that horizontal FDI does not
necessarily induce technology spillovers, because it is mainly motivated by saving
transportation costs and appears even in the absence of technological difference. This
result corresponds with result H.
Chapter 7 “Do Deep Regional Trade Agreements Enhance International Tech-
nology Spillovers?: Depth, Breadth, and Heterogeneity”
A rapid proliferation of RTAs has been observed during the last two decades. RTAs
are primarily aimed at expanding trade in goods by reducing tariffs on imports and
removing non-tariff barriers, but many recent RTAs pursue deeper integration, and
include liberalization of investment and harmonization of IPR protection policy. It
seems that RTAs affect the diffusion of knowledge (i.e., technology spillovers) across
countries. We empirically investigate this issue.
We use patent citation data as a proxy for technology spillovers. Previous research
shows that technology spilloversmeasured by patent citations decrease as geographi-
cal distance extends, but has paid little attention to the effects of “economic distance”
on the localization of technology spillovers. Economic distance is a measure of prox-
imity between two locations in an economic sense, which is affected by not only
geographical distance but also other factors such as membership of RTAs, infras-
tructure, a transportation mode, and public policy. A given geographical distance
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between two countries (or regions) is constant, although the economic distance can
vary, depending on such factors. Therefore, economic distance seems to be more
meaningful to a measurement of technology spillovers than geographical distance.
In particular, the membership of the same RTA or any other organization to facilitate
international trade of goods will affect the economic distance between two countries
and be of importance for the localization of technology spillovers.
Peri (2005) and Jinji et al. (2019a) have investigated the effects of RTAs on tech-
nology spillovers. Using a sample of 18 countries with 147 subnational regions in
Western Europe and North America for the period of 1975–1996, Peri (2005) esti-
mates a gravity-like model to examine the effects of several resistance factors on
patent citations. He shows that regional, national, and linguistic borders have a sig-
nificantly negative effect on technology spillovers, whereas the effect of “trade blocs”
on them is insignificant. By contrast, Jinji et al. (2019a) find a significantly positive
effect of RTAs on technology spillovers for the sample of 114 countries/regions
during 1991–2007.
In comparison to these studies, we conduct a more comprehensive analysis of
the effects of RTAs on technology spillovers by extending the sample to 243 coun-
tries/regions and the coverage of RTAs to 110. Specifically, we extend the research
of Jinji et al. (2019a). For example, we construct a panel for 11,667 pairs of the citing
and cited countries/regions from the sample of 243 countries/regions for 25 years
from 1991 to 2015 by patent application and citation data from the US patent office.
We focus both on the impacts of the depth and breadth of RTAs and the heteroge-
neous effects of individual RTAs on international technology spillovers. With regard
to the depth of RTAs, we use indexes in the areas of tariffs, NTBs, BBPs, and OPs.
As for the breadth of RTAs, we construct indexes for services, technology, invest-
ment/capital, labor, and NEP areas. On the other hand, the heterogeneous effects of
individual RTAs are captured by various RTA dummies. In addition to the usual RTA
dummy, we use separate dummy variables for RTAs signed by the United States and
European countries, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU), RTAs with the United States,
and FTAs with the EC/EU.
The main findings are as follows. First, we confirm the result of Jinji et al. (2019a)
that RTAs increase international technology spillovers measured by bilateral patent
citations. Second, we demonstrate that deep RTAs with higher coverage of policy
areas in the depth categories and those with higher coverage of policy areas in the
breadth categories both have positive effects on international technology spillovers.
Third, we show that the NAFTA has a strongly positive effect on such spillovers in
comparison with the effects of the EU and EU enlargement.
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Chapter 2
The Trend of Deep Regional Integration
2.1 Introduction
The last quarter century until around 2016 has witnessed “unprecedented trade inte-
gration” (Baier et al. 2019) in the world. There has been a rapid proliferation of
regional trade agreements (RTAs). Figure2.1 shows the evolution of RTAs in the
world since the World War II. The red bar indicates the number of RTAs in force
notified to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in each year and the gray bar indicates the number of inactive
RTAs notified to the GATT/WTO in each year. Moreover, the gray line indicates the
cumulative notifications of RTAs in force and inactive RTAs, the red line the cumula-
tive notifications of RTAs in force, and the black line the cumulative number of RTAs
in force. For any of these indexes to show the evolution of RTAs, it is evident that a
proliferation of RTAs started around 1992. More than 15 new RTAs were notified to
theWTO each year. More than 35 new RTAs were notified to theWTO in 2009 when
their number peaked. The high level of the proliferation had been maintained until
2015, but the momentum seemed to be paused from 2016 to 2020. The main causes
of the momentary pause are the anti-globalization sentiment in many countries and
the implementation of protectionism policies by the Trump Administration in the
United States and other countries (Jinji 2021). Moreover, since 2020 the COVID-19
pandemic may have affected the momentum of globalization.
The unprecedented trade integration over the last quarter century involved not
only a rapid increase in the number of RTAs but also the “deepened” and “widened”
nature of trade integration (World Trade Organization (WTO) 2011). As one of the
stylized facts about RTAs,WTO (2011) points out that the coverage of RTAs in terms
of policy areas has been deepened and widened over time. That is, many of the recent
RTAs go beyond traditional tariff-cutting and include awide array of non-tariff policy
areas, both at the border and behind-the-border, such as services trade, investment,
labor market regulation, intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, and technical
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Fig. 2.1 Evolution of RTAs in the World, 1948–2021. Notes: Notifications of RTAs: goods, ser-
vices and accessions to an RTA are counted separately. The cumulative lines show the number of
RTAs/notifications that were in force for a given year. The notifications of RTAs in force are shown
by year of entry into force and the notifications of inactive RTAs are shown by inactive year. Source:
RTA Section, World Trade Organization Secretariat
barriers to trade. For example, according to WTO (2011), about one third of RTAs
in force in the 2000s contain services commitments, compared to less than a tenth
in 1990.
The main purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the current trend of regional
integration in terms of the contents of RTAs by distinguishing between shallow and
deep integration and to shed light on the causes and impacts of recent deep regional
integration.
In Sect. 2.2 we explain what shallow and deep RTAs mean and why countries
have recently pursued deep integration. In Sects. 2.3 and 2.4 we argue how we can
measure the degree of deep RTAs and what data are available to analyze the content
and effects of deep RTAs. In Sect. 2.5 we examine the state of deep RTAs in the
world and in the Asia-Pacific region using the measurement and data introduced
in Sect. 2.3. In Sect. 2.6 we review existing studies on the effects of deep regional
integration on global firms and technology spillovers. Finally, in Sect. 2.7 we provide
the concluding remarks of this chapter.
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2.2 Shallow and Deep Regional Integration
2.2.1 The Concept of Shallow and Deep Regional Trade
Agreements
The concept of shallow and deep integration is originally proposed by Lawrence
(1996). Shallow integration is simply trade liberalization, which involves the removal
of trade barriers. By contrast, deep integration “moves beyond the removal of border
barriers” (Lawrence 1996, p. 8). Deep RTAs contain a variety of provisions including
on investment, labor, the environment, and IPR.
It is said that recent RTAs tend to be deeper than old ones.A good comparison of an
old RTA with a recent RTA in terms of the degree of the depth is provided by Rodrik
(2018). He compares two RTAs signed by the United States: the United States–Israel
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the United States–Singapore FTA. Both Israel
and Singapore are small nations. The United States–Israel FTA, which entered into
force in 1985, was the first bilateral trade agreement that the United States signed in
the postwar period. The legal text of the United States–Israel FTA contains only 22
articles and three annexes, and consists of fewer than 8,000 words. Thus, it is “quite
a short agreement” (Rodrik 2018, p. 75). By contrast, the United States–Singapore
FTA entered into force in 2004. Its legal text is much longer than that of the United
States–Israel FTA. It contains 20 chapters with many articles in each and more than
a dozen annexes. The total length is about 70,000 words. These two agreements are
distinct in the coverage of policy areas.Most of the articles in theUnited States–Israel
FTA are devoted to trade liberalization issues, such as the elimination of duties and
other restrictive regulations, free of import licensing requirements, and rules of origin
(RoO). On the contrary, only the first seven chapters in the United States–Singapore
FTA cover trade issues, and the remaining 13 chapters address a variety of policy
areas including financial services, anti-competitive business conduct, e-commerce,
investment, IPR, labor, and the environment. Based on the coverage of the policy
areas, the United States–Singapore FTA can be considered to be “deeper” than the
United States–Israel FTA.
2.2.2 Countries’ Motivation for Deepening Regional Trade
Agreements
Given the fact that recent RTAs tend to be deeper than older ones, one may ask why
countries have recently pursued deep integration. Lawrence (1996) argues that the
development of regional production systems and the promotion of service investment
became important in the 1990s. Deeper forms of economic integration such as the
elimination of differences in national production and product standards that make
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regionally integrated production costly are required in order to facilitate international
investment and the operation of multinational enterprises (MNEs).
Baldwin (2011, 2016a) explains in detail why countries have been pursuing deep
regional economic integration. He calls the second phase of globalization initiated
by the information and communication technology (ICT) revolution in the 1990s the
“second unbundling,” which is the geographic separation of factories. The fragmen-
tation of production processes and offshoring occur in the second unbundling. The
ICT revolution enabled know-how in rich (North) countries to be combined with
low-wage labor in poor (South) countries. Baldwin (2016a) calls this combination
the high-tech/lowwagemix. In this era of the second unbundling, the so-called trade–
investment–services–intellectual property nexus (Baldwin 2016a) emerged because
of this mix. That is, MNEs from rich countries bring their intangible property to the
factories built in poor countries and conduct part of the production process there.
Parts and components are traded between parent firms and their foreign affiliates.
Thus, the trade of goods, the movement of capital, services that connect unbundled
factories, and intellectual property are all involved in the production of branded goods
under the above nexus. Baldwin (2016a) argues that this nexus thus requires a new
package of disciplines, which can be provided by deep RTAs.
Another motivation for countries to pursue deep regional integration is to address
a number of important issues that have been debated in the international community,
but that have been difficult for countries to agree to include in the GATT/WTO rules.
Those issues include IPR protection, the environment, and labor market regulation.1
Those countries that are active in addressing those issues try to construct international
regulatory rules on these issues by including them in RTAs.
2.3 Measurement of Deep Regional Integration
2.3.1 WTO-Plus and WTO-Extra Policy Areas
We need some measurement of the depth of RTAs in order to know how deep each
RTA is.
Horn et al. (2010) propose a systematic method to measure the depth and nature
of the economic integration of RTAs, which examines the policy areas covered by
their provisions and legal enforceability of these obligations. They identify 52 policy
areas covered by RTAs of which either the United States or the European Community
is a member, classifying them into two groups: WTO-plus (WTO+) and WTO-extra
(WTO-X). The WTO+ group includes provisions that fall under the current mandate
of theWTO, but go beyond commitments at themultilateral level. By contrast,WTO-
X policy areas include issues that fall outside the current WTOmandate. TheWTO+
1 With regard to studies on trade and the environment, see, for example, Cherniwchan et al. (2017)
and Copeland and Taylor (2003, 2004).
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Table 2.1 List of WTO+ and WTO–X areas in RTAs
WTO+ Areas (14) WTO–X Areas (38)
FTA Industrial Goods Anti-Corruption Health
FTA Agricultural Goods Competition Policy Human Rights
Customs Administration Environmental Laws Illegal Immigration
Export Taxes IPR Illicit Drugs
SPS Investment Industrial Cooperation
TBT Labor Market Regulation Information Society
State Trading Enterprises Movement of Capital Mining
Anti-dumping Consumer Protection Money Laundering
Countervailing Measures Data Protection Nuclear Safety
State Aid Agriculture Political Dialogue
Public Procurement Approximation of Legislation Public Administration
TRIMs Audio Visual Regional Cooperation
GATS Civil Protection Research and Technology
TRIPS Innovation Policies SME
Cultural Cooperation Social Matters
Economic Policy Dialogue Statistics
Education and Training Taxation
Energy Terrorism
Financial Assistance Visa and Asylum
Source: Horn et al. (2010)
group includes 14 policy areas andWTO-X group includes 38 policy areas, as shown
in Table2.1.
The method developed by Horn et al. (2010) evaluates the coverage and legal
enforceability of each policy area in RTAs using two indexes: the area-covered (AC)
and legally-enforceable (LE) indexes. The AC index simply indicates whether a
policy area is covered by an RTA. It takes the value 1 if a policy area is mentioned
and 0 otherwise. On the contrary, the LE index evaluates the legal enforceability of
each policy area on a three-point scale: 0 for not mentioned in the agreement or not
legally enforceable, 1 for legally enforceable but explicitly excluded by a dispute
settlement provision, and 2 for legally enforceable.
2.3.2 Depth and Breadth
Limão (2016) proposes recategorizing theWTO+ andWTO-X policy areas from the
viewpoints of the depth and breadth of RTAs (see Table2.2). The depth measures the
level of bilateral economic cooperation. In general, the lower the applied tariffs are
the deeper is the level of bilateral economic cooperation.Moreover, various non-tariff
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Table 2.2 Depth and breadth of RTAs
Depth Breadth
Field Policy area Field Policy area
(a) Import tariffs FTA industrial goods
FTA agricultural goods



































































measures and the behind-the-border policies (BBPs) affect market access and hence
are the factors to characterize the depth of cooperation. Other policies (OPs), such as
regional, industrial, and agricultural cooperation and financial assistance, may also
affect market access. Limão (2016) proposes that the depth of RTAs is measured by
four categories of fields in the WTO+ and WTO-X groups: (a) import tariffs, (b)
non-tariff barriers (NTBs), (c) BBPs, and (d) OPs. Field (a) comprises two policy
areas, field (b) consists of six policy areas, field (c) consists of five policy areas, and
field (d) comprises 16 policy areas (see Table2.2).
Alternatively, the breadth of RTAs measures how wide the coverage of policy
areas is. The classification is made by (i) the type of trade (goods/services), (ii)
technology (innovation/spillovers/IPR), and (iii) factors of production (capital/labor).
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Then, Limão (2016) proposes that the breadth of RTAs is measured by five fields:
(a) services, (b) technology, (c) investment/capital, (d) labor, and (e) non-economic
policies (NEPs). Field (a) comprises one policy area, field (b) six policy areas, field
(c) three policy areas, field (d) four policy areas, and field (e) nine policy areas (see
Table2.2).
In Sect. 2.5, we use the depth and breadth measures to illustrate the current state
of deep RTAs in the world and in the Asia-Pacific region.
2.4 Data on the Content of Deep Trade Agreements
In this section, we explain the data that enable us to analyze deep RTAs.
2.4.1 Content of the Deep Trade Agreements Database
The first dataset on deep RTAs was provided by Horn et al. (2010). The coverage
of their dataset was restricted to RTAs signed by the United States and those by
European countries. The number of covered RTAs was 100.
Hofmann et al. (2019) substantially extend the coverage ofRTAs in the dataset pre-
sented by Horn et al. (2010) to 279. The extended dataset, which covers 1958–2015,
is called “Deep Trade Agreements database 1.0 (horizontal depth).” It is provided
on the World Bank’s website.2
This dataset includes information on 14WTO+policy areas and 38WTO-Xpolicy
areas for agreement and country-pair levels. The dataset consists of the AC and LE
indexes for each policy area.We can use the dataset to measure the depth and breadth
of RTAs.
2.4.2 Deep Trade Agreements Database 2.0
A new dataset of the content of deep trade agreements, which is called the “Deep
Trade Agreements database 2.0 (vertical depth)”, was released by the World Bank
in 2020 (Mattoo et al. 2020). This dataset includes more detailed information on
the provisions in each policy area.3 The policy areas covered by this new dataset
include (1) preferential tariffs, (2) export restrictions, (3) services, (4) investment,
(5) movement of capital, (6) IPR, (7) visa and asylum, (8) rules of origin, (9) trade
facilitation and customs, (10) anti-dumping, (11) countervailing duties, (12) technical
barriers to trade (TBT), (13) sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, (14) public
2 https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/content-deep-trade-agreements.
3 https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/content-deep-trade-agreements.
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procurement, (15) subsidies, (16) state-owned enterprises, (17) competition policy,
(18) environmental laws, and (19) labor market regulations. In each of these policy
areas, many indexes are constructed to measure the degree of coverage in detail.
The detailed information on this dataset is provided by Mattoo et al. (2020).
This dataset is the outcome of a collaborative project of the World Bank’s team
with a number of academic researchers and other international organizations such
as the International Trade Centre, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
2.4.3 DESTA Dataset
An alternative database of the contents of RTAs called DESTA (Design of Trade
Agreements) was created by Dür et al. (2014). It originally covered 587 trade agree-
ments for 1945–2009. This database has now been updated and extended to more
than 710 trade agreements.4 The period has also been extended to 2019. Although
only 22 policy areas (15 trade and seven non-trade areas) are covered by the DESTA,
each policy area is evaluated in detail by multiple variables.
Its trade-related areas include (1) market access, (2) services, (3) global value
chains, (4) investments, (5) temporary entry of business persons, (6) IPRs, (7) pub-
lic procurement, (8) competition, (9) TBT, (10) SPS measures, (11) regulatory co-
operation and transparency, (12) trade defense instruments, (13) e-commerce, (14)
data flows, and (15) capital movement and exchange rates. Non-trade areas include
(i) corruption, (ii) labor standards, (iii) environmental protection, (iv) human rights,
(v) democracy, (vi) security, and (vii) others.
The DESTA project is ongoing. The latest version of the DESTA is likely to
include more data.
2.5 The State of Deep Regional Integration
2.5.1 The State of Deep RTAs in the World
Using the Content of Trade Agreement (TA) dataset by the World Bank, which was
described in the previous section, Jinji (2021) illustrates the state of deep RTAs in
the world.
Figures2.2a, b show the average number of WTO+ and WTO-X policy areas
included in RTAs by signatory group and their year of entry, respectively. The sig-
natory groups are the United States, European countries, Association of South-East
Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, Japan, China, Russia, and other countries. The
4 The DESTA dataset can be found at www.designoftradeagreements.org/.
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(a) WTO+ LE policy areas (LE=1 or 2) (b) WTO-X LE policy areas (LE=1 or 2)
Fig. 2.2 Average number ofWTO+ andWTO-X LE policy areas by RTA signatory group and year
of entry. Note: Abbreviations in the figure: US = United States, EU = European countries, ASE
= ASEAN countries, JPN = Japan, CHN = China, RUS = Russia, and OTH = other countries.
Numbers in the graph indicate the number of RTAs entered into force by signatory group and period.
Source: Fig. 1 in Jinji (2021)
observation period is divided into three: until 1999, from 2000 to 2009, and from
2010 to 2015. For example, as shown in Fig. 2.2a, the RTAs signed by the United
States before 2000 include, on average, 12 WTO+ policy areas (of the 14 WTO+
policy areas) with the LE index being either 1 or 2; those in 2000–2009 include, on
average, 12.1 WTO+ policy areas with LE ≥ 1; and those in 2010–2015 include, on
average, 12.7 WTO+ policy areas with LE ≥ 1. The numbers placed above the bars
indicate the number of RTAs signed by the signatory country/group that entered into
force in each period. For example, the United States signed two RTAs before 2000,
nine RTAs during 2000–2009, and three RTAs during 2010–2015.
This figure indicates that the RTAs signed by the United States cover most of the
WTO+ policy areas with at least some legal enforceability even before 2000. On
average, more than 12 out of the 14 policy areas are covered and legally enforceable.
The RTAs signed by the EU include fewer than 10 WTO+ policy areas, on average,
until 2009 but more (11.6 on average) in 2010–2015. Although the RTAs formed
by ASEAN countries and Russia before 2000 include a small number of WTO+
policy areas (2.4 and 4.9 on average, respectively), those in the 2000s include more
WTO+ policy areas (about 10 policy areas on average). As for Japan and China,
the number of legally enforceable WTO+ policy areas in RTAs increased in 2010–
2015: 12 (Japan) and 11.6 (China) policy areas on average.5 The number of legally
enforceable WTO+ policy areas included in the RTAs signed by other countries has
steadily increased.
By contrast, panel (b) of Fig. 2.2 shows the average number of WTO-X policy
areas included in RTAs with the LE index taking the value of LE ≥ 1. There are
38 WTO-X policy areas, but the average number included in RTAs with at least
some legal enforceability is fewer than nine for all countries, even in 2010–2015. In
general, recent RTAs include more legally enforceable WTO-X policy areas for all
countries; however, the highest average is still around eight policy areas in the 2010s
(8.3 for the United States, 8.4 for the EU, and 8.0 for Japan).
5 Neither Japan nor China signed RTAs before 2000.
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Fig. 2.3 Depth of RTAs by signatory group and period. Note: Each bar indicates the shares of
LE = 1 (light color) and LE = 2 (dark color) policy areas included in each field in all the RTAs
signed by each country/group that entered into force in each period. Source: Fig. 2 in Jinji (2021)
Jinji (2021) also illustrates the state of world RTAs in terms of depth and breadth,
as explained in Sect. 2.3.2.
Figure2.3 shows the depth of RTAs by signatory group and year of entry. Each bar
indicates the shares of LE = 1 (light color) and LE = 2 (dark color) policy areas
included in each category in all the RTAs signed by each country/group that entered
into force in each period. As shown in panel (a) of Fig. 2.3, most RTAs, particularly
those that entered into force in the 2000s, fully cover both policy areas in the category
of import tariffs with LE = 2. The coverage of policy areas in the NTBs category
is relatively high. More than 80% of the RTAs signed by the United States before
2000 cover the policy areas of NTBs with LE = 2. In 2010–2015, about 90% of the
RTAs signed by the United States cover those policy areas, but about 40% are with
LE = 1. The RTAs signed by the EU, Japan, and Russia in 2010–15 cover about
90% of the policy areas in this category. The coverage of the RTAs signed by China
in 2010–2015 is much higher and close to 1. The coverage of the policy areas in the
BBPs category is rather low. Even the highest level of coverage is about 0.7 for the
RTAs signed by the United States and the EU in 2010–2015. The coverage of the
policy areas in this category by the RTAs signed by ASEAN countries, China, and
Russia is less than 0.5. Moreover, the coverage of the policy areas in the category of
OPs is much lower. The coverage is below 0.2 for all RTAs in all periods.
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Fig. 2.4 Breadth of RTAs by signatory group and period. Note: Each bar indicates the shares of
LE = 1 (light color) and LE = 2 (dark color) policy areas included in each field in all the RTAs
signed by each country/group that entered into force in each period. Source: Fig. 3 in Jinji (2021)
Figure2.4 shows the breadth of RTAs by signatory country/group and year of
entry.As in Fig. 2.3, each bar indicates the shares of LE = 1 (light color) and LE = 2
(dark color) policy areas included in each category in all the RTAs signed by each
country/group that entered into force in each period.
The fields for which the coverage of policy areas is relatively high are (a) services
and (c) investment/capital. However, the coverage depends on the signatory country.
The RTAs signed by the United States, Japan, and ASEAN countries in the 2000s
cover fields (a) and (c) at relatively high shares. The coverage of the service area in
the RTAs signed by China in 2010–2015 is 100%. By contrast, the RTAs signed by
the EU and Russia only cover policy areas in fields (a) and (c) at low shares. The
coverage of other fields ((b), (d), and (e)) tends to be low for all RTAs. In particular,
the coverage of (e) (NEPs) is less than 0.2 for all RTAs.
2.5.2 The State of Deep RTAs in the Asia-Pacific Region
We next examine the state of deep RTAs in the Asia-Pacific region using the depth
and breadth indexes.
We create the following index for each field of the depth measure by signatory
group. Let Nc(LE ≥ 1)ikt be the number of policy areas with the LE index taking
the value of one or two in field c of the depth measure included in RTA k signed
by country i and entered into force in period t . The depth measure consists of fields
c ∈ {Tari f f, NT B, BBP, OP}. We set t = {1, 2, 3}, where t = 1 indicates years
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until 1999, t = 2 indicates years from 2000 to 2009, and t = 3 indicates years from






N c(LE ≥ 1)ikt
Mc
, (2.1)
where Lit is the number of RTAs signed by country i and entered into force in period
t , Sit is the set of RTAs signed by country i and entered into force in period t , and
Mc is the number of policy areas in field c of the depth measure. For each field of
the depth measure, Mc is two for Tari f f , six for NT B, five for BBP , and 16 for
OP . Thus, Av_Depth_indexcit is the average share of the policy areas with LE ≥ 1
in all policy areas in field c of the depth measure of RTAs signed by country i and
entered into force in period t .
Figure2.5 shows the values of Av_Depth_indexcit forASEAN, Japan, andChina.
As a reference, we also show Av_Depth_indexcit for the United States and the
members of the EU.
As is seen in the figure, all countries have the value of the index in the tariff field
almost one. However, deep RTAs should include policy areas in the fields of NTBs,
BBPs, and OPs. RTAs signed by ASEAN countries show an improvement in the
NTB index in 2000–2009 and a further improvement in 2010–2015. However, an
improvement in the BBP and OP indexes in the 2000s is small or almost negligible.
RTAs signed by Japan in 2010–2015 show almost the same level of theNTB andBBP
indexes as those by the United States and European countries. However, the value of
Fig. 2.5 Depth indexes of RTAs by signatory group. Note: The average share of LE ≥ 1 policy
areas included in each field in the RTAs signed by each country/group that entered into force in
each period is calculated. Source: Authors’ creation from the World Bank’s database
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the BBP index in 2010–2015 is still lower than 0.8 for all of Japan, the United States,
andEuropean countries.With regard to theRTAs signed byChina, an improvement in
the NTB and BBP indexes from 2000–2009 to 2010–2015 is large, but the level of the
BBP index is still low even in 2010–2015, compared with Japan, the United States,
and European countries. Moreover, progress in the inclusion of legally enforceable
OP policy areas gets very slow even in 2010–2015 for all countries shown in this
figure.
Next, similar to the depth measure, we create the following index for each field






N c(LE ≥ 1)ikt
Mc
, (2.2)
where the notations are the same as those in Eq. (2.1). Thus, Av_Breadth_indexcit
is the average share of the policy areas with LE ≥ 1 in all policy areas in field c of
the breadth measure of RTAs signed by country i and entered into force in period t .
The breadthmeasure consists of fields c ∈ {GAT S (Services), T ech (Technology),
I nv/Cap (Investment/capital), Lab (Labor), NEP (NEPs)}. For each field of
the breadth measure, Mc is one for GAT S, six for T ech, three for I nv/Cap, four
for Lab, and nine for NEP .
The values of Av_Breadth_indexcit for ASEAN, Japan, China, theUnited States,
and the members of the EU are shown in Fig. 2.6.
In Fig. 2.6 there are interesting differences in the patterns of the breadth indexes
across countries. RTAs signed by ASEAN countries and Japan demonstrate the pat-
Fig. 2.6 Breadth indexes of RTAs by signatory group. Note: The average share of LE ≥ 1 policy
areas included in each field in the RTAs signed by each country/group that entered into force in
each period is calculated. Source: Authors’ creation from the World Bank’s database
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tern that is similar to that of the RTAs signed by the United States: the value of the
GATS index is very high (close to one) and that of the Inv/Cap index is also high.
Although the Tech index is lower than the GATS and Inv/Cap indexes, it is relatively
higher than the Lab and NEP indexes. By contrast, RTAs signed by China indicate a
quite different pattern, compared with other countries. That is, only the GATS index
in 2010–2015 is high. Although the level of the Tech index in 2010–2015 is com-
parable to that of ASEAN and Japan, the level of the Inv/Cap index is much lower
than ASEAN and Japan even in 2010–2015. With regard to the Lab index, the level
is almost the same among these three signatory groups (i.e., ASEAN, China, and
Japan) in 2000–2009, but the Lab index becomes higher for Japan, compared with
ASEAN and China, in 2010–2015. RTAs signed by European countries also show
distinct patterns. The levels of the breadth indexes are generally low. In particular,
the levels of the GATS index and the Inv/Cap index are much lower than those of
Japan and the United States.
In summary, the content of RTAs signed by ASEAN countries, China, and Japan
is quite different in the depth and breadth measures. Specifically, the differences
are significant in the NTB and BBP policy areas in the depth measure and Invest-
ment/Capital and Labor policy areas in the breadth measure. The shares of including
legally enforceable OP policy areas and NEP policy areas are very low for all of
ASEAN countries, China, and Japan. Thus, the degree of deep RTAs in the Asia-
Pacific region is still not so high both in the OPs in the depth measure and in the
NEPs in the breadth measure.
2.6 The Impact of Deep Regional Integration
Lawrence (1996) points out that deep integration could be better or worse than
shallow integration. He argues that deep integration could “take the form of imposing
measures on countries that are inappropriate for their stage of development, such as
excessively stringent environmental standards, orwhich reduce economic efficiency”
(p. 8). Therefore, we cannot expect a priori that deep integration ensures higher
economic welfare than shallow integration. It is important to consider the effects
of deep integration on various economic activities and economic welfare of RTA’s
signatories and non-signatories.
2.6.1 Deep Regional Integration and Global Firms
As argued above, the main driving force for countries to sign deep RTAs is, in the ter-
minology of Baldwin (2016a), the trade–investment–services–intellectual property
nexus for global production and supply of goods and services by MNEs. Thus, it is
important and interesting to examine how deep regional integration actually affects
global activities of firms.
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Osnago et al. (2017, 2019) analyze the relationship between deep RTAs and
vertical FDI. Osnago et al. (2019) use a simplified version of the model developed
by Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2008) and examine theoretically how differences in
contractibility across production processes and across countries affect a final good
producer’s choice over the location (either North or South) of sourcing components
and over engaging in vertical FDI or FO. Based on the theoretical analysis, they
predict that deep RTAs with provisions improving the contractibility of components
(e.g., TBT provision) increase the share of firms engaging in vertical FDI, whereas
deep RTAs with those improving the contractibility of headquarters services (e.g.,
IPR and investment provisions) decrease the share of firms engaging in vertical FDI
and raise the share of firms engaging in FO. Using firm-level data, Osnago et al.
(2017, 2019) measure vertical FDI from country i to country j in sector k by the
aggregate revenue of all the subsidiaries owned by firms in country i that produce
inputs for sector k in country j . Osnago et al. (2017) address the endogeneity issue
of deep RTAs using the instrumental variable approach and find that deep RTAs have
significantly positive effects on vertical FDI.Moreover, Osnago et al. (2019) conduct
empirical tests of their theoretical predictions and provide evidence to support both
theoretical predictions.
A number of studies have investigated the impact of deep RTAs on global value
chains (GVCs) and production networks (Boffa et al. 2019; Laget et al. 2020; Orefice
and Rocha 2014). Augmented structural gravity models are extensively employed
in the empirical analysis of this issue. Boffa et al. (2019) focus on the different
impacts of deep RTAs and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on various trade in
value added indicators, or GVC trade. They find that although both deep RTAs and
BITs increase GVC trade, their transmission channels differ. Specifically, backward
linkages are stimulated through both deep RTAs and BITs, but only deep RTAs affect
forward linkages. Based on this finding, they argue that negotiating a deep RTA with
investment provisions has a larger impact on value-added trade than signing a shallow
RTA and a separate BIT.
Laget et al. (2020) analyze the impact of deep RTAs on GVC participation. They
find that deepRTAs increase the domestic and foreign value-added content of exports.
According to their estimates, each additional policy area increases the domestic
value-added of intermediate goods and services exports by 0.48% through forward
GVC linkages, whereas an additional provision increases the foreign value-added of
those exports by 0.38% through backward GVC linkages.
Orefice and Rocha (2014) estimate the relationship between deep RTAs and pro-
duction networks trade. They capture production networks trade by import values
in parts and components. Their finding is that signing deep RTAs increases produc-
tion networks trade amongmembers by about 12% points. Furthermore, they analyze
whether higher levels of production networks trade increase the likelihood of forming
deep RTAs. After taking other RTA determinants into account, a 10% point increase
in the share of production networks trade over total trade increases the depth of an
agreement by about 6% points.
Apart from GVCs and production networks, Jinji et al. (2021) investigate the
impact of shallow and deep RTAs on cross-border licensing. They first derive a
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micro-founded gravity equation for cross-border licensing from the heterogeneous
firm trademodel byHelpman et al. (2004). Jinji et al. (2021) add licensing as a supply
mode to the foreign market, so that firms choose licensing, export, or FDI. Under
certain assumptions, low productivity firms engage in cross-border licensing, while
high productivity firms serve the foreign market either by export or FDI. Based on
comparative statics analyses, they show that deep RTAs as a whole and deep RTAs
with IPR provisions in particular increase cross-border licensing. By contrast, shal-
low RTAs may not enhance cross-border licensing. These theoretical predictions are
fairly supported by the empirical evidence obtained through estimating a structural
gravity model.
2.6.2 Deep Regional Integration and Technology Spillovers
We turn to the studies on the impact of deep regional integration on knowledge
diffusion or technology spillovers.Nowadays, it is an important issuewhether signing
deep RTAs facilitates knowledge diffusion and enhance technology spillovers among
countries. However, compared with the studies on the relationship between deep
RTAs and global activities of firms, research on this issue is much scarcer.
To the best of our knowledge, Peri (2005) is the first study to investigate the
effects of RTAs on technology spillovers. He uses patent citation data as a proxy of
technology spillovers. This approach was pioneered by Jaffe et al. (1993) and has
been employed in a number of studies (e.g., Hall et al. 2001; Jaffe and Trajtenberg
1999;Maurseth andVerspagen 2002).6 Peri (2005) uses a sample of 18 countrieswith
147 subnational regions in Western Europe and North America from 1975 to 1996.
He estimates a gravity-like model to examine the effects of several resistance factors,
such as trade blocs as well as regional, national, and linguistic borders, on technology
spillovers measured by patent citations. “Trade blocs” correspond to RTAs. The
estimated results indicate that while regional, national, and linguistic borders have a
negative effect on technology spillovers, the impact of the trade blocs is insignificant,
which implies that RTAs do not enhance technology spillovers. Only the European
Economic Community (EEC)/the European Community (EC)/the European Union
(EU) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are included as RTAs,
so that the estimation of the impact of RTAs in his study is quite limited.
Jinji et al. (2013) extend the previous analysis to a sample of 103 countries for the
period 1990–1999 using patent citation data. Unlike Peri (2005), they find a positive
and significant effect of RTAs on technology spillovers. Their study is also limited
because only nine RTAs are included in the analysis. Moreover, neither Peri (2005)
nor Jinji et al. (2013) take the depth nature of RTAs into account.
6 Patent citations are references to existing patents included in patent documents. The advantage of
using patent citations as a proxy of technology spillovers is that it is a direct measure of knowledge
flows (Hall et al. 2001).
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Jinji et al. (2019a) is the first study to examine whether deep RTAs enhance inter-
national technology spillovers. They measure international technology spillovers by
cross-country patent citations and employ panel data on 114 countries/regions for the
period 1991–2007. They argue that since international trade in goods is amajor chan-
nel of technology spillovers and trade liberalization by RTAs increases trade among
members, both shallow and deep RTAs facilitate international technology spillovers.
However, RTAs and technology spillovers are linkedmore directly through the inclu-
sion of provisions that stimulate technology spillovers. For example, some RTAs
actually include provisions to encourage collaborative research projects and transfer
of technology between firms in member countries. As a result, it is expected that
deep RTAs enhance technology spillovers more strongly than shallow RTAs. Jinji
et al. (2019a) actually find that deep RTAs enhance technology spillovers. Moreover,
they analyze which provisions increase technology spillovers more. Interestingly,
they find that a deep integration in a broad sense has a greater impact on technology
spillovers than RTAs with provisions that are more directly related to technology.
Chapter 7 extends the analysis of Jinji et al. (2019a) and further investigates the
issue of the impact of deep RTAs on international technology spillovers.
2.7 Conclusion
It is said that recent RTAs tend to be deeper than old RTAs. In this chapter, we
discussed howwe can distinguish shallow and deep regional integration. Then, using
the classification of the policy areas included in RTAs by the WTO+ and WTO-X
groups and the depth and breadth measures, we examined in what sense RTAs that
have recently entered into force are actually deeper than those signed before 2000.
We also explored the state of deep regional integration in the Asia-Pacific region.
After that, we reviewed existing studies on deep regional integration. Our focus was
on the effects of deep regional integration on global activities of firms and on the
impact of deep regional integration on technology spillovers. In this way, we looked
at how deep regional integration, global firms, and technology spillovers are related
with each other.
Global firms are themain topic ofChaps. 3 and4.Chapters5 and6address the issue
of technology spillovers. In particular, Chap. 5 focuses on the relationship between
international trade and technology spillovers, and Chap. 6 examines how foreign
direct investment affects technology spillovers. Then, in Chap. 7, we investigate the
impact of deep regional integration on technology spillovers.
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Chapter 3
Which Aspect of Firm Performance is
Important for the Choice of
Globalization Mode?
3.1 Introduction
The relationship between firm performance and the choice of globalization mode,
such as exports, foreign direct investment (FDI), and foreign outsourcing (FO), has
been extensively investigated. For example, Melitz (2003) theoretically predicts a
premium in productivity for firms engaging in exporting goods, relative to those
supplying goods only to their domestic markets. Helpman et al. (2004) predict a
further productivity premium for multinational enterprises (MNEs). Empirically, the
superior performance of exporting firms relative to non-globalized firms has been
confirmed by a number of studies (e.g., Bernard and Jensen 1995, 1999; Clerides
et al. 1998; Mayer and Ottaviano 2007). Moreover, the productivity advantage of
MNEs relative to non-MNE exporters has been documented (e.g., Head and Ries
2003; Helpman et al. 2004; Kimura and Kiyota 2006; Wakasugi 2014).1
On the other hand, Antràs and Helpman (2004) theoretically demonstrate that the
productivity ordering (from the highest to the lowest) emerges from MNEs, foreign
outsourcers, and non-globalized firms. Their prediction is supported by Tomiura
(2007), Federico (2010), and Kohler and Smolka (2012) but partially unsupported
by Defever and Toubal (2013). As for the choice between FDI and FO, Chen et al.
(2012) predict that a high Tobin’s q tends to motivate firms to choose FDI rather than
FO. Jinji et al. (2019b) find empirical support for their prediction.
In this chapter, we attempt to compare the effects of firm performance on firms’
globalization activity through various measures. We use detailed Japanese firm-level
data covering the period 1994–1999 for empirical analysis. Our dataset includes
information on sales, employment, capital, research and development (R&D) expen-
diture, direct exports, and costs of domestic and foreign outsourcing of the compa-
nies headquartered in Japan, and sales of their foreign affiliates. Data on corporate
1 For a survey of the literature, see Greenaway and Kneller (2007), Helpman (2006), and Wagner
(2007, 2012).
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balance sheets and patent applications are also included. Then, we capture the degree
of engagement in each mode of globalization by calculating the ratio of a mode of
globalization activity (export, FDI, or FO) to the domestic sales of headquarters
companies. We also capture the relative choice of globalization mode by taking the
ratio of the volume of direct export by the headquarters companies to FDI (i.e., sales
of foreign affiliates) and their ratio of costs of FO to FDI.
As for the measures of firm performance, we use three variables. First, as a mea-
sure of productivity, we use labor productivity (LP), defined by value-added per
worker. LP is among the most frequently used measures in the literature, to measure
productivity. Second, we employ two different measures to capture the importance of
knowledge-capital intensity, discussed in Chen et al. (2012). One measure is Tobin’s
q (Tobin 1969). We estimate Tobin’s q by a simple approximation version proposed
by DaDalt et al. (2003). Another one is intangible asset intensity, which is the ratio of
intangible to tangible assets. In general, intangible assets include patents, copyrights,
trademarks, trade names, goodwill, and other items that lack physical substance but
provide long-term benefits to the company. In this chapter, we use the stock of patent
applications as a direct measure of intangible assets.
Then, we regress the indexes of firm choice of globalization mode on these vari-
ables. We employ a quantile regression in order to incorporate a strong negatively
skewed distribution of our indexes of globalization activity. Unlike traditional esti-
mation techniques such as the linear regression model, the quantile regression can
provide estimates of parameters at different points in the conditional distribution of
the dependent variable. Thus, it incorporates heterogeneity among firms and allows
outliers in the sample.2 In our estimation, we control for capital intensity (capital–
labor ratio) and R&D intensity (the ratio of R&D stock to labor).
The main findings are as follows. Our quantile regression estimation indicates
that LP plays an important role in the choice between exporting and FDI but Tobin’s
q does not. In contrast, Tobin’s q has a significant effect on the choice between FDI
and FO, but LP does not. Interestingly, the intangible asset intensity favors FDI over
both exporting and FO. Finally, our estimation result indicates that firms with higher
physical capital intensity tend to engage in more FDI and less FO.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section3.2 describes the
data employed in this chapter and explains variables used in our analysis. Section3.3
explains our estimation strategy. Section3.4 provides empirical results and discusses
implications arising from those results. Section3.5 concludes.
2 Koenker and Bassett (1978) introduce quantile regressions. See Koenker (2005) and Hao and
Naiman (2007) for technical details. In the trade literature, studies of employing quantile regressions
include Dufrenot et al. (2010), Figueiredo et al. (2016), Liu and Ma (2021), and Wagner (2006).
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3.2 Data and Variables
3.2.1 Data
We first collect firm-level data on Japanese companies from two sources: the Basic
Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities (BSJBSA) or Kigyo Katsudo
Kihon Chosa, and the Basic Survey of Overseas Business Activities (BSOBA) or
Kaigai Jigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa. These are annual surveys implemented by the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and include data on the busi-
ness activities of companies headquartered in Japan and their affiliates, such as
sales, employment, capital, R&D expenditure, and direct exports of the headquar-
ters, and sales of their foreign affiliates. The BSJBSA also includes information on
outsourcing—i.e., the number of domestic and foreign firms to which a headquarters
company contracted out its manufacturing or processing tasks and the cost involved
in contracting out business activities during 1994–1999.
We obtain data on corporate balance sheets from the Nikkei Economic Electronic
Database Systems (NEEDS) Company Financial Reports, which covers about 4,000
publicly traded firms on the Japanese stock market. All publicly traded firms are
identified by two codes—a Nikkei company code defined by Nikkei Inc. and a secu-
rity code defined by the Japanese Securities Identification Code Committee. Since
firm codes in the BSJBSA and BSOBA surveys differ from those in NEEDS, we use
the Nikkei company code to link the three datasets. By matching the full names and
addresses of companies among the three datasets we were able to identify approxi-
mately 1,100 headquarters companies for each year during the period 1994–1999.
Moreover, we collect data on patent applications by companies headquartered in
Japan made to the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) during 1990–1999 from the database
released by the Institute of Intellectual Property (IIP).3
3.2.2 Measures of Globalization Activity
The globalization activity of our sampled companies is indicated by providing the
number of firms engaging in each globalization mode in Table3.1. We identify FDI
firms, outsourcing firms, and export firms by acquiring information on foreign affil-
iates’ sales reported in the BSOBA survey in year t and on the costs of FO and
export reported in the BSJBSA survey in year t . Among these headquarters compa-
nies, about two-thirds reported implementing at least one globalization activity from
1994 to 1999. The share of the companies involved in globalization activities in our
sample is overwhelming, contrary to the findings in Tomiura (2007) that about 90%
of the firms are “domestic” for Japanese companies. This may be because the pub-
licly traded companies are usually sizable and competitive compared with firms that
3 See Goto and Motohashi (2007) for the details of the IIP dataset.
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X + I I + O X + O All (X +
I + O)
1994 1006 325 32 13 315 101 131 89
1995 1280 277 51 6 503 141 167 135
1996 1388 234 68 9 555 167 195 160
1997 1323 193 77 5 569 157 173 149
1998 1334 222 67 9 551 153 186 146
1999 1380 248 71 13 552 157 188 151
Total 7711 1499 366 55 3045 876 1040 830
Source: Authors’ calculation from BSJBSA and BSOBA for 1994–1999
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics
No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Percentiles
10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
RX I 3707 32.44 719.43 0.00 0.27 0.84 2.16 7.13
ROI 3707 997.16 28608.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 19.52
TobinQ 7105 1.29 0.61 0.80 0.98 1.18 1.44 1.78
LnPatK 5691 − 5.17 1.86 −7.76 −6.31 −4.86 −3.81 −3.02
LnLP 7084 2.25 0.72 1.36 1.81 2.26 2.71 3.13
LnK L 7104 2.48 0.82 1.54 2.02 2.48 2.95 3.45
LnRL 5691 −12.17 1.99 −14.68 −13.34 −11.92 −10.79 −9.94
Source: Authors’ calculation from BSJBSA, BSOBA, NEEDS, and IIP for 1994–1999
are not publicly traded. Therefore, the publicly traded companies may have greater
ability to enter international markets. Among our sampled companies, over 66%
undertake FDI (including companies that also engage in export and/or FO). About
83% of our sampled firms export and 36% outsource. Compared with the number of
firms engaged in FDI and exporting, the number of FO firms is quite limited.
To capture the degree of engagement in globalizationmodes, we construct indexes
tomeasure the relative choice of globalizationmodes. RX I is the ratio of export sales
(denoted X ) to FDI, which is measured by sales by foreign affiliates (denoted I ).
ROI is the ratio of outsourcing costs (denoted O) to foreign affiliate sales (I ). The
former measures the relative choice of exporting over FDI, and the latter measures
the relative choice of FO over FDI.
Descriptive statistics are summarized in Table3.2. The statistics of the percentiles
andmean show that the distributions of the indexes have a strong negative skew.There
are some outliers among firms that engage in globalization activities, reflecting that
some leading MNEs mainly produce abroad rather than domestically.
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3.2.3 Measures of Firm Performance
In this subsection, we explain our measures of firm performance. We begin with LP.
Following Tomiura (2007), LP (LnLP) is measured in logarithms as
LnLP = log [(Sales − COGS)/L] ,
where L and Sales denote the number of regular employees and total sales, respec-
tively, and COGS refers to the cost of goods sold. Tomiura (2007) argues that this
measure is preferable to gross output per worker because deducting costs from sales
is important, especially when the manufacturing process involves outsourcing.
Tobin’s q (Tobin 1969) is measured as the ratio of the firm’s market value to
its tangible assets. Corporate finance scholars have developed complex estimations
of Tobin’s q that rely on the estimated market value of the firm (Abel and Blan-
chard 1986; Perfect and Wiles 1994). As indicated by DaDalt et al. (2003), these
approaches to Tobin’s q produce more precise estimations but are computationally
costly. Moreover, these approaches may be subject to a larger selection bias. They
suggest that a simple approach is preferable unless extreme precision of the q esti-
mates is paramount and the sample selection bias is unlikely to be significant. We
attempt to use a simpler approximation version as discussed in DaDalt et al. (2003),
who propose the following simple approximation of Tobin’s q:
Tobin’s q = MV E + PS + LT DEBT + CL + BV I NV − CA
T A
,
where MV E is the year-end value of common stock and PS is the liquidation
value of preferred stock. LT DEBT , CL , BV I NV , CA, and T A denote the book
values of long-term debt, current liabilities, inventory, current assets, and total assets,
respectively. We exclude PS in our measure for Tobin’s q because the data are
unavailable.
As a measure of intangible assets, we use patent stock, Pat . We construct a patent
stock at period t from the data on patent applications by using the perpetual inventory
method as follows:
Patt = It + (1 − δ)Patt−1, (3.1)
where Patt is the stock of patent applications at the end of period t , It is the number
of patent applications during period t , and δ is the depreciation rate. Following the
convention in the literature, we resort to the traditional 15% depreciation rate (see
Hall et al. 2005). We use the number of patent applications in 1990 as the benchmark
value for Pat . Since our data on patent applications begin from 1990 and our sample
period begins in 1994, there are four years between the benchmark year and the first
year of the sample period. Thus, the value of Pat in 1994 estimated by the perpetual
inventory method is influenced little by the initial value of Pat in the benchmark
year. We then compute the logarithm of the ratio of patent stock to tangible fixed
capital, denoted as LnPatK , as ameasure of the ratio of intangible to tangible assets.
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Table 3.3 Correlations of variables
LnLP TobinQ LnPatK LnK L LnRL RX I RO I
LnLP 1
TobinQ 0.18 1
LnPatK −0.17 0.15 1
LnK L 0.35 −0.03 −0.26 1
LnRL −0.21 0.06 0.80 −0.32 1
RX I −0.02 0.01 0.01 −0.02 0.01 1
ROI 0.00 −0.01 0.00 −0.02 0.02 0.09 1
Moreover, as shown in Helpman et al. (2004), we control for capital intensity and
R&D intensity. The former is measured by the logarithm of the ratio of tangible fixed
capital to regular employees in the headquarters company, denoted as LnK L . The
latter ismeasured by the logarithmof the ratio ofR&Dstock to employees, denoted as
LnRL . R&D stock, denoted as RD, is computed in the samemanner as patent stock.
That is, in Eq. (3.1), Patt and Patt−1 are replaced by RDt and RDt−1, respectively,
and It is interpreted as the R&D expenditure in the period of t . In calculating R&D
stock we use δ = 0.15. Similar to the case of patent stock, R&D expenditure in 1990
is used as the benchmark value, and R&D stock in 1994 is estimated by the perpetual
inventory method.
Descriptive statistics for these measures of firm performance are presented in
Table3.2 and correlations of the variables are shown in Table3.3. As shown, the
mean and median values of Tobin’s q are 1.29 and 1.18, respectively, both of which
are very close to those reported in Hall et al. (2005) for the US firms and slightly
below those in Fukuda et al. (1999) for Japanese firms in the period 1985–1996.
3.3 Estimation Strategy
As discussed in the previous section, the globalization indexes in our sample have a
strong negatively skewed distribution, which indicates that the heterogeneity across
firms may be substantial. Thus, the relationships between the globalization indexes
and firm characteristics may also differ across firms. It may be important to provide
information about the relationship at different points in the conditional distribution
of the indexes.
Quantile regressions are a useful tool to address this issue.4 Themajor advantage of
a quantile regression estimator is that it can provide information about the relationship
at different points in the conditional distribution of the globalization indexes. In
contrast, traditional regression techniques, such as ordinary least squares (OLS), can
only summarize the average relationship between the globalization indexes and the
4 See Koenker 2005 and Hao and Naiman 2007 for details on quantile regression estimation.
3.3 Estimation Strategy 45
set of regressors. A key underlying assumption of these traditional techniques is that
the effects of the regressors on the dependent variable are best represented at the
conditional mean of the dependent variable. This is not the case in the presence of a
skewed distribution.
Here, we use an algorithm known as least absolute deviations (LAD) to provide
quantile estimates, where estimation is implemented by solving linear-programming
problems.5
3.4 Empirical Results
In this section, we report our empirical results. We examine the effects of LP, Tobin’s
q, and the intensity of intangible assets on the relative choice between two globaliza-
tion modes, RX I and ROI . Following Helpman et al. (2004), we use a linearized
version of regression equations and consider a specification that controls for the
firm’s capital intensity (LnK L) and R&D intensity (LnRL).
Tables3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 summarize quantile regressions of LnLP , TobinQ, and
LnPatK on globalization choices RX I and ROI . For RX I , the estimated coef-
ficients of LnLP in Table3.4 are negatively significant at two higher quantiles of
the 50th and 75th percentiles. This result implies that an increase in LP tends to
motivate a firm to choose more FDI and less exporting. However, all coefficients of
LnLP fail the null hypothesis for ROI . In Table3.5, the coefficients of TobinQ
are significantly negative for ROI at the 25th and 75th percentiles, whereas we find
no significant effects of TobinQ on RX I . Thus, an increase in Tobin’s q tends to
Table 3.4 Quantile estimates of productivity on globalization choices
Variables RX I RO I
QR25 QR50 QR75 QR25 QR50 QR75
LnLP −0.02 −0.15∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ 0.25 0.15 −1.13
(0.027) (0.040) (0.12) (0.19) (0.97) (2.51)
LnK L 0.07∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ −1.55∗∗∗ −5.24∗∗∗ −15.96∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.039) (0.12) (0.26) (1.33) (3.52)
LnRL 0.04∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 3.32∗∗∗ 4.05∗∗∗
(0.0087) (0.016) (0.047) (0.12) (0.58) (1.53)
No. of Obs. 3034 3034 3034 868 868 868
Notes: (a) ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. (b) The values in the parentheses are standard errors.
(c) QRX refers to quantile regression at X th percentile. (d) A
constant term and industrial and year dummies are included in the
estimations. (e) Quantile regression is based on the least-absolute value
(LAV) model
5 See Cameron and Trivedi (2009) for the detailed Stata command for the quantile estimation.
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Table 3.5 Quantile estimates of Tobin’s q on globalization choices
Variables RX I RO I
QR25 QR50 QR75 QR25 QR50 QR75
TobinQ 0.01 −0.01 0.00 −0.40∗∗ −1.47 −5.99∗∗
(0.014) (0.045) (0.002) (0.18) (0.94) (3.00)
LnK L 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05 0.30∗∗∗ −1.40∗∗∗ −5.57∗∗∗ −16.07∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.038) (0.11) (0.26) (1.17) (3.42)
LnRL 0.04∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 3.08∗∗∗ 3.71∗∗
(0.0088) (0.018) (0.048) (0.13) (0.53) (1.58)
No. of Obs. 3042 3042 3042 871 871 871
Notes: (a) ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. (b) The values in the parentheses are standard
errors. (c) QRX refers to quantile regression at X th percentile.
(d) A constant term and industrial and year dummies are included in
the estimations. (e) Quantile regression is based on the LAV model
Table 3.6 Quantile estimates of intangible asset intensity on globalization choices
Variables RX I RO I
QR25 QR50 QR75 QR25 QR50 QR75
LnPatK −0.04∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.40∗∗∗ −1.81∗∗∗ −4.43∗∗∗ −16.87∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.017) (0.064) (0.17) (0.41) (1.28)
LnK L 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ −1.80∗∗∗ −5.79∗∗∗ −26.90∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.025) (0.10) (0.33) (0.73) (2.10)
LnRL 0.06∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 4.51∗∗∗ 6.34∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.016) (0.058) (0.17) (0.37) (1.19)
No. of Obs. 3042 3042 3042 871 871 871
Notes: (a) ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. (b) The values in the parentheses are standard errors.
(c) QRX refers to quantile regression at X th percentile. (d) A constant
term and industrial and year dummies are included in the estimations.
(e) Quantile regression is based on the LAV model
motivate a firm to choose more FDI and less FO, but it does not affect the choice
between exporting and FDI.
In Table3.6, on the other hand, all quantile estimates of LnPatK are significantly
negative for both RX I and ROI . This result implies that headquarters companies
with relatively higher intangible assets tend to favor FDI over exporting and outsourc-
ing. In short, the effects of intangible asset intensity on firms’ choices of globalization
mode are not the same as those of Tobin’s q.
In Tables3.4, 3.5 and 3.6, all coefficients of LnK L are significantly negative in
the regressions for ROI : an increase in capital intensity leads a firm to choose more
FDI and less FO. This result seems consistent with the finding of Tomiura (2007)
and confirms the prediction by Antràs (2003). In contrast, the coefficients of LnK L
in the regressions for RX I are significantly positive in most cases. This suggests
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that an increase in capital intensity prompts a firm to choose more exporting and less
FDI. This contradicts the result shown by Helpman et al. (2004), who find that firms
in more capital-intensive sectors tend to export less relative to FDI.6 However, to our
knowledge, there are no definitive theoretical predictions regarding the relationship
between capital intensity and the choice between exporting and FDI.
Moreover, all coefficients of LnRL are significantly positive. Thus, an increase in
R&D intensity causes a firm to export and outsource more relative to an engagement
in FDI. One might regard this result as inconsistent with the conventional wisdom.
However, Helpman et al. (2004) show that R&D intensity is not a useful predictor of
exports versus FDI. Norbäck (2001) finds that firms with higher R&D intensity tend
to export rather than engage in FDI if the costs of technology transfer are high, while
the opposite is true if its costs are low. Theoretically, there is no definitive relation-
ship between R&D intensity and the choice of globalization mode. Our empirical
results suggest that the relationship between R&D intensity and the choice of the
globalization mode should be investigated further theoretically and empirically.
3.5 Conclusion
By using firm-level data on Japanese firms, in this chapter it has been investigated
empirically which measure of performance is important for a firm to choose various
modes of globalization activity.Usingquantile regressions,we found that a difference
in LP is important in the choice between exporting and FDI but not important in the
choice between FDI and FO. In contrast, a difference in Tobin’s q is important in
the choice between FDI and FO but not in the choice between exporting and FDI.
Interestingly, a difference in the intangible asset intensity is important in the choice
between exporting and FDI as well as in the choice between FDI and FO. Thus, our
analysis revealed the differences among various measures of firm performance in the
effects of globalization activity.
Our findings have important policy implications. Although existing empirical
studies have primarily focused on the relationship between a firm’s productivity and
its choice of globalization mode, our findings illuminate the potential importance of
Tobin’s q on firms’ globalization activities. In particular, we found that a difference
in Tobin’s q affects the choice between FDI and FO, whereas that in productivity is
relatively less important for the choice between those two activities. Firmswith lower
Tobin’s q are relatively more active in FO than in FDI. Thus, policies to facilitate
FO will benefit the domestic economy, because FO contributes to improving the
competitiveness of outsourcers by reducing their production costs. Since relatively
lower values of Tobin’s q imply that these firms do not effectively utilize their capital,
deregulation and expansion of supportive services to small and medium enterprises
may be helpful. Providing information on regulations in foreign countries and helping
to find potential partner companies for outsourcing may also enhance gains from FO
6 Tomiura (2007) also finds that MNEs tend to be more capital intensive than exporters.
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by reducing thefixed costs of outsourcing.On the other hand, firmswith lowerTobin’s
q may be reluctant to enhance FDI because they have difficulties in financing the
costs of investment, as indicated by the low value of Tobin’s q. Thus, policies to
create a financing mechanism for FDI will help those firms facilitate outward FDI.
There are a few caveats with respect to our analysis. First, we captured firms’
globalization activities in the relative size measured by sales of foreign affiliates,
such as the ratio of exports to sales of foreign affiliates and the ratio of costs of FO
to sales of foreign affiliates, because many globalized firms engage in more than
one globalization mode. In the theoretical models of Helpman et al. (2004) and
Chen et al. (2012), by contrast, individual firms do not engage in multiple modes of
globalization, although we observe multiple modes at the aggregated industry level.
Second, we cannot fully explain our estimation results regarding the effects of capital
intensity and R&D intensity on the choice of globalization mode. Further theoretical
and empirical studies on this issue are required.
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Chapter 4
Does Tobin’s qMatter for a Firm’s
Choice of Globalization Mode?
4.1 Introduction
For the last two decades, sorting of firms by productivity into different modes of
globalization has been well documented both theoretically and empirically in the
trade literature.1 Melitz (2003) presents a model in which the most productive firms
export goods to foreign markets, whereas less productive firms supply goods only
to their domestic market. Helpman et al. (2004) extend the framework in Melitz
(2003) to incorporate the possibility that firms serve foreign markets through for-
eign direct investment (FDI). They predict that only the most productive firms find
it profitable to serve foreign markets via FDI and that medium-productivity firms
serve foreign markets through exports. A large empirical literature confirms these
sorting patterns (e.g., Bernard and Jensen 1995, 1999; Head and Ries 2003; Help-
man et al. 2004; Kimura and Kiyota 2006; Mayer and Ottaviano 2007). On the other
hand, an offshored production may be conducted via FDI or outsourced to a local
firm. In such a situation, Antràs and Helpman (2004) predict that relatively more
productive firms conduct FDI, whereas relatively less productive firms choose for-
eign outsourcing (FO). Because of data limitations, only a few studies have reported
firm-level evidence on this issue. Using Japanese data, Tomiura (2007) observes that
firms engaging only in FO tend to be less productive than those engaging in FDI.
Federico (2010) and Kohler and Smolka (2012) find similar patterns for Italian and
Spanish firms, respectively. In contrast, Defever and Toubal (2013) report a reverse
ordering of firm productivity due to the higher fixed costs of outsourcing for French
firms.
In the previous chapter we investigated the effects of the various aspects of firms’
performance on their globalization activities. We measured firm performance by
productivity, Tobin’s q, and intangible asset intensity. In this chapter we focus more
1Helpman (2006), Greenaway andKneller (2007), andWagner (2007, 2012) provide useful surveys
of the literature.
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on Tobin’s q (Tobin 1969). Specifically, we attempt to sort firms into different modes
of globalization by Tobin’s q. Our study is motivated by a theoretical analysis by
Chen et al. (2012). Combining the property-rights approach (Grossman and Hart
1986; Hart and Moore 1990) and the knowledge-capital model (Horstmann and
Markusen 1987; Markusen 1984, 2002), they examine how the relative importance
of knowledge capital over physical capital affects a firm’s choice between FDI and
FO for the offshored production. They show that firms with a higher physical-capital
intensity tend to choose FO, whereas firms with a higher knowledge-capital intensity
tend to conduct FDI. An interesting testable hypothesis is obtained from this result:
firms with a high Tobin’s q (i.e., the ratio of firm’s market value to the replacement
value of book equity) tend to conduct FDI, whereas those with a low Tobin’s q tend
to choose FO. Because the firm’s market value reflects both knowledge-based and
physical assets, and given that the book value of capital reflects only physical assets, a
firmwith a higher knowledge-capital intensity will have a higher Tobin’s q. Thus, the
above hypothesis follows. Moreover, although the knowledge-capital model predicts
that firms with a high Tobin’s q tend to prefer FDI to exports to serve the foreign
market, this relationship is not so robust as the imperfect contractibility of knowledge
capital and the costly transfer of knowledge capital tend to make FDI less attractive
to knowledge-capital intensive firms.
In our empirical study, we employ detailed Japanese firm-level data covering the
period 1994–1999. Our dataset includes information on sales, employment, capital,
research and development (R&D) expenditure, direct exports, the values of domes-
tic and foreign outsourcing of the companies headquartered in Japan, and the sales
of their foreign affiliates. Moreover, corporate balance sheet data are included. Our
dataset enables us to identify not only whether a firm engages in a particular global-
ization activity (i.e., exports, FDI, and FO) but also the extent to which it is involved
in that activity. We utilize this feature of our dataset to construct indexes to measure
the relative choice of globalization mode by calculating the ratio of the values of FO
(i.e., total expenditure on outsourcing to foreign contracting firms) to the total FDI
(i.e., total sales of foreign affiliates) and the ratio of the volume of direct exports by
the headquarters company to horizontal FDI (i.e., sales of foreign affiliates, exclud-
ing exports to Japan). Thereafter, we regress these indexes of globalization activity
on Tobin’s q. Our measurement of Tobin’s q is based on the simple approximation
proposed by DaDalt et al. (2003). Furthermore, we regress the indexes of globaliza-
tion activity on the total factor productivity (TFP) of individual firms to demonstrate
the manner in which sorting patterns by Tobin’s q differ from those by the firm’s pro-
ductivity. We employ the method developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) to compute
TFP. Our analysis mainly focuses on firms engaging in multiple globalization modes
and attempts to reveal whether a difference in Tobin’s q (and TFP) motivates these
firms to select more or less FDI relative to FO or exports.2 In addition, we verify
the robustness of results by including firms choosing a single globalization mode in
estimations.
2We also estimate the relationship between Tobin’s q (and TFP) and each globalization activity by
constructing indexes to measure the degree of engagement in each globalization mode.
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We need to address two important econometric issues in our analysis. First, the
globalization indexes in our sample exhibit strong negative skewness and include
outliers. As is well known, the presence of outliers may distort the classical least
squares estimator (Wooldridge 2010). Thus, we employ several estimation methods
to cope with this issue, namely, the median regression (or quantile regression) esti-
mators, Huber M-estimators, and the MM-estimators (Huber 1981; Rousseeuw and
Yohai 1984; Verardi and Croux 2009; Wooldridge 2010). The second econometric
issue is endogeneity. Endogeneity potentially arises when factors that simultane-
ously influence the choice of globalization mode and Tobin’s q exist. Except for this
the problems of omitted variables may involve endogeneity. To control for possi-
ble endogeneity, we employ the endogenous quantile regression (QRIV) techniques
proposed by Lee (2007), using two sets of instrumental variables (IVs). We discuss
our estimation strategy in detail in Sect. 4.4.
The main findings of this chapter are as follows. First, we find that Tobin’s q
is negatively (positively) and significantly correlated with the ratio of FO to the
total FDI (the ratio of total FDI to FO), which strongly supports the hypothesis that
a higher Tobin’s q is associated with a higher FDI engagement relative to FO by
multinational enterprises (MNEs). In contrast, little evidence exists on a definite
relationship between Tobin’s q and the ratio of exports to horizontal FDI (or the
ratio of horizontal FDI to exports). This result seems to imply that the imperfect
contractibility of knowledge capital and a higher technology transfer cost actually
matter for knowledge-capital intensive firms to choose between exports and FDI,
because these factors weaken the positive relationship between Tobin’s q and the
ratio of FDI to exports. These findings are quite robust even when we include firms
engaging in a single globalization mode in estimations. Moreover, we find that the
relationship between Tobin’s q and the firm’s choice of globalization mode fairly
differs from that of TFP. When we regress our globalization indexes on TFP, we
find that TFP is negatively (positively) and significantly correlated with the ratio
of exports to horizontal FDI (the ratio of horizontal FDI to exports), whereas no
significant relationship exists between TFP and the ratio of FO to the total FDI (or
the ratio of total FDI to FO). The former result is consistent with the theoretical
prediction of Helpman et al. (2004) and a large number of existing empirical studies
(Head and Ries 2003; Helpman et al. 2004; Kimura and Kiyota 2006; Mayer and
Ottaviano 2007; Yeaple 2009).3 However, the latter result differs from the prediction
and findings of Antràs and Helpman (2004) in a limited number of existing studies
(Federico 2010; Kohler and Smolka 2012; Tomiura 2007).
This chapter extends the empirical analysis of Jinji et al. (2019b) in three ways.
First, we employ different estimation techniques from theirs to examine the impact
of Tobin’s q on the firm’s choice between FO and FDI. In this respect, we provide
evidence consistent with their findings. Second, we analyze the relationship between
Tobin’s q and another choice of globalization mode, namely, the choice between
export and FDI. Third, we extend the analysis to the impact of productivity (i.e.,
3Greenaway and Kneller (2007) and Hayakawa et al. (2012) provide useful surveys of the literature.
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TFP) on the firm’s choice of globalization mode. The second and the third issues are
not investigated by Jinji et al. (2019b)
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. The next section discusses
our empirical hypotheses. Section4.3 describes the data and variables employed
in the analysis. Section4.4 explains our estimation strategy. Section4.5 reports the
estimation results. Section4.6 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Theory and Hypotheses
This section briefly discusses our empirical hypotheses and theory behind them. We
mainly focus on the relationship between the firm’s value of Tobin’s q and its mode
choice for globalization strategy. As a straightforward extension of the q investment
theory to the case of FDI (i.e., investment abroad), one may simply expect a positive
relationship between Tobin’s q and FDI. In the presence of an alternative mode of
globalization, however, we need to consider the relationship between Tobin’s q and
a shift of the firm’s activities between FDI and an alternative mode in each of the
following two different situations: offshoring of production and the supply of goods
to foreign markets. As we argue below, the relationship between Tobin’s q and FDI
will differ in these two situations. A key in our argument below is that, besides its
role in the investment theory, Tobin’s q indicates a firm’s knowledge-capital intensity
(relative to physical capital).
We first consider the situation in which production is offshored to a foreign coun-
try. A firm has two options: to produce goods at a foreign subsidiary (i.e., FDI) or
to outsource production to a local firm (i.e., FO). In this situation, we expect that
Tobin’s q is positively related to the ratio of FDI to FO. Our argument is based on the
theoretical analysis by Chen et al. (2012) and Jinji et al. (2019b). Chen et al. (2012)
demonstrate that knowledge-capital (relative to physical capital) intensity rather than
physical capital (relative to labor) intensity is an important factor for the firm’s choice
between FDI and FO. The reason is as follows. The owner of physical capital can
relatively easily control the use of the physical capital. In contrast, it is relatively
difficult for the owner of knowledge capital to specify and completely control the
use of the knowledge capital. This is mainly because knowledge capital is partly
non-excludable in nature and hence its use is not fully contractible.
Let us consider the case in which production in foreign country requires both
physical and knowledge capital along with non-contractible effort by a local agent.
The local agent is a manager if production occurs at a subsidiary and a licensee if
it is outsourced to an independent local firm. An MNE that owns knowledge capital
produces a good in two periods. Under FO, the agent who owns the physical capital
makes an efficient effort to utilize its capital in period 1. Under FDI, in contrast, as the
MNE owns the physical capital, the agent has no incentive to make an effort under
the incomplete-contracting environment. On the other hand, under FO, the MNE
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transfers only an insufficient amount of the knowledge capital to the agent to prevent
the agent from using knowledge absorbed in period 1 together with the physical
capital for outside uses in period 2. Under FDI, as the agent who does not own the
physical capital cannot use the absorbed knowledge for outside uses in period 2, the
MNE transfers the full amount of the knowledge capital to the agent in period 1.
The more important knowledge capital is in production, the smaller is the loss for
the MNE from the agent’s inefficient effort in period 1 under FDI and the larger is
the loss for the MNE from an insufficient transfer of the knowledge capital to the
agent under FO. Thus, the MNE prefers FDI to FO. If the physical capital is more
important, the opposite is true and hence the MNE prefers FO.
We can easily extend the above model by Chen et al. (2012) to the case in which
a final good is produced by assembling many intermediate goods. The whole pro-
duction process is offshored to a foreign country. Intermediate goods vary in their
knowledge-capital intensity. An MNE decides whether to outsource production for
each intermediate good. Then, as the average knowledge-capital intensity of the
MNE is higher, a smaller fraction of intermediate goods is outsourced. As argued in
Sect. 4.1, a higher knowledge-capital intensity implies a higher value of Tobin’s q.
Given this, the above argument yields our first empirical hypothesis that Tobin’s q is
positively related to an FDI engagement relative to FO by MNEs.
We next consider the situation in which a firm supplies its goods to a foreign
market. The firm can do so either via exports or horizontal FDI. There are two types
of fixed costs: firm-specific fixed costs that mainly reflect knowledge-based assets
and plant-specific fixed costs that mainly reflect physical assets. The knowledge-
capital models of horizontal FDI (Horstmann and Markusen 1992; Markusen 1984,
2002) reveal that the jointness property of knowledge capital leads to multi-plant
economies of scale. Hence, a firm with a higher intensity of knowledge capital tends
to prefer FDI to exports. However, this tendency will be weakened as the degree
of contractibility of knowledge capital is lower. This is because a wage premium is
required when a manager of the foreign subsidiary, who absorbs knowledge capi-
tal, moves to a local competing firm (Fosfuri et al. 2001). In addition, the use of
knowledge capital in foreign production incurs technology transfer costs that are
increasing in technological complexity (Keller and Yeaple 2013). A higher intensity
of knowledge capital generally implies higher technology transfer costs. This factor
functions against the tendency mentioned above. Overall, whether a higher intensity
of knowledge capital is associated with a lower ratio of exports to FDI depends on the
relative strengths of the three factors mentioned above. Thus, our second empirical
hypothesis is that there is no clear-cut relationship between Tobin’s q and an MNE’s
ratio of exports to FDI.
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4.3 Data and Variables
4.3.1 Data
We primarily collect data from three datasets of Japanese companies: the Basic
Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities (BSJBSA) or Kigyo Katsudo
Kihon Chosa, the Basic Survey on Overseas Business Activities (BSOBA) or Kaigai
Jigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa, and the Nikkei Economic Electronic Database Systems
(NEEDS) Company Financial Reports.
BSJBSA and BSOBA are annual surveys by the Ministry of Economy, Trade,
and Industry (METI).4 BSJBSA is a mandatory survey for all firms with 50 or more
employees and paid-up capital or investment funds exceeding 30 million yen. It
covers mining, manufacturing, wholesale/retail trade, and service industries, and
approximately 26,000 firms responded to the survey in 1999. On the other hand,
BSOBA is an approved-type survey for Japanese corporations which (as of the end
of March) own or previously have owned overseas affiliates. BSOBA lists two types
of overseas affiliates: (1) those with at least 10% of their capital held by a Japanese
parent company; and (2) those with at least 50% of their capital held by a foreign
subsidiary that in turn has at least 50% of its capital held by a Japanese parent com-
pany. However, BSOBA excludes foreign affiliates in the financial, insurance, and
real estate industries. Approximately 2,200 Japanese parent companies and 14,000
overseas affiliates responded to the survey in 1999. The data from BSJBSA and
BSOBA include sales, employment, capital, R&D expenditures, headquarters’ direct
exports, and their foreign affiliates’ sales. BSJBSA for the period 1994–1999 also
includes information on outsourcing, that is, the number of domestic and foreign
firms to which a headquarters company has contracted manufacturing and/or pro-
cessing tasks and the total expenditures on the contracting out of business activities.
Unfortunately, detailed data on outsourcing are unavailable after 2000. Because of
this data limitation, our sample is restricted to the period of 1994–1999.
The corporate balance sheet data that we use to calculate Tobin’s q and TFP
are extracted from NEEDS, which incorporates approximately 4,000 publicly traded
firmson the Japanese stockmarket, and covers the period from1975 to the present.All
publicly traded Japanese firms are identifiable using two codes—a Nikkei company
code defined by Nikkei, Inc., and a security code defined by the Japanese Securities
Identification Code Committee. Given that firm codes in BSJBSA and BSOBA differ
from those in NEEDS, we use the Nikkei company code to link the three datasets.
In addition, we identify approximately 1,000 to 1,300 headquarters companies for
each year during the period 1994–1999 by matching full names and addresses of
4See METI’s websites for details on these surveys (BSJBSA: www.meti.go.jp/english/statistics/
tyo/kikatu/index.html; and BSOBA: www.meti.go.jp/english/statistics/tyo/kaigaizi/index.html).
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companies in the three datasets.5 In our sample, each headquarters company engages
in at least one globalization activity (exports, FDI, or FO).6
4.3.2 Indexes of Globalization Activity
As shown byTable3.1 inChap.3,many firms engage inmultiple globalizationmodes
rather than a single mode. For example, more than 550 firms engaged in both exports
and FDI in 1999. This is more than double the number of firms engaged only in
exports in 1999. This evidence is important when we select our preferred empirical
framework.
Moreover, our dataset contains unique information regarding other dimensions
of firms’ globalization activities, including sales of foreign affiliates, the value of
exports from the headquarters in Japan, and the value of FO. We utilize the informa-
tion available in our dataset tomeasure the extent of engagement in each globalization
mode by taking the ratio of the size of a particular activity (exports, FDI, or FO) to
the domestic sales of headquarters companies. Moreover, we can measure the firm’s
relative choice of globalization mode by calculating the ratio of two variables rep-
resenting its globalization activity. First, we denote domestic sales by headquarters
companies in Japan as D, the total sales of foreign affiliates as I , the value of exports
from the headquarters companies as X , and the total expenditure on outsourcing
to companies abroad as O . Note that we can measure the size of the total FDI by
I . Thereafter, we construct an additional measure of FDI denoted as I h (where the
superscript h refers to the horizontal type) by excluding exports to Japan from the
sales of foreign affiliates, which measures the size of horizontal FDI. We employ
these variables to calculate the ratio of each globalization activity (i.e., X , I , I h ,
and O) to D, denoted as RXD, RI D, RI hD, and ROD, respectively. Moreover,
we calculate the ratio of O to I , denoted as ROI , to capture the relative choice
between FO and FDI, and the ratio of X to I h , denoted as RX I h , to capture the rel-
ative choice between exports and horizontal FDI. In the index for the relative choice
of exports over FDI, we use I h as the measure of FDI because, as Helpman et al.
(2004) reveal, horizontal FDI matters to firms when choosing between export and
FDI. Conversely, ROI measures the relative choice of FO over FDI. In this index,
we consider that the total sales of foreign affiliates, including exports to the source
country, are an appropriate measure of FDI. Note that by specifying the total sales
of foreign affiliates as a measure of FDI, our analysis is consistent with that of Chen
et al. (2012), who consider only the case where production occurs in the foreign
country and a domestic firm chooses either FDI or outsourcing. In their model, FDI
can be horizontal or vertical.
5Note that even among those identified companies, many do not answer every item in the surveys
each year during the sample period.
6 In the sample of headquarters companies in the BSOBA and BSJBSA surveys, approximately
two-thirds of them report implementing at least one globalization activity during 1994–1999.
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Table 4.1 Definition of variables
Variable Definition
D The value of domestic sales by a headquarters company in Japan (million yen)
X The value of exports from a headquarters company in Japan (million yen)
I The value of total sales of overseas affiliates held by a Japanese headquarters
company (million yen)
I h I minus the value of total exports to Japan from overseas affiliates (million yen)
O The total expenditure on outsourcing to companies abroad by a headquarters
company (million yen)
RXD The ratio of X to D
RI D The ratio of I to D
RI hD The ratio of I h to D
ROD The ratio of O to D
RX I h The ratio of X to I h
RI h X The ratio of I h to X
ROI The ratio of O to I
R I O The ratio of I to O
Table4.1 summarizes the definition of variables that measure the firm’s global-
ization activities.
4.3.3 Tobin’s q and TFP
We measure Tobin’s q (Tobin 1969) using the ratio of the firm’s market value to
its tangible assets. We follow DaDalt et al. (2003) and specify the following simple
approximation of Tobin’s q7:
Tobin’s q = MV E + PS + LT DEBT + CL + BV I NV − NCA
T A
,
where MV E denotes the year-end value of a common stock, PS denotes the liquida-
tion value of a preferred stock, and LT DEBT , CL , BV I NV , CA, and T A denote
the book values of long-term debt, current liabilities, inventory, current assets, and
7Several studies significantly incorporate more complex estimations of Tobin’s q, which rely on the
estimated market value of the firm (Abel and Blanchard 1986; Perfect and Wiles 1994). However,
as argued by DaDalt et al. (2003), although the approaches to Tobin’s q produce more precise
estimations, they are computationally costly. Moreover, these approaches may be subject to greater
selection bias. DaDalt et al. (2003) suggest that a simple approach is then preferable unless the
extreme precision of the q estimates is paramount and the sample selection bias is not likely to be
significant.
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total assets, respectively. We exclude PS in our measure of Tobin’s q because the
requisite data are unavailable.
We estimate TFP following Olley and Pakes (1996) and Keller and Yeaple (2009).
We first define value-added and capital stock. The value-added of firm i at time t Yit
is measured as follows:
Yit = SAit − COGSit − SGAit + ORit + PEit + DEit + STit ,
where SA, COGS, SGA, OR, PE , DE , and ST denote total sales, cost of goods
sold, selling, general and administrative expenses, office rents, payroll expenses,
depreciation expenses, and sundry taxes of firm i at time t , respectively. All values
are converted into real measures using the GDP deflator released by METI.
The capital stock Kit is estimated by the perpetual inventory method:
Kit = Iit + (1 − δ)Kit−1, (4.1)
where Kit is the stock of equipment of firm i at the end of period t , Iit is the real
investment of equipment of firm i during period t , and δ is the depreciation rate. Real
investment Iit includes three types of investment involved in firm production: build-
ings and structures, machinery, and transportation machinery and tools. Following
Hayashi and Inoue (1991), we apply depreciation rates of 5.2%, 9.5%, and 8.8% to
buildings and structures, machinery, and transportation machinery and tools, respec-
tively. We estimate each type of investment using Eq. (4.1) first and then aggregate
them into Kit .
Then, let yit be the logarithm of the value added of firm i at time t , and kit and
li t be the logarithm of the firm’s capital and labor, respectively. We consider the
following production function:
yit = β0 + βkkit + βl li t + ωi t + ηi t , (4.2)
where yit is the logarithm of value-added ln Y in firm i at time t , kit is the logarithm of
the capital input ln K , li t is the logarithm of the number of full-time employees ln L ,
ωi t is productivity, and ηi t is either the measurement error or a shock to production.
Both ω and η are not observed. Olley and Pakes (1996) argue that the endogeneity of
input demand and self-selection induced by the exit behavior bias the OLS estimates
of Eq. (4.2). In general, endogeneity arises because input choices are determined by
the firm’s beliefs regarding ωi t when these inputs are used.
Following Olley and Pakes (1996), we assume that labor l is the only variable
factor whose choice can be affected by the current value of ω and that capital k is a
fixed factor only affected by the distribution of ωi t , conditional on the information
available at time t − 1 and past values of ω. The investment demand function is
then given by ii t = i(ωi t , kit ). Provided ii t > 0, the equation is strictly increasing
in ω for any k, so that the investment demand function can be inverted to yield
ωi t = h(ii t , kit ). Substituting this result into Eq. (4.2) gives
yit = βl li t + φ(ii t , kit ) + ηi t , (4.3)
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where φ(ii t , kit ) = β0 + βkkit + h(ii t , kit ). Because φ(·) contains the productivity
term ω, which is the source of the simultaneity bias, we can estimate Eq. (4.3) to
obtain consistent estimates for βl .8 We use a fourth-order polynomial with interac-
tion terms in investment and capital to identify the unknown function φ(·). As the
investment demand function (and hence φ(·)) should differ across industries, we
estimate different polynomials for each of 10 main sectors: (i) food, textiles/apparel,
and wood/paper products; (ii) chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and refined petroleum
products; (iii) non-metallic products, basic metals, and fabricated metal products;
(iv) machinery and precision instruments; (v) electrical and electronic equipment;
(vi) transportation equipment; (vii) construction; (viii) trading; (ix) wholesale trade;
and (x) other service activities.
A firmmaximizes its expected value of both current and future profits and evolves
according to an exogenousMarkov process. In every period, the firm decides whether
to continue an operation along with decisions on its labor input l and investment i ,
conditional on staying in themarket.With consistent estimates ofβl , we use estimates
of the survival probabilities to identifyβk . The survival probabilities Prit are obtained
using a probit regression on a fourth-order polynomial with the interaction terms for
capital and investment with a one-period lag. The final step to estimate βk is as
follows:
yit − β̂l li t = βkkit + g(φ̂i t−1 − βkkit−1, ̂Prit ) + ηi t , (4.4)
where variables with a hat (ˆ) indicate estimators of these variables. In Eq. (4.4),
we also estimate the unknown function g(·) using a fourth-order polynomial with
interaction terms for φ̂i t−1 − βkkit−1 and ̂Prit with non-linear regression onβk . Using
consistent estimates of βl and βk , we estimate TFP as
T FPit = yit − β̂l li t − β̂kkit .
Table4.2 provides descriptive statistics for variables in our analysis. As shown, the
percentiles and means suggest that the distributions of these indexes are extremely
negatively skewed.
Table4.3 reports the correlations of the variables. In our data, it turns out that
the correlation between Tobin’s q and TFP is positive but weak. The correlation
coefficient is 0.013.9
8Equation (4.3) is referred to as the “partially linear”model,which identifiesβl but not the coefficient
of capital βk in the production function.
9The relationship between firm productivity and Tobin’s q is not obvious. In theory, there may or
may not be a positive relationship between them (Dwyer 2001). In the presence of ex ante uncertainty
with respect to the outcome of investment, and given that firmswith successful investmentswill have
high productivity and market value relative to the replacement cost of assets, a positive relationship
exists between productivity and Tobin’s q (Hopenhayn 1992; Jovanovic 1982; Melitz 2003). In
contrast, if physical capital embodies any productivity differential, the relationship between them
is not necessarily positive (Cooley et al. 1997). Some studies in the corporate finance literature find
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5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95%
Tobin’s
q
5221 1.177 0.723 0.441 0.577 0.840 1.106 1.390 1.714 1.986
T FP 5148 1.260 0.587 0.464 0.607 0.863 1.254 1.635 1.963 2.186
RXD 4884 0.132 0.550 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.048 0.154 0.326 0.459
RI D 4035 0.469 2.593 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.073 0.303 0.850 1.623
RIh D 2461 0.359 1.632 0.000 0.001 0.018 0.086 0.280 0.696 1.272
ROD 4792 0.014 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.057
RX Ih 2436 21.008 459.833 0.000 0.000 0.081 0.388 1.399 4.921 13.259
RIh X 2162 26.132 363.223 0.000 0.020 0.321 1.305 4.526 14.185 31.304
ROI 3402 8.722 292.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.151 0.506
RI O 940 160.636 818.611 0.000 0.000 1.629 9.425 47.427 181.589 584.900
CF 7432 3424.8 11313.1 −528.0 19.0 286.5 773.5 2356.5 6930.0 14646.0
LnK 6798 10.677 1.685 8.040 8.690 9.647 10.609 11.643 12.971 13.639
LnT B 5187 3.927 0.324 3.258 3.555 3.829 3.932 4.111 4.344 4.382
Source: Authors’ calculation from BSJBSA, BSOBA, and NEEDS for 1994–1999
Table 4.3 Correlations of variables
LnQ T FP RXD RI D RI h D ROD RX I h RI h X
LnQ 1.000
T FP 0.013 1.000
RXD −0.019 0.007 1.000
RI D 0.010 0.035 0.576 1.000
RI h D −0.016 0.082 0.455 0.854 1.000
ROD −0.082 −0.050 0.669 0.563 0.434 1.000
RX I h 0.094 0.015 0.019 0.099 −0.034 −0.005 1.000
RI h X −0.010 0.060 −0.045 0.013 0.054 −0.016 −0.007 1.000
ROI −0.071 0.047 −0.075 −0.138 −0.144 0.120 −0.002 −0.034
RI O 0.055 −0.195 0.005 −0.019 −0.037 −0.083 0.045 0.084
CF 0.134 0.145 0.028 0.113 0.109 −0.067 0.132 0.001
LnK 0.227 −0.213 0.063 0.159 0.153 −0.048 0.057 0.008
LnT B −0.006 −0.057 −0.029 0.118 0.107 0.044 0.031 −0.020
ROI RI O CF LnK LnT B
RO I 1.000
RI O −0.107 1.000
CF −0.107 0.058 1.000
LnK −0.214 0.115 0.476 1.000
LnT B −0.037 −0.072 0.061 0.353 1.000
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4.4 Estimation Strategy
In this section,we explain our empirical strategy. First, whenwe estimate the relation-
ship of Tobin’s q or TFP to our globalization indexes RXD, RI D, RI hD, and ROD,
we need to address the censoring problem in the data because only a small proportion
of the sampled firms engage in all three globalization activities. Thus, we implement
Tobit regression, in addition to the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation.
Second, as discussed in the previous section, the relative globalization indexes
(i.e., ROI and RX I h) in our sample have a strong negatively skewed distribution,
indicating that heterogeneity across firms may be substantial, and outliers may exist
in the dataset. As is well known, the presence of outliers can strongly distort the
OLS estimator, leading to unreliable results. Thus, in addition to the OLS method,
we employ several robust regression methods to cope with these issues, as robust
OLS estimator,median regression estimator, HuberM-estimator, andMM-estimator.
The robust OLS (ROLS) is an OLS regression with robust variance estimates (Huber
1981). Themedian regression estimator, or quantile regression (QR) estimator, deals
with the heterogeneity across firms and the presence of outliers (Wooldridge 2010).
Although the QR estimators are resistant to the existence of vertical outliers (i.e.,
outliers in the y dimension without outlying in the x dimension), they behave poorly
in the presence of bad leverage points (i.e., points associated with outlying values
in the x dimension that locate far away from the true regression line) (Verardi and
Croux 2009). In addition, their efficiency is lowat a normal distribution (Huber 1981).
TheHuberM-estimator generalizes the QR estimators by considering a loss function
other than the absolute values of the residuals, which increases the efficiency, keeping
robustness with respect to vertical outliers (Verardi and Croux 2009). However, the
M-estimators are not robust with respect to bad leverage points (Rousseeuw and
Yohai 1984). Finally, theMM-estimator introduced byYohai (1987) performswell in
both high efficiency and a high breakdown point. A breakdown point is the smallest
fraction of contamination (i.e., very bad outliers) in the sample that can cause an
estimator to take on values arbitrarily far from the true values (Rousseeuw and Leroy
1987). Thus, a higher breakdown point means that the estimator is more resistant to
outliers.10
In addition to the issue of outliers, endogeneity is another important issue to
be addressed in our estimation. Endogeneity potentially arises because factors that
simultaneously influence the choice of globalization mode and Tobin’s q may exist.
The problem of omitted variables may also involve endogeneity. For example, pre-
vious studies in the investment literature have shown that the presence of adjustment
costs or financial frictions causes Tobin’s q to diverge from the marginal value of
installed capital, or “marginal q” (Abel and Eberly 1994; Hennessy 2004). More
recently, Abel and Eberly (2011) have demonstrated that investment is positively
a positive relationship between the firm’s productivity and Tobin’s q even after controlling other
factors that affect the firm’s market value (Dwyer 2001; Palia and Lichtenberg 1999).
10For example, the OLS has a 0% breakdown point. In contrast, Yohai (1987) shows that the
MM-estimator guarantees a 50% breakdown point, which is the best that can be expected.
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related to both Tobin’s q and cash flow even in the absence of adjustment costs
or financial frictions. Moreover, Gala and Julio (2012) suggest that, in addition to
Tobin’s q and cash flow, firm size may play an important role in explaining invest-
ment. Therefore, our regression of the globalization indexes on Tobin’s qmay suffer
from omitted variable bias if these variables are not controlled for.
We employ the QRIV technique proposed by Lee (2007) to control for possi-
ble endogeneity with the potential presence of outliers. The estimation procedure
comprises two steps: the first step is to estimate the residuals of the reduced-form
equation for the endogenous explanatory variable (i.e., Tobin’s q); and the second
step is to use the reduced-form residual as an additional explanatory variable to esti-
mate the primary equation, which describes the relationship between the choice of
globalization mode and Tobin’s q.
In our QRIV estimations, we employ IVs that are assumed to be related to the
omitted variable problem in measuring firm performance, which are suggested in the
literature (Abel and Eberly 2011; Gala and Julio 2012). Among others, we employ
two sets of IVs to verify the robustness of our estimation results. The first set includes
the cash flow CFit−1 and the years in business T Bit for the headquarters company
i , where CFit−1 stands for the beginning-of-year cash flow for the headquarters
company i in year t − 1.11 We denote the QRIV with the first set of IVs as QRIV(1).
The second set of IVs comprises CFit−1/Kit−1, LnKit−1, and LnT Bit , which denote
the ratio of cash flow to capital stock, the natural logarithm of capital stock, and the
natural logarithm of years in business for the headquarters company, respectively.
Now Kit−1 is the beginning-of-year capital stock for the headquarters company i in
year t − 1.Weuse LnK as ameasurement of firm size, as suggested byGala and Julio
(2012). We denote the QRIV with the second set of IVs as QRIV(2). We assume that
if changes in these IVs are not controlled, they will be part of the error, accounting
for inconsistent estimates as long as they are correlated with the performance of the
headquarters companies, such as Tobin’s q.12
4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 The Relationships of Tobin’s q and TFP to the Degree
of the Firm’s Engagement in Globalization Modes
We first analyze the relationship between Tobin’s q or TFP and the degree of the
firm’s engagement in a particular globalization mode by regressing each of RXD,
RI D, RI hD, and ROD on Tobin’s q or TFP. Results are reported in Table4.4.
11Cash flow CFit is calculated by CFit = DEit + PFit − STit , where PF denotes profits.
12As shown in Table4.3, our IVs are fairly correlated with Tobin’s q, while they have no evident
correlation with the indexes of globalization activity.
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Table 4.4 OLS and Tobit estimates
OLS Tobit
RXD RI D RI h D ROD RXD RI D RI h D ROD
LnQ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.064 0.005∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.069 0.038∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.11) (0.058) (0.0014) (0.018) (0.10) (0.078) (0.0087)
No. of
obs.
4870 4024 2455 4778 4870 4024 2455 4778
R2 0.0208 0.0174 0.0139 0.0345
Pseudo
R2
0.0224 0.0057 0.0040 0.1512
T FP 0.033 −0.063 0.140 0.003 0.050∗∗ −0.063 0.156∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.19) (0.13) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.11) (0.087) (0.0097)
No. of
obs.
4870 4024 2455 4778 4870 4024 2455 4778
R2 0.0199 0.0137 0.0146 0.0342
Pseudo
R2
0.0225 0.0043 0.0042 0.1443
Notes: (a) A constant term and industrial and year dummies are included in the estimations. (b)
Values in the parentheses are standard errors. (c) ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
The upper panel of Table4.4 shows the results of OLS and Tobit regression of
the globalization indexes (i.e., RXD, RI D, RI hD, and ROD) on the logarithm of
Tobin’s q, denoted as LnQ. The estimation results for TFP are summarized in the
lower panel of Table4.4. The OLS and Tobit estimates of LnQ are both statistically
significant and positive except for the case of RI hD. In contrast, the OLS estimates
of TFP fail against the null hypothesis for all of the globalization indexes. After we
control for censoring problems by adopting Tobit regression censored at zero, the
estimates of T FP are positively significant for RXD, RI hD, and ROD.
Our results indicate the positive relationship between Tobin’s q and the global-
ization indexes. In addition, the results for T FP are consistent with Tomiura (2007)
for the most part. That is, highly productive firms tend to engage in more global-
ization activity (FDI, exporting, or FO). However, the results for RI D suggest that
higher-productivity firms do not necessarily have a higher ratio of foreign affiliate
sales to domestic sales of the headquarters company. This may be because FDI in
RI D includes both the horizontal and vertical types of FDI, and vertical FDI may
not be implemented by high-productivity firms.
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Table 4.5 Estimation results (explanatory variable: LnQ)
Regression technique Dependent Variable
ROI RI O RX I h RI h X
(1) OLS 44.078 75.197 23.169 −7.615
(30.86) (53.73) (14.81) (8.40)
(2) ROLS −0.025∗∗ −0.050 2.460 −0.069
(0.011) (0.035) (1.97) (0.11)
(3) QR −0.064∗∗ 8.160∗∗∗ −0.004 0.011
(0.027) (2.96) (0.024) (0.092)
(4) Huber M-estimators −0.056∗∗∗ 7.228∗∗ 0.093 −0.185
(0.021) (3.59) (0.058) (0.18)
(5) MM-estimators −0.022∗ 2.373∗∗ −0.057∗ −0.079
(0.0012) (1.05) (0.034) (0.070)
No. of Observations 858 828 2095 1964
Notes: (a) ROLS, QR, Huber M-estimation, and MM-estimation are implemented in Stata’s com-
mand rreg, qreg, mregress, and mmregress. (b) Chamberlain’s bandwidth and triangle
kernel function are used to measure robust VCE for qreg. (c) A constant term and industrial and
year dummies are included in the estimations. (d) Values in parentheses are robust standard errors
for (1), (3), and (5) and standard errors for (2) and (4). (e) Robust variance calculation is used in
the variance estimator for OLS regression. (f) ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
4.5.2 Tobin’s q and the Relative Choice of Globalization
Modes
We next regress the indexes of the relative choice of globalization modes on Tobin’s
q. As we calculate the ratios of the two globalization modes and their multiplicative
inverses (i.e., FO to the total FDI for ROI , exports to horizontal FDI for RX I h ,
and their multiplicative inverses, RI O and RI h X ), we exclude the observations that
have zero values for at least one of the two modes.13 We check the robustness of our
estimation results by including the observations with zero values in Sect. 4.5.3.
Table4.5 summarizes the results of regressing the four globalization indexes on
the logarithm of Tobin’s q, denoted as LnQ. We first estimate the model by the OLS.
As shown in row (1) of Table4.5, the OLS estimates of the coefficients of LnQ are
all insignificant, and the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is relatively large,
suggesting that the presence of outliers seriously affects the regression coefficients.
13Multi-nationality may possibly increase a firm’s Tobin’s q. As we restrict our sample to MNEs,
we do not have to address this issue. Morck and Yeung (1991) report that multi-nationality itself
does not significantly impact Tobin’s q.
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Thereafter, we run the ROLSwith robust variance estimates.14 As reported in row (2),
the magnitude of the estimated coefficients becomes modest by employing ROLS,
and the coefficient of ROI is negative at the 5% significance level.
We next run the robust regression with QR, Huber M-estimators, and MM-
estimators.15 Estimated results are reported in rows (3), (4), and (5) in Table4.5,
respectively. As shown in the table, the three types of estimates are all significant
and negative for ROI and positive for RI O , indicating that Tobin’s q is positively
correlated with a motive of a firm toward more FDI and away from FO. Unlike ROI
and RI O , the estimates of RX I h and RI h X are statistically insignificant, except for
the MM-estimate of RX I h , which is negative at the 10% significance level. Thus,
we cannot find any evident relationship of Tobin’s q to the choice of globalization
mode between horizontal FDI and exports.
Furthermore, we employ a QRIV technique using two sets of IVs, as explained
in the previous section, to account for the possible endogeneity.16 Table4.6 reports
the estimated results from the QRIV median estimates. It indicates that the results
are quite consistent between the two sets of IVs. That is, the estimated coefficient of
LnQ is negative and statistically significant for ROI and positive for RI O , whereas
the estimated coefficients are all insignificant for RX I h and RI h X . These results
suggest that our findings reported in Table4.5 can be supported even after controlling
for possible endogeneity in our estimations.
As the globalization indexes in our sample have a strong negatively skewed distri-
bution, the relationships between the globalization indexes and firm characteristics
may substantially differ at different points in the conditional distribution of the global-
ization indexes. We estimate the coefficients of LnQ for ROI and RX I h at various
quantiles between 10% and 90% using QRIV(2) to check heterogeneity between
globalization indexes and firm characteristics. We report the results in Fig. 4.1. In
this figure, we plot point and interval estimates fromQRIV(2) for LnQ. In each panel
in Fig. 4.1, the horizontal axis measures the quantile, and the vertical axis measures
the value of estimates. Moreover, the thick black lines depict the point estimates at
various quantiles, and dashed lines indicate the lower and upper bounds of a 95%
confidence interval.
Panel (1) shows that the confidence interval for the estimated coefficient of LnQ
in the regression of ROI lies below zero at all quantiles between 10% and 90%. In
14The ROLS estimations are implemented using Stata’s command rreg.
15The QR estimators, Huber M-estimators, and MM-estimators are obtained by using Stata’s com-
mand qreg, mregress, and mmregress. For the qreg, the robust VCE is used with Cham-
berlain’s bandwidth and triangle kernel function.
16The estimation is implemented using Stata’s commandcqiv. The Stata code forcqiv is released
and introduced by Chernozhukov et al. (2015). We employ an endogenous quantile estimation
involved in cqiv without censoring, which is developed on the basis of Lee (2007). The infor-
mation required to build pointwise confidence intervals is obtained by 500 bootstrap replications.
The value of t-statistics is measured using the bootstrap mean and the lower and upper bounds of a
95% confidence interval. To check the robustness of the estimated results by QRIV, we employ an
alternative approach of QRIV proposed by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008), using Stata’s com-
mand ivqreg produced by Kwak (2010). The results, which are available from the corresponding
author upon request, are fairly consistent with those in Table4.6.
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ROI RI O RX I h RI h X
QRIV(1) −0.228∗∗ 59.013∗ 0.017 1.693
(0.10) (34.11) (0.85) (3.26)
QRIV(2) −0.356∗∗∗ 55.569∗∗ 0.034 1.116
(0.11) (27.37) (0.85) (3.02)
No. of
Observations
869 835 2105 1973
Notes: (a) QRIV(1) and QRIV(2) estimations are implemented using Stata’s command cqiv with
500 bootstrap replications. (b) A constant term and industrial and year dummies are included in the
estimations. (c) Values in parentheses are standard errorsmeasured by bootstrap. (d) An endogenous
variable estimator is LnQ. QRIV(1) includes CFt−1 and T B , and QRIV(2) includes CFt−1/Kt−1,
LnKt−1, and LnT B as IVs. (e) ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively
contrast, panel (2) shows that the 95% confidence interval in the regression of RX I h
includes zero at all quantiles. As a result, Fig. 4.1 suggests that the estimated results
reported in Table4.6 hold at all quantiles between 10% and 90%.
4.5.3 Robustness of the Results
In the analysis in the previous subsection, we focused on firms engaging in multiple
globalization modes. However, firms may choose a single mode rather than multiple
modes, as suggested by theoretical models such as that in Chen et al. (2012). Thus,
we check whether our results in the previous subsection are robust even when we
include firms that engage only in a single mode in our estimation.
The globalization indexes we used in the previous subsection are ROI and RI O
for the choice between FO and FDI, and RX I h and RI h X for the choice between
exports and horizontal FDI. Here, we include observations with zero values for the
numerator of each index. For example, in the case of RI O , all firms in the sample
for estimation engage in FO but some of them do not conduct FDI.
Besides the estimation techniques we employed in the previous subsection, we
estimate the model using a censored quantile regression (CQR) technique to address
the censoring problem in the data.17 As shown in Table3.2, the value of ROI is zero
even at the 0.70 quantile because only a small fraction of firms that conduct FDI also
engage in FO. Consequently, we cannot obtain technically sound quantile estimates,
such as a median estimate, for ROI . Therefore, we omit the estimated results for
ROI .
17We use the Stata’s command cqiv, which implements the estimator proposed by Chernozhukov
and Hong (2002) for CQR.
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Fig. 4.1 Estimates and confidence intervals for LnQ by QRIV(2)
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QR CQR No. of Obs.
RI O 1.724 4.806∗ 1.110 5.076∗∗ 5.785∗ 920
(1.33) (2.75) (0.77) (2.43) (3.27)
RX I h −0.038 0.090∗ −0.009 0.037 0.042 2402
(0.027) (0.047) (0.021) (0.033) (0.060)
RI h X −0.062 −0.143 −0.106∗ −0.051 −0.044 2134
(0.092) (0.15) (0.062) (0.090) (0.15)
Notes: (a) Values in parentheses are standard errors. (b) The coefficients of QR and CQR are
estimated at median quartile. CQR is implemented using Stata’s commandcqivwith 500 bootstrap
replications. (c) ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. (d) A constant term and industrial and year dummies are included in the estimations
The estimated results with zero values in the numerator of the globalization index
are reported in Table4.7. The Huber M-estimator, QR, and CQR provide positive
and statistically significant estimates of the coefficient of LnQ in the regression of
RI O . In contrast, in the regression of RX I h , statistically insignificant estimates are
obtained for LnQ, except for the Huber M-estimator. Similarly, for RI h X , insignif-
icant estimates of LnQ are provided, except for the MM-estimator. These findings
are quite consistent with those in the previous subsection.
Thus, from the analysis in this subsection we conclude that our findings in
Sect. 4.5.2 are quite robust even when we include firms engaging in a single mode
in the estimation.
4.5.4 TFP and the Relative Choice of Globalization Modes
We next regress the indexes of globalization modes on TFP using the same esti-
mation methods as those employed in Sect. 4.5.2 to investigate any possible differ-
ences between Tobin’s q and productivity in the firm’s choice of globalization mode.
Table4.8 reports the estimated results.
As shown in the table, the estimates of ROI and RI O are insignificant for all
estimators. We cannot find any significant relationship of TFP to the choice of glob-
alization mode between FDI and FO.18 On the other hand, as for its relationship
with the choice between horizontal FDI and exports, the results indicate that the
estimates of RI h X are positive and statistically significant, except for OLS, and that
18This finding may appear to be inconsistent with the prediction of Antràs and Helpman (2004).
However, as Grossman et al. (2005) and Defever and Toubal (2013) show, the productivity ordering
in the model of Antràs and Helpman (2004) depends crucially on the relative size of fixed costs
associated to FDI and FO. That is, their prediction concerning the productivity ordering is not robust.
Our estimates reveal that there is actually no evident relationship between TFP and the choice of
FDI versus FO.
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Table 4.8 Estimation results (explanatory variable: T FP)
Regression technique Dependent Variable
ROI RI O RX I h RI h X
(1) OLS 139.478 −43.532 20.376 −8.680
(101.47) (47.11) (15.91) (16.84)
(2) ROLS 0.012 0.027 −0.449 0.225∗∗
(0.0094) (0.035) (1.68) (0.11)
(3) QR 0.007 −1.979 −0.110∗ 0.293∗∗
(0.020) (3.16) (0.066) (0.15)
(4) Huber M-estimators −0.014 3.445 −0.095∗ 0.312∗
(0.017) (3.04) (0.057) (0.17)
(5) MM-estimators −0.002 −1.063 0.021 0.126∗
(0.0054) (1.10) (0.022) (0.076)
No. of Observations 862 832 2104 1973
Notes: (a) ROLS, QR, Huber M-estimation, and MM-estimation are implemented using Stata’s
command rreg, qreg, mregress, and mmregress. (b) Chamberlain’s bandwidth and triangle
kernel function are used to measure robust VCE for qreg. (c) A constant term and industrial and
year dummies are included in the estimations. (d) Values in parentheses are robust standard errors
for (1) and (3) and standard errors for (2), (4), and (5). (e) Robust variance calculation is used in
the variance estimator for OLS. (f) ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively
the estimates of RX I h are negative and significant by QR and Huber M-estimators.
This suggests a positive relationship between TFP and a motive of a firm toward a
greater horizontal FDI and less export, which is consistent with the findings in the
large empirical literature.
It is then apparent from a comparison between Tables4.5 and 4.8 that the rela-
tionships of Tobin’s q with the relative choice of globalization modes clearly differ
from those of TFP.
4.6 Conclusion
Using Japanese firm-level data, we empirically investigated the manner in which
the firm’s choice of globalization mode differs according to the value of Tobin’s
q. Our empirical results indicated that Tobin’s q is negatively related to the ratio
of FO to FDI by Japanese MNEs. This finding implies that the knowledge-capital
intensity plays an important role in the choice between FDI and FO, as Chen et al.
(2012) demonstrate. This finding is consistent with that of Jinji et al. (2019b). In
contrast, we could not find a definite relationship between Tobin’s q and the ratio
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of exports to horizontal FDI. This may be explained by the dominance of a higher
technology transfer cost for knowledge capital and/or the imperfect contractibility
of knowledge capital over multi-plant economies of scale of knowledge capital.
Moreover, we found that the relationship between Tobin’s q and an MNE’s mode
choice for globalized activity fairly differs from the relationship between productivity
and an MNE’s choice of the mode for globalized activity. Our estimated results
revealed that TFP is negatively correlated with the ratio of exports to horizontal FDI
but has only an insignificant relationship with the outsourcing decision. The former
evidence supports the prediction by Helpman et al. (2004) and is consistent with the
findings of existing empirical studies.
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Chapter 5
Trade Patterns and International
Technology Spillovers: Theory and
Evidence from Japanese and European
Patent Citations
5.1 Introduction
International diffusion of knowledge is important to both the speed of the world’s
technology frontier expansion and income convergence across countries. For exam-
ple, Eaton and Kortum (1996) estimate innovation and technology diffusion among
19 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries
to test predictions from a quality ladders model of endogenous growth with patent-
ing. They find that each OECD country other than the United States obtains more
than half of its productivity growth from technological knowledge originated abroad.
They also find that more than half of the growth in every OECD country is derived
from innovation in the United States, Japan, and Germany. Eaton and Kortum (1999)
fit a similar model to research employment, productivity, and international patenting
among the five leading research economies, i.e., the United States, Japan, Germany,
the United Kingdom, and France. They find that research performed abroad is about
two-thirds as influential as domestic research. In particular, technological knowl-
edge from Japan and Germany diffuses most rapidly, while France and Germany are
the quickest to exploit knowledge. They also show that the United States and Japan
together contribute to over 65% of the growth in each of the five countries.
Previous studies have identified international trade as a major channel of inter-
national diffusion of knowledge.1 Coe and Helpman (1995) examine international
1 Trade works as a channel of international diffusion of knowledge because, for example, firms can
obtain information on advanced technology by reverse engineering of imported goods. International
trade also provides channels of cross-border communication that facilitates learning of production
and organizational methods and market conditions (Grossman and Helpman 1991). Another major
channel is foreign direct investment (FDI). Productivity spillovers through FDI are empirically
confirmed by a number of studies (Branstetter 2006; Haskel et al. 2007; Javorcik 2004; Keller and
Yeaple 2009), while some studies do not find significant spillovers (Aitken and Harrison 1999;
Haddad and Harrison 1993).
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productivity spillovers among OECD countries and find large spillover effects from
foreign research and development (R&D) capital stocks to domestic productivity that
is measured by total factor productivity (TFP). They also show that countries exhibit
higher productivity levels by importing goods from countries with high levels of
technological knowledge, which supports the existence of trade-related international
productivity spillovers. However, Keller (1998) provides a finding that casts doubt
on Coe and Helpman’s result by employing aMonte-Carlo-based robustness test. He
finds that estimated international productivity spillovers among randomly matched
trade partners turn out to be large (and even larger than those among actual trade
partners). Xu andWang (1999) estimate that about half of the returns on R&D invest-
ment in seven OECD countries spilled over to other OECD countries and that trade in
capital goods is a significant channel of productivity spillovers. Acharya and Keller
(2009) find that the diffusion of technological knowledge is strongly varying across
country-pairs. They show that imports are crucial for technology diffusion fromGer-
many, France, and the United Kingdom, while non-trade channels are relativelymore
important for the United States, Japan, and Canada.
Although a number of studies have investigated international diffusion of techno-
logical knowledge through trade, none of the existing studies have paid attention to
the relationship between bilateral trade patterns and technology spillovers. The only
exception is Jinji et al. (2015). They empirically examine the relationship between
the bilateral trade structure and technology spillovers. In this chapter, we comple-
ment Jinji et al. (2015) by both analyzing theoretically the relationship between the
bilateral trade structure and technology spillovers and providing further evidence on
such a relationship based on Japanese and European patent data.We follow Jinji et al.
(2015) to categorize bilateral trade flows into one way trade (OWT), or inter-industry
trade, and two-way trade, or intra-industry trade (IIT). IIT is further decomposed into
horizontal intra-industry trade (HIIT) and vertical intra-industry trade (VIIT) (e.g.,
Fontagné and Freudenberg 1997; Fukao et al. 2003; Greenaway et al. 1995). The
difference between HIIT and VIIT reflects differences in the quality of products in
the same category traded between two countries. In HIIT, horizontally differenti-
ated products (i.e., products with similar quality but different varieties) are traded,
whereas vertically differentiated products (i.e., products with different qualities) are
traded in VIIT.2 As for data, HIIT and VIIT can be distinguished by using unit values
(i.e., total value of import or export in one product category divided by the quantity
of import or export in that product category) under the assumption that unit values
are increasing in product quality.
The theoretical literature on IIT has been separated into two branches for a long
period. As is well known, trade models with monopolistic competition could explain
HIIT (e.g., Eaton and Kierzkowski 1984; Helpman 1981; Krugman 1979, 1980).
However, in these models, product varieties are symmetric and not differentiated in
2 Note that in the literature the terms of HIIT and VIIT are sometimes used in different meanings.
In an alternative definition, HIIT means trade of final goods in the same industry across countries,
while VIIT involves trade of intermediate goods with final goods in the same industry (Yomogida
2004). Since we do not consider the distinction between intermediate goods and final goods in this
chapter, this alternative definition of HIIT and VIIT is not applicable.
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quality. Trade models with vertical differentiation, on the other hand, could explain
VIIT but could not explain HIIT (e.g., Falvey 1981; Falvey and Kierzkowski 1987;
Flam and Helpman 1987; Herguera and Lutz 1998; Lambertini 1997; Motta et al.
1997; Shaked and Sutton 1984). Given the fact that HIIT and VIIT arise in con-
tinuous phenomena, this divergence in the theory would not be acceptable. More
recently, a number of studies have attempted to introduce quality differentiation into
themonopolistically competitive trademodel. Some studies use a quality-augmented
type of Dixit–Stiglitz demand specification (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977) in the frame-
work of Melitz (2003)3 with the assumption that higher quality is associated with
higher marginal cost (Baldwin and Harrigan 2011; Gervais 2015; Helble and Okubo
2008; Johnson 2012; Kugler and Verhoogen 2012; Mandel 2010). On the other hand,
Antoniades (2015) introduces quality differentiation into the quasi-linear utility with
a quadratic subutility specification in the framework of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
and considers endogenous quality upgrading by heterogeneous firms. He shows that
firmswith higher productivity choose higher qualities and charge higher prices. How-
ever, his model has some limitations when it is extended to the case of two-country
trade. In this chapter, we also introduce quality differentiation into the framework
of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). We employ a different approach from Antoniades
(2015). We assume that firms randomly draw their product quality so that firms with
identical productivity are heterogeneous in product quality. This reflects the stochas-
tic nature of product R&D. This formulation of quality differentiation turns out to
be tractable. Then, we show that our model can explain OWT, HIIT, and VIIT in one
unified framework. Using this framework, we examine how international technology
spillovers are associated with bilateral trade structure.
For empirical analysis of international technology spillovers,we use data on patent
citations as a proxy for spillovers of technological knowledge. There are a number
of empirical studies on knowledge flow based on patent citations (e.g., Haruna et al.
2010; Hu and Jaffe 2003; Jaffe and Trajtenberg 1999; Jaffe et al. 1993; MacGarvie
2006; Mancusi 2008).4 In the literature, patent citation data are used as a direct
measure of technology spillovers (Hall et al. 2007). Hu and Jaffe (2003) use data on
patents granted in theUnitedStates and examine patent citations by inventors residing
in Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States to infer the pattern of technological
knowledge flows from the United States and Japan to Korea and Taiwan. They find
that Korean patents are much more likely to cite Japanese patents than US patents,
while Taiwanese patents cite both Japanese and US patents evenly. Mancusi (2008)
estimates technological knowledge diffusion within and across sectors and countries
by using European patents and citations for 14 OECD countries. She finds that
international knowledge diffusion is effective in increasing innovative productivity
in technologically laggard countries, while technological leaders (the United States,
3 Originally, Melitz (2003) mentions that differences in productivity may be interpreted as those in
product quality at equal cost.
4 However, Jaffe et al. (1993) admit that patent citations are a coarse and noisymeasure of knowledge
flow, because not all inventions are patented and not all knowledge flows can be captured by patent
citations. Based on a survey of inventors, Jaffe et al. (2000) suggest the validity of patent citations
as indicators of technology spillovers, despite the presence of noise.
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Japan, and Germany) are a source rather than a destination of knowledge flows.
Using French firms’ patent citations and firm-level trade data, MacGarvie (2006)
finds that the patents of importing firms are significantly more likely to be influenced
by technology in the exporting country than are the patents of firms that do not
import. In contrast, she finds no significant evidence of exporting firms’ citing more
patents from their destination countries. Moreover, Haruna et al. (2010) investigate
whether the trade structure plays an important role as a channel of technological
knowledge diffusion between Asian economies (Korea, Taiwan, China, and India)
and G7 countries including the United States and Japan. In that paper, they use a
modified version of the Balassa’s index of Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA),
which represents the share of country i in sector j relative to the country’s export
(or import) share for all sectors. Then, they find that trade specialization, especially
import specialization, has a direct effect on knowledge diffusion.
In this chapter, we take our study one step further and investigate in more detail
the relationship between bilateral trade patterns and international knowledge flow.
In order to accomplish this task, we develop a two-country model of monopolistic
competition with quality differentiation, in which inter- and (horizontal and vertical)
intra-industry trade patterns endogenously arise, depending on the conditions of
trading countries. Our model is an extension of the model developed by Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008), and firms are heterogeneous in product quality rather than
in productivity. Then, after deriving hypotheses from the model, we test them by
using data on bilateral trade among 44 countries/economies and patent citations at
the European and Japanese patent offices.
The main results are as follows. Our model predicts that the bilateral trade pattern
is HIITwhen the two countries have access to a similar level of technology, while it is
VIIT when there is technological difference between them. Moreover, if the techno-
logical difference is sufficiently large, the bilateral trade pattern becomes OWT. Our
model also predicts that technology spillovers are highest when the bilateral trade
pattern is HIIT, followed by VIIT and OWT. Our estimation results basically confirm
the predictions of the model. We find that an increase in the share of intra-industry
trade in the bilateral trade has a positive effect on the number of patent citations
between the two countries. HIIT has a larger effect than VIIT. On the other hand,
the effects of OWT on the number of citations are much weaker than those of IIT.
These findings for Japanese and European patents are generally consistent with that
of Jinji et al. (2015) for the US patents.
The remainder of the chapter is organized in the followingway. Section5.2 sets up
a closed-economy model of monopolistic competition with quality differentiation.
Section5.3 extends the model to the case of two-country trade and derives testable
implications from the theoretical model. Section5.4 conducts an empirical analysis.
Section5.5 concludes this chapter.
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5.2 The Basic Model
In this section, we describe the basic structure of the model in a closed economy.
Consider country d that has two sectors: a homogenous numeraire sector and a
differentiated manufacturing sector.5 We introduce quality differentiation in a quasi-
linear (instantaneous) utility with a quadratic subutility, developed byOttaviano et al.
(2002) andMelitz and Ottaviano (2008).6 There are Ld consumers, which is constant
over time. Preferences are identical across consumers and defined over a continuum
of differentiated varieties indexed by i ∈ Ωd , whereΩd is a set of varieties available
in themarket, and a homogeneous numeraire good. The infinitely lived representative





where ρ is the common subjective discount rate and u(t) is the instantaneous utility
given by
u(t) = q0t +
∫
i∈Ωdt














where q0t and qit are the individual consumption levels of the numeraire and variety i ,
andαi t > 0measures the product quality of variety i at time t .7 The parameter γ > 0
measures the degree of horizontal differentiation, and the parameter η > 0 captures
the degree of substitution between the differentiated varieties and the numeraire.
We assume that consumers have positive demands for the numeraire. The inverse
demand for variety i is then given by
pdit = αi t − γqit − ηQt , (5.3)
where pdit is the price of variety i , and Qt =
∫
i∈Ωdt qitdi is the total consumption
level over all varieties. Let Ωd∗t ⊂ Ωdt be the subset of varieties that are actually
consumed. From Eq. (5.3), the market demand for variety i ∈ Ωd∗t is
5 In this section, we develop a simple two-sector model. The analysis can be easily extended to a
model with many differentiated manufacturing sectors, similar to that in Eckel and Neary (2010).
However, such an extension will not qualitatively change the main results.
6 The formulation proposed by Antoniades (2015) is different from ours. In his model, more pro-
ductive firms choose higher qualities and charge higher prices. Another approach is to use a quality-
augmented Dixit–Stiglitz demand specification (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977) in the framework ofMelitz
(2003), which assumes that higher quality is associated with higher marginal cost (Baldwin and
Harrigan 2011; Johnson 2012; Kugler and Verhoogen 2012).
7 Häckner (2000) provides this treatment of product quality in a discrete version of quadratic utility.
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qdit ≡ Ldqit =
Ld
γ










where Ndt is themeasure of consumedvarieties inΩ
d∗
t , and ᾱ
d
t = (1/Ndt )
∫
i∈Ωd∗t αi tdi




itdi are their average quality and price.
In both sectors, labor, which is inelastically supplied in the competitive labor
market, is the only production factor. One unit of labor is required to produce one
unit of the numeraire, yielding that the wage rate w is equal to one.
In the differentiated manufacturing sector, each firm produces a different variety.
Every product variety has generations (or versions) depending on the date of develop-
ment. For simplicity, we assume that each product generation loses its consumption
value after one period. Thus, each firmmust engage in product R&D to develop a new
generation of variety in every period. While the cost of product R&D, f (measured
in units of labor), is identical for all manufacturing firms, the outcome of product
R&D, αi t , is stochastic.8 Since R&D in practice has an uncertain outcome, it is quite
natural to model R&D as a stochastic process. Let αdMt be the maximum possible
product quality with the current technology. For firm i the degree of successfulness
of R&D, ait , is randomly given from a time-invariant common (and known) prob-
ability density function g(a) with support on [a, 1], where a ∈ (0, 1). Assume that
g′(a) < 0. Then, firm i’s product quality is given by αi t = aitαdMt . This implies that
the product R&D can be equivalently expressed as a random draw from a cumula-
tive distribution function Gdt (α) with support on [αdt ,αdMt ], where αdt = aαdMt . As
is explained below, Gdt (α) shifts as time passes. Let us normalize α
d
M0 = 1.
In the manufacturing sector, firms compete in a three-stage game. In stage one,
all potential entrants decide whether to engage in product R&D. In stage two, the
firms that chose to conduct R&D observe the outcome of the R&D and then decide
whether to stay in the market. In stage three, the firms that chose to stay in the market
select prices to maximize their own profits.
Avariety of themanufactured goods is produced under the constant returns to scale
technology at unit labor requirement c. Givenw = 1, c is the (constant)marginal cost.
Since the R&D costs are sunk costs, firms able to cover their marginal production
costs survive and supply goods to the market. Surviving firms maximize their profits
in each period by taking the average quality level ᾱd , the average price level p̄d and
the number of firms Nd in that period as given. Hereafter, we omit the time index
unless it is necessary. Given the market demand for variety i (Eq. (5.4)), it is easily
seen that the price elasticity of demand, εi ≡ −(∂qdi /∂ pdi )(pdi /qdi ), does not tend
to infinity as Nd goes to infinity. Thus, the manufacturing sector is characterized by
monopolistic competition. Let pdmax(α) be the price at which demand for a variety
with quality α is driven to 0. Equation (5.4) yields
8 The cost of product R&D serves as a fixed entry cost. Since firms pay a fixed entry cost and are
randomly given their productivity parameter in Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008),
they engage in stochastic process R&D. In our model, however, firms engage in stochastic product
R&D.
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pdmax(α) ≡ α −
ηNd
ηNd + γ (ᾱ
d − p̄d). (5.5)
Then, any i ∈ Ωd∗ satisfies pdi ≤ pdmax(αi ). Given Eq. (5.4), firm i’s gross profit





[pdD(α) − c], (5.6)
where qdD(α) and p
d
D(α) are profit-maximizing output and price for domestic sales
of the product with quality α and the subscript D indicates variables for domestic
sales. Let αdD be the quality level for the firm that earns zero profit from domestic
sales due to pdD(α
d
D) = pdmax(αdD) = c. Equation (5.5) yields
αdD =
ηNd
ηNd + γ (ᾱ
d − p̄d) + c. (5.7)
Then, substitute Eq. (5.4) into Eq. (5.6) and use Eq. (5.7) to obtain





This implies that firms with positive demands charge prices above the marginal cost











Note that the average product quality of the surviving firms, ᾱd , is expressed as
ᾱd = [∫ αdM
αdD
αdGdt (α)]/[1 − Gdt (αdD)] and the mass of entrants in country d is given
by NdE = Nd/[1 − Gdt (αdD)].
We assume the following condition:
Assumption 5.1 0 < dᾱd/dαdD < 1.
This condition means that an increase in the cut-off quality increases the average
quality of products supplied in the market, but the extent of the increase in the
average quality of the products is smaller than that of the increase in αdD . This
condition restricts the shape of the distribution Gdt (α).
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Let μdD(α) = pdD(α) − c and πdD(α) = pdD(α)qdD(α) − qdD(α)c be the absolute








(α − αdD)2. (5.10)





t (α) − f










(α − αdD)2dGdt (α) = f. (5.11)
From Eqs. (5.9) and (5.11), we obtain
Lemma 5.1 (i) Given Gdt (α), α
d
D and ᾱ
d are both decreasing in f (R&D cost) and
γ (the degree of horizontal differentiation) and increasing in Ld (the market size).
(ii) Under Assumption 5.1, for a given Gdt (α), a higher α
d
D results in a higher N
d
(more varieties) and a higher NdE (more entrants).
Proof Part (i) is directly obtained from Eq. (5.11). For part (ii), differentiate Eq.












Assumption 5.1 ensures that the right-hand side of the above equation is positive.
Then, since NdE = Nd/[1 − Gdt (αdD)], a higher αdD and a higher Nd result in a higher
NdE . Q.E.D.
We consider a shift of the distribution Gd(α) to the right with keeping its shape.
Lemma 5.2 An upward shift of Gd(α) leaves μdD(α) and π
d
D(α) unchanged, but
increases Nd and NdE .
Proof Let Gd0(α0) and Gd1(α1) be the distributions before and after the change,
respectively. Let αd0M and α
d1
M be the upper bounds of G
d0(α0) and Gd1(α1), and
set αd1M = αd0M + k with k > 0. Then, since α1 = α0 + k holds for any α0 and α1
that take the same relative position in each distribution, Eq. (5.11) for Gd0(α0) can
be transformed to that of Gd1(α1). Thus, Eq. (5.10) is unchanged. However, since
ᾱd − αdD is unchanged and αd1D = αd0D + k, Eq. (5.9) yields a higher Nd and hence
a higher NdE . Q.E.D.
This lemma implies that as long as all firms have equal access to general knowl-
edge, technology improvement, in the sense of an upward shift of Gd(α), increases
the absolute levels of product quality for all varieties, but the relative positions of the
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firms in the industry remain unchanged. Besides, Lemma 5.2 implies that there are
more varieties in an economy with advanced technology than in an economy with
less advanced technology.
5.3 Trade Between Two Countries
5.3.1 A Two-Country Setting
Now, we consider two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F), with Ld consumers
in country d (= H, F). Consumers in both countries share the same preferences
given by Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2). We assume that the markets in the two countries are
segmented, while firms can produce in one location and supply their products to the
market in the other country by incurring a per-unit trade cost.
Manufacturing firms in the two countries have the same marginal cost c and
draw product quality αd from their domestic distributions Gdt (α) with support on
[αdt ,αdMt ].
Following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), we assume that firms in country s ( 	= d,
s = H, F) must incur the unit cost of τ dc with τ d > 1 to deliver one unit of their
products to themarket in country d.We also assume that the homogeneous numeraire
good is always produced in each country after opening up to trade, such that the wage
rate is equal to one in both countries.
The price threshold for positive demand in market d is given by Eq. (5.5), but Nd
denotes the mass of firms selling in country d, which includes both domestic firms
in country d and exporters from country s, and ᾱd and p̄d are average quality and
average price of both local and exporting firms in country d. Let NdD and N
d
X denote
the masses of firms producing in country d that supply products to the domestic
market and the other country’s market, respectively. Then, Nd = NdD + NsX holds.
Firms maximize their profits earned from local and export sales independently
(due to the assumptions of segmented markets and constant returns to scale tech-
nology). The quality level for a firm producing in country d that earns zero profits
from local sales, αdD , is still given by Eq. (5.7). Similarly, let α
d
X be the quality level
for the firm producing in country d that earns zero profits from export sales. From
p(αdX ) = psmax(αdD) = τ sc, we obtain
αdX =
ηNs
ηNs + γ (ᾱ
s − p̄s) + τ sc. (5.12)
From Eqs. (5.7) and (5.12), it holds that
αsX = αdD + (τ d − 1)c. (5.13)
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Let πdX (α) = [pdX (α) − τ sc]qdX (α) be the maximized value of profits for a firm
with quality α producing in country d from export sales, where pdX (α) is the profit-
maximizing price for export sales and qdX (α) is the corresponding quantity. From the
first-order condition, it holds that qdX (α) = (Ls/γ)[pdX (α) − τ sc]. Then, the optimal




+ τ sc, qdX (α) =
Ls(α − αdX )
2γ
.




(α − αdX )2. (5.14)
Note that the maximized profits from domestic sales, πdD(α), are still given by Eq.
(5.10).
In the case of the open economy, the free-entry equilibrium condition in country










t (α) = f.
Substitute Eqs. (5.10), (5.13), and (5.14) into this to yield the two free-entry equi-












α − αFDt − (τ F − 1)c
]2












α − αHDt − (τ H − 1)c
]2
dGFt (α) = 4γ f, (5.16)
which jointly determine the cut-off qualities for domestic sales in countries H and F
at time t , αHDt and α
F











t (α) > f .
Assumption 5.2 ensures that the range of possible product qualities is wide enough
to yield the interior cut-off for country d, that is, αdDt > α
d
t , even in the latter case.
This assumption implies that there are always some firms that exit the market in
country d even if no firm enters the market in country s.
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The mass of firms selling in country d at time t is still determined by Eq. (5.9),




α dGdt (α) +
∫ αsMt
αdDt+(τ d−1)c α dG
s
t (α)
2 − Gdt (αdDt ) − Gst (αdDt + (τ d − 1)c)
, d 	= s.
The mass of entrants producing in country d at time t , NdEt , is now determined
by
[1 − GHt (αHDt )]NHEt + [1 − GFt (αFXt )]N FEt = NHt ,
[1 − GFt (αFDt )]N FEt + [1 − GHt (αHXt )]NHEt = N Ft ,
where [1 − Gdt (αdDt )]NdEt = NdDt and [1 − Gdt (αdXt )]NdEt = NdXt , for d = H, F . The
free-entry equilibrium conditions (5.15) and (5.16) hold so long as there is a positive
mass of entrants NsEt > 0 in country s at time t . Otherwise, N
s
Et = 0 and country s
specializes in the production of the numeraire good.
5.3.2 Technology Spillovers
In the manufacturing sector, an individual firm’s technological knowledge spills
over to other firms irrespective of whether or not its spillovers are deliberate. In the
spirit of Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1990, 1991), we assume that
technological knowledge has a public-good nature. That is, each individual firm’s
R&D output contributes to “knowledge” in the country, and all firms in the same
country have equal access to the general knowledge of the country without any
added cost. We capture technology spillovers by the expansion of the technology
frontier, αMt . More specifically, we assume that αdMt changes in the following way:
α̇dMt = λKdt αdMt , d = H, F, (5.17)
where λ > 0 and Kdt is the knowledge flow at time t . Assuming that the knowledge
flow is proportional to the number of varieties supplied in the country and knowledge
spillover is perfect within a country but imperfect across countries, we have





{= 1, if αdMt = αsMt ,
∈ (0, 1), otherwise, (5.19)
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which controls the degree of international knowledge spillovers, depending on the




In Eq. (5.18), our primary interest is in technology spillovers from countries s to
d at time t , Sdst :
Sdst = φd(αdMt ,αsMt )NsXt . (5.20)
We assume that technology spillovers are proportional to the number of varieties
actually imported. However, the degree of technology spillovers is reduced unless
the two countries share the same technology level: when country d is more tech-
nologically advanced than country s, knowledge spillovers from s to d are reduced
because a technologically advanced country benefits less from an inferior technol-
ogy, and when country d is technologically less advanced than country s, knowledge
spillovers from s to d may also be reduced as a technologically less advanced country
has a lower capacity to absorb knowledge.
5.3.3 Trade Patterns and Technology Spillovers
We now investigate the relationship between trade patterns and international technol-
ogy spillovers. First consider a case inwhich two countries share the same technology
at a given time t , that is,αHMt = αFMt . If the size of themarket and the trade barriers are
symmetric (i.e., LH = LF and τ H = τ F ), then the countries have the same average
quality and the same average price of export goods. Then the two countries have an
HIIT trade pattern. As a result, technology spillovers occur in both directions in the
same degree (i.e., SHFt = SFHt ) because φH = φL = 1 and NHXt = N FXt .
We next consider cases in which there is a technology gap between the two coun-
tries. Without loss of generality, we assume that the home country is technologically
superior to the foreign country at a given time.We continue to assume that LH = LF .
It is useful to consider both a symmetric case, αHMt = αFMt , and an asymmetric
case, αHMt > α
F
Mt . Let us label the symmetric case as “case 0” and the asymmetric
case as “case 1”. Assume that αH0Mt = αH1Mt = αF0Mt > αF1Mt holds, where the numerical
superscript (0 or 1) indicates the symmetric or asymmetric case. It follows from this
assumption that GH0t (α) = GH1t (α) = GF0t (α) holds for all α , and GF0t (α) first-
order stochastically dominatesGF1t (α), i.e.,G
F1
t (α) ≥ GF0t (α) for anyα. Then, from











holds (d = H, F). Moreover, from Eq. (5.13), αd0Dt > αd1Dt implies αd0Xt > αd1Xt , and
hence Nd0Xt > N
d1
Xt holds for the free-entry equilibrium conditions.
In case 0, due to transport costs, competition must be more intensive in the home








9 The average quality and price of goods exported
from country d are given by
9 Note that if τ H = τ F = 1, then the cut-off quality has to be identical in the two markets.





1 − Gdt (αdXt )




In case 1, αH1Mt > α
F1
Mt holds, and this difference is larger than that between α
F1
Xt and





and p̄H1Xt > p̄
F1
Xt hold. On average, the home country exports varieties with a higher
quality at a higher price.
Recall that the size of technology spillovers from countries s to d is measured by
Eq. (5.20), which consists of the degree of technology spillovers, φd , and the mass
of varieties actually imported, NsXt . As for technology spillovers under VIIT, φ
H and
φF are both smaller in case 1 than in case 0, and NHXt and N
F
Xt are both smaller in
case 1 than in case 0. In other words, when countries engage in VIIT, both the degree
of technology spillovers and the mass of varieties actually imported are smaller in
either direction, compared to the case of HIIT. Therefore, we obtain
Result 5.1 The size of technology spillovers is lower in either direction when the
trade pattern is VIIT than when it is HIIT.
This result implies that two countries with similar levels of technologies benefit more
from technology spillovers than those with different levels of technologies.











Xt . However, this does
not necessarily imply that the size of technology spillovers from countries H to F is
larger than in the opposite direction. The reason is that φH > φF may hold and may
cause SHF > SFH to hold. Thus, we obtain
Result 5.2 When the trade pattern is VIIT, the relative size of technology spillovers
from the home country to the foreign country and those in the opposite direction is
ambiguous.
The intuition is the following: the country exporting varieties with higher average
quality exports more varieties than the other exporting country. However, the country
importing varietieswith higher average qualitymaynot necessarily benefitmore from
technology spillovers because its absorptive capacity of technology is lower and a
difference in the absorptive capacity may dominate the effect of a larger mass of
varieties in imports.
We next consider a case where the technology gap between the two countries is
widened further, such that either (i)αFMt < α
F
Xt holds or (ii) the free-entry equilibrium












α − αHDt − (τ H − 1)c
]2
dGFt (α) < 4γ f.
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In the former case, some foreign firms may still enter the manufacturing sector but
no foreign firms can export goods to country H. In the latter case, N FEt = 0 holds
and country F is specialized in the numeraire. In either case, the trade pattern is
characterized by pure OWT. Technology spillovers still occur from countries H to
F but no spillovers occur in the opposite direction. As is evident from the above
discussion of the VIIT trade pattern, a widened technology gap causes αHDt and α
F
Dt
to be smaller under OWT than under VIIT. Then, αHXt is also smaller when there
is OWT than when there is VIIT, which implies that the mass of varieties exported
from country H (i.e., NHXt ) is smaller when there is OWT. Moreover, since the gap
between αHMt and α
F
Mt is greater, φ
F becomes smaller.
Result 5.3 The size of technology spillovers is lower in the OWT case than in the
VIIT case.
As will be argued in the next section, OWT does not necessarily mean that the
trade pattern is completely inter-industry. In the empirical analysis, a small amount
of intra-industry trade that is below some critical value is categorized into OWT.
Thus, the direction of technology spillovers in the case of OWT is not necessarily
one way.
One may presume that the technology gap between two countries rather than
trade patterns is the primary factor determining international technology spillovers.
This may not hold true because the technology gap itself does not induce technology
spillovers if there is no trade between two countries.
From the theoretical investigation, we obtained three testable hypotheses (i.e.,
Results 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3) on the relationship between trade patterns and international
technology spillovers. In the next section, we empirically test these three hypotheses.
5.4 Empirical Analysis
In the previous section, we have shown that technology spillovers across countries
may be related to the patterns of bilateral trade. In this section, we empirically test the
predictions of the theoretical model by using bilateral trade data and patent citation
data.
5.4.1 Estimation Framework
We first explain the method of categorizing bilateral trade flows. In the previous
studies, trade patterns are usually categorized into three types, namely, OWT, HIIT,
and VIIT (e.g., Fontagné and Freudenberg 1997; Fukao et al. 2003; Greenaway et al.
1995). The standard method of categorization is given by Fontagné and Freudenberg
(1997), which is based on the assumption that the gap between the unit values of
imports and exports for each commodity reflects the qualitative differences of the
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products exported and imported between two countries.10 We extend the standard
method to take the direction of trade into account and categorize bilateral trade flows
into five types.
Let Xi jk and Mi jk be the values of country i’s exports to and imports from country
j of product k, respectively. Then, the trade pattern in industry k is one-way trade
with importing (OWTM ) if
min(Xi jk, Mi jk)
max(Xi jk, Mi jk)
≤ θ and Xi jk < Mi jk
hold, where θ is set at some value, and one-way trade with exporting (OWTX ) if
min(Xi jk, Mi jk)
max(Xi jk, Mi jk)
≤ θ and Xi jk > Mi jk
hold. The trade pattern in industry k is two-way trade or intra-industry trade (IIT) if
min(Xi jk, Mi jk)
max(Xi jk, Mi jk)
> θ
holds. IIT is further divided into three types. Let UV Xi jk and UV
M
i jk be unit values of
country i’s exports to and imports from country j of product k, respectively. Then,
the trade pattern in industry k is horizontal intra-industry trade (HIIT) if




≤ 1 + ξ
holds (This condition is the same as that in the standard method), where ξ is set
at some value. The trade pattern in industry k is vertical intra-industry trade with
importing higher-quality products (VIITM ) if
UV Xi jk
UV Mi jk
< 1 − ξ
10 There is another method of categorizing trade patterns proposed by Greenaway et al. (1994,
1995), which is based on a decomposition of Grubel–Lloyd index. In their method, intra-industry
trade in industry k is measured by
I I Tk = 1 −
∑





where n refers to products and z denotes HIIT or VIIT. In order to disentangle total IIT into HIIT
and VIIT, they also use the ratio of unit values. Fontagné et al. (2006) investigate the difference
between these two methods. They argue that, while the two methods diverge on the definition of
IIT, they rely on the same assumption regarding the relationship between unit values and the quality
of traded products.
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> 1 + ξ




i jk + Mzi jk)∑
k(Xi jk + Mi jk)
,
where z denotes one of the five trade types, i.e., OWTM , OWTX , HIIT, VIITM , and
VIITX . In the above conditions, the choice of θ and ξ is to a large extent arbitrary.
Although Fontagné and Freudenberg (1997) and some other studies use ξ = 0.15,
Fontagné et al. (2006) report the sensitivity of the relative importance of HIIT to total
intra-industry trade and argue that defining θ as 0.1 and ξ as 0.25 is quite reasonable.
Fukao et al. (2003) also employ θ = 0.1 and ξ = 0.25 and argue that a 25% threshold
would be reasonable because of the possible effects of exchange rate fluctuations on
the value recorded in trade statistics and noise in the measurements of unit values at
a six-digit level of trade statistics. Then we use θ = 0.1 and ξ = 0.25 in our analysis.
We use patent citations to measure technology spillovers. The use of patent cita-
tions in measuring technology spillovers has been pioneered by Jaffe et al. (1993), in
which patent citations are used to measure the extent of technology spillovers within
the United States. Every US patent applicant is required to disclose any knowledge
of the “prior art” in his or her application. Hall et al. (2001) point out that the pre-
sumption for using patent citations as a proxy for learning technology is that the
citations to the “prior art” are informative of the causal links between those patented
innovations, because citations made may constitute a “paper trail” for diffusion, i.e.,
the fact that patent B cites patent Amay be indicative of knowledge flowing fromA to
B. This logic is also practicable to the case of the patent citations between countries.
On the other hand, patent citations between two countries may be associated with
the past records of patenting in both the cited and the citing countries. The number
of patents filed by the citing country is related to the scale of human resource in
this country, and reflects the indigenous capacity to absorb foreign technology. The
number of patents in the cited country simultaneously implies a potential opportunity
of citations for the citing country. Based on the reasoning above, our regressionmodel
is defined as follows:
ln c∗i j t = β′xi j t + εi j t
= β1Sharei j t (OWTM , OWTX , H I I T, V I I TM , or V I I TX )
+β2 ln(Pit × Pjt ) + ui j + ei j t ,
where c∗i j t is the number of patent citations made by patents filed by country i (the
citing country) to country j (the cited country) in year t , xi j t is a vector of independent
variables, Sharei j t is bilateralOWTM , OWTX , HIIT,VIITM , orVIITX share between
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countries i and j in year t , Pit and Pjt are the number of patent applications filed by
countries i and j , respectively, in year t .11 Thus, we use c∗i j t as a proxy for technology
spillovers from countries j to i . The term Pit × Pjt is included to control the effects
of the citing country’s absorptive capacity of technology and the cited country’s
potential opportunity of citations.
Since some countries rarely cite patents applied by inventors of other countries,
there are substantial zero values in c∗i j t . We then use a random-effects panel Tobit
model to deal with this issue. In that case, the dependent variable is now a latent
variable, where
ln ci j t =
{
ln c∗i j t , if c
∗
i j t > 0,
0, otherwise,
and




In general, independence between the u and e is assumed. On the other hand,
there is neither a convenient test nor an estimation method for the test of random
versus fixed-effects of the Tobit model as well as for estimation of a conditional
fixed-effects model.12 In order to assess the robustness of the estimated results by
the random-effects panel Tobit model, we try to use a fixed-effects negative binomial
model proposed by Hausman et al. (1984) for our same sample.
5.4.2 Data
5.4.2.1 Trade Data
There are several kinds of datasets on empirical analysis of international trade such
as International Trade Commodity Statistics (ITCS–SITC) released by the OECD,
and Personal Computer Trade Analysis System (PC–TAS) published by the United
Nations Statistical Division. As indicated by Gaulier and Zignago (2008), the empir-
ical analysis suffers due to the two different figures for the same trade flow, because
the import values are generally reported in CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) and
export values in FOB (free on board). To reconcile the two figures, Gaulier and Zig-
nago (2008) develop a procedure to estimate an average CIF rate and remove it from
11 The stochastic nature of product R&D assumed in our theoretical model is not directly reflected
in our estimation framework. As we have shown in the previous sections, however, the average
quality and the distribution of quality among actually supplied products in an industry are invariant
for a given distribution Gt (α). Since we use the industry average to determine the bilateral trade
patterns, our empirical framework is considered to be consistent with the theoretical model in the
previous sections.
12 Honoré (1992) has developed a semiparametric estimator for fixed-effects Tobit models.
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the declarations of imports to provide FOB import values for bilateral trade flows
drawn on United Nations COMTRADE data. Nowwe utilize this reconstructed trade
dataset, called BACI. The BACI dataset covers more than 200 countries and 5,000
products from 1995.13 In this chapter we use the BACI data from 1995 to 2004.
5.4.2.2 Patent Citation Data
The data on patents and patent citations used in this chapter consist of two sources,
i.e., EuropeanPatentOffice (EPO)WorldwidePatent StatisticalDatabase (PATSTAT)
and the Institute of Intellectual Property (IIP) Dataset. We collect the patent statistics
of EPO from the former, and those of the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) from the
latter. The two datasets include the dates of patent applications, the International
Patent Classification (IPC), the citation information, and the country names of both
citing and cited patent applicants.
Unlike the patent applications in the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO), the patent applicants in the JPO have no legal duty to list the patents that
he/she cites on the front page of document, although some referenced information
provided by the applicants lies scattered across the patent body text. The citations
information on the front page is usually added by the examiners in the JPO as well
as in the EPO (Hall et al. 2007). According to Goto and Motohashi (2007), since the
1990s about two thirds of JPO citations have been decided by the examiners.
Although the decision on which patents to cite ultimately depends on the patent
examiner, implying that the inventors may have been unaware of the cited patents,
the presumption that the citations are relevant as the indicator of technology links
between the citing and the cited is widely recognized in many empirical studies, such
as Jaffe et al. (1993), Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1996, 1999), andHall et al. (2001) for US
patents, and Maurseth and Verspagen (2002), and MacGarvie (2006) for European
patents.
5.4.2.3 Sample Selection
We start to select our sample from the top 60 trading countries/economies in 2008,
according to the quantity of their import and exports in the world. Because crude
oil makes up most of the trade in some top trade countries/economies such as Saudi
Arabia, Nigeria, Russia, and Venezuela, we exclude these countries from our sample.
At the same time, we exclude countries such as Kazakhstan, Peru, and Vietnam,
since they rarely made or received patent citations in the JPO or EPO. As a result,
we obtain a sample that covers 44 countries/economies across advanced, emerging,
and developing economies in the world. The list of sample countries/economies is
presented in Table5.1.
13 See the CEPII website (www.cepii.fr) for the details of BACI dataset. The existing studies that
use BACI dataset include Fontagné et al. (2005, 2006) and Olper and Raimondi (2009).
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Table 5.1 Sample countries/economies
No. Country/Economy No. Country/Economy
1 Germany 23 Australia
2 China 24 Norway
3 United States 25 Poland
4 Japan 26 Czech Republic
5 France 27 Ireland
6 Italy 28 Indonesia
7 Netherlands 29 Turkey
8 United Kingdom 30 Denmark
9 Belgium–Luxembourg 31 Hungary
10 Canada 32 Finland
11 Korea 33 South Africa
12 Singapore 34 Chile
13 Mexico 35 Slovak Republic
14 Spain 36 Argentina
15 Taiwan 37 Israel
16 Malaysia 38 Philippines
17 Sweden 39 Portugal
18 Switzerland 40 Ukraine
19 Brazil 41 Romania
20 Austria 42 Colombia
21 Thailand 43 New Zealand
22 India 44 Slovenia
The patent statistics used in this chapter are classified according to the IPC, which
is based either on the intrinsic nature of the invention or on the function of the inven-
tion. Schmoch et al. (2003) provide a concordance between technical fields and
industrial sectors. This concordance table refers to IPC for patents, and international
classifications, namely the European Union’s Classification of Economic Activities
within the European Communities (NACE), the United Nations’ International Stan-
dard Industrial Cassification (ISIC), and the US Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) with 44 industrial sectors. The empirical analyses in Schmoch et al. (2003)
show that this concordance with 44 industrial sectors (or technical fields) has a
reasonable level of disaggregation, because the economic data on international com-
parisons are not available in the finer differentiation. Thus, we use their concordance
table to allocate the patent statistics into 44 industrial sectors, as shown in Table5.2.
Since the number of citations is very limited in some sectors, especially for products
in some light manufacturing sectors such as textiles, wearing, and paint, we focus
our analysis on five fields, i.e., non-metal products, metal products, machinery, ICT
related equipment, and motor vehicles. The five fields correspond with Sectors 17
and 18, Sector 20, Sectors 21–25, Sectors 28 and 34–38, and Sector 42 in Schmoch
et al. (2003).
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Table 5.2 Correspondence between technical fields and ISIC industrial classifications















15 Other chemicals 2429
16 Man-made fibers 243
17 Plastic products 25
18 Mineral products 26
19 Basic metals 27
20 Metal products 28
21 Energy machinery 2911, 2912, 2913
22 Non-specific machinery 2914, 2915, 2919
23 Agricultural machinery 2921
24 Machine-tools 2922
25 Special machinery 2923, 2924, 2925, 2926, 2929
26 Weapons 2927
27 Domestic appliances 293
28 Computers 30
29 Electrical motors 311
30 Electrical distribution 312, 313
31 Accumulators 314
32 Lightening 314
33 Other electrical 315
34 Electronic components 321
35 Telecommunications 322
36 Television 323
37 Medical equipment 3311
38 Measuring instruments 3312
39 Industrial control 3313
40 Optics 332
41 Watches 333
42 Motor vehicles 34
43 Other transport 35
44 Consumer goods 36
Source: Tables 3–1 and 3–5 in Schmoch et al. (2003)
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Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics
Variable No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
H I I T 46764 0.05 0.10 0.00 1.00
V I I T 46764 0.17 0.19 0.00 1.00
OWT 46764 0.28 0.24 0.00 1.00
JPO citations 47300 14.5 419.0 0 39332
Pi in JPO 47300 2382.7 19395.3 0 279823
Pj in JPO 47300 1527.8 11114.7 0 233511
EPO citations 47300 0.9 18.3 0 1614
Pi in EPO 47300 275.1 1273.5 0 16533
Pj in EPO 47300 275.1 1273.5 0 16533
In order to match the data on trade with patents, we map the six-digit Harmonized
System (HS6) and the ISIC rev. 3 according to the industrial concordance table
provided by Jon Haveman.14 Then, we use the method explained above to measure
the shares ofOWT,HIIT, andVIIT for our sample countries in thefivefields discussed
above for the periods of 1995–1996, 1997–1998, 1999–2000, 2001–2002, and 2003–
2004 (i.e., five periods). The descriptive statistics for the shares of OWT, HIIT, and
VIIT, and the number of citations are presented in Table5.3. On one hand, there
are substantial citations between some developed countries, especially between the
United States and Japan. For instance, theUS patents that belonged to Sector 28made
more than 56,300 citations to Japanese patents during the period of 2003 and 2004.
On the other hand, of about four fifths of observations citations are not identified in
our sample period.
Table5.4 describes the shares of OWT, HIIT, and VIIT for some selected sam-
ple countries averagely across five fields and five periods. From the table, we find
that remarkable bilateral IIT (HIIT+VIIT) intensities are observed among European
countries. More than 91% of trade is IIT for the trade between Germany and France,
79% for France and Belgium–Luxembourg, and 92% for Netherlands and Belgium–
Luxembourg. These figures largely coincide with those reported by Fontagné et al.
(2006) for the same country-pairs (86.2%, 80.4%, and 85.0%, respectively), based
on trade statistics for the year 2000.
Table5.5 presents how patent citations have been made by the patents of some
selected countries filed to theUSPTO, JPO, andEPO, respectively.Although the scale
of citations is different across the patent offices, the patterns of citations between the
selected countries are similar across the patent offices. For example, theUnitedStates,
Japan, and Germany are the largest targets of citations not only for other countries,
but also for each other, while citations are to date relatively less received as well as
made by Chinese patents.
14 See www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman/trade.resources/tradedata.html.
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Table 5.4 Shares of OWT, HIIT, and VIIT for selected countries
China US Japan France Italy Netherlands UK Belgium Canada Korea
Germany 0.63 0.25 0.36 0.08 0.19 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.52 0.58
0.03 0.20 0.21 0.51 0.31 0.48 0.37 0.40 0.09 0.05
0.25 0.54 0.42 0.41 0.50 0.40 0.51 0.43 0.29 0.29
China 0.63 0.50 0.59 0.53 0.64 0.63 0.50 0.63 0.42
0.04 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.12
0.30 0.39 0.23 0.34 0.19 0.25 0.18 0.16 0.37
US 0.48 0.28 0.41 0.36 0.21 0.44 0.08 0.58
0.12 0.19 0.08 0.09 0.24 0.12 0.28 0.06
0.40 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.41 0.28 0.35
Japan 0.51 0.48 0.57 0.44 0.59 0.67 0.42
0.15 0.10 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.06
0.28 0.33 0.30 0.40 0.22 0.12 0.50
France 0.19 0.20 0.08 0.11 0.34 0.51
0.37 0.28 0.45 0.42 0.10 0.06
0.43 0.51 0.47 0.47 0.42 0.26
Italy 0.29 0.26 0.32 0.50 0.53
0.13 0.26 0.28 0.05 0.07
0.55 0.47 0.39 0.28 0.21
Netherlands 0.14 0.07 0.37 0.46
0.25 0.42 0.07 0.03
0.60 0.50 0.38 0.18









Notes: (a) The upper, middle and lower figures are for OWT, HIIT and VIIT, respectively. (b) The
sum of OWT, HIIT and VIIT could be less than 1.0 due to unavailability for the unit value in some
cases. (c) Luxembourg is included in Belgium. Source: Authors’ calculation from the BACI data
5.4.3 Estimation Results
Table5.6 summarizes the results for full fields, estimated based on the patent citations
in the JPO and EPO, respectively. We added dummy variables to control for the
fields and time periods, and, as we expected, the coefficient estimates of the number
of patents held by citing and cited countries are positively significant. To assess the
robustness of the estimated results in Table5.6 at the same time, we also apply an
alternative regression technique, namely, a fixed-effects negative binomial model
proposed by Hausman et al. (1984), to the same sample. Table5.7 summarizes the
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Table 5.6 Random-effects panel Tobit estimates for patent citations
JPO citations EPO citations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
H I I T 2.615∗∗∗ 2.699∗∗∗ 2.290∗∗∗ 2.434∗∗∗ 2.433∗∗∗ 1.974∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
V I I TM 2.338
∗∗∗ 2.420∗∗∗ 2.548∗∗∗ 2.137∗∗∗ 2.100∗∗∗ 2.107∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
V I I TX 2.399
∗∗∗ 2.466∗∗∗ 2.580∗∗∗ 2.183∗∗∗ 2.195∗∗∗ 2.169∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
OWTM 1.268
∗∗∗ 1.600∗∗∗ 1.037∗∗∗ 1.116∗∗∗ 1.205∗∗∗ 0.754∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
OWTX 1.498
∗∗∗ 1.737∗∗∗ 1.180∗∗∗ 1.128∗∗∗ 1.214∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
ln(Pi × Pj ) 0.152∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0032)
1/σu 1.991∗∗∗ 1.992∗∗∗ 2.000∗∗∗ 2.044∗∗∗ 1.379∗∗∗ 1.387∗∗∗ 1.414∗∗∗ 1.443∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
1/σe 1.064∗∗∗ 1.063∗∗∗ 1.066∗∗∗ 1.066∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
ρ 0.778 0.778 0.779 0.786 0.787 0.790 0.794 0.804
(0.97) (0.97) (0.97) (0.98) (0.98) (0.99) (0.99) (1.01)
No. of obs. 46764 46764 46764 46764 46764 46764 46764 46764
Log likelihood −13169 −13148 −13201 −13324 −8099 −8099 −8218 −8338
Ward test 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(Prob4>chi2)
LR test 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(Prob>chi2)
Notes: (a) The regression is based on full sample and includes a constant term. (b) Period dummies
and field dummies are included. (c) ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. (d) The values in the parentheses are standard errors. (e) The likelihood ratio
test for RE model versus pooled model
fixed-effects negative binomial estimates, where the number of citations is used as a
dependent variable.
In Tables5.6 and 5.7, we see that most of the coefficient estimates for HIIT and
VIIT are significant and positive, implying that intra-industry trade plays a significant
role in technology spillovers. The coefficients for HIIT are evidently larger than
those for VIIT, when the two variables are used in the same regression for the two
different patent statistics. This pattern remains true also in Table5.7. Compared with
the vertical intra-industry trade, the horizontal intra-industry trade shows a dominant
effect on technology spillovers.
Unlike the intra-industry trade, the estimations for the relationship between OWT
and the number of citations reveal somewhat mixed results. In Table5.6, the esti-
mated coefficients of OWT are significantly positive, whereas the magnitudes of the
coefficients are smaller than those for HIIT and VIIT. In Table5.7, the estimated
coefficients of OWTM are insignificant in the case of the EPO and even significantly
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Table 5.7 Fixed-effects negative binomial estimates for patent citations
JPO citations EPO citations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
H I I T 0.400∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗ 0.469∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 0.234
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.20) (0.20) (0.17)
V I I TM 0.130 0.609
∗∗∗ 0.235∗ 0.295 0.459∗∗ 0.219
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19)
V I I TX 0.493
∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19)
OWTM −0.259∗ −0.110 −0.248∗ 0.235 0.192 0.052
(0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18)
OWTX 0.968
∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗ 0.514 ∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗ 0.264
(0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.20) (0.19) (0.17)
ln(Pi × Pj ) 0.058∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036)
No. of obs. 8900 8900 8900 8900 6110 6110 6110 6110
Log likelihood −11335 −11311 −11327 −11332 −6216 −6212 −6217 −6220
Ward test 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(Prob>chi2)
Notes: (a) The regression is based on full sample. (b) Period dummies are included. (c) ***, **, and
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (d) The values in the parentheses
are standard errors
negative in the case of the JPO. In contrast, some of the estimated coefficients of
OWTX are comparable to those for HIIT and VIIT. These results imply that the effect
of OWT on technology spillovers is much weaker than that of IIT if the country is
an importer, whereas that effect may be comparable to that of IIT if the country is
an exporter.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined how technology spillovers across countries would
differ according to bilateral trade patterns. We first developed a two-country model
of monopolistic competition with quality differentiation by extending the model of
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). In our model, the quality of each product in the manu-
facturing sector is differentiated and stochastically determined by firms’ engaging in
product R&D. The structure of our model is similar to that of Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008), except for the fact that firms are heterogeneous in product quality rather
than in productivity. We then introduced technology spillovers in our model as the
process of expanding the technology frontier of the industry. We assumed that, in a
given sector, all firms in the same country equally have access to the “general knowl-
edge” without paying any cost. However, technology spillovers are imperfect across
countries. In particular, the degree of international technology spillovers falls as the
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technology gap between the two countries increases. We then showed that in our
model the trade pattern is intra-industry when the technology gap between the two
countries is small, while it is inter-industry when the technology gap is sufficiently
large. Since products are differentiated in quality in our model, both horizontal and
vertical intra-industry trade patterns also emerge endogenously.
From the model we derived three testable hypotheses for empirical analysis. The
first hypothesis (Result 5.1) was that technology spillovers are larger when the trade
pattern between the two countries isHIIT thanwhen it is VIIT. The second hypothesis
(Result 5.2) was that when the trade pattern is VIIT, the relative size of technology
spillovers from the country exporting high quality products on average to the country
exporting low quality products on average and in the opposite direction is ambiguous.
The third hypothesis (Result 5.3) was that technology spillovers are lower when the
trade pattern is IIT or OWT than when it is VIIT.
We then empirically tested these hypotheses by using bilateral trade data among 44
countries at six-digit level and patent citations data at the EPO and JPO. Following
Jaffe et al. (1993) and other recent studies on technology spillovers, we measure
international technology spillovers by patent citations among countries.
Our estimation results basically confirmed the predictions of our model. That
is, we found that an increase in the shares of HIIT and VIIT has a significantly
positive effect on international technology spillovers. Our estimation results showed
that HIIT has a larger effect on spillovers than VIIT does. On the other hand, the
relative magnitudes of technology spillovers between the country exporting high
quality products and the country exporting low quality products on average under
VIIT are generally ambiguous. We also found that the effect of OWT on technology
spillovers tends to be much weaker than that of other trade patterns. These results
from Japanese and European patents are generally consistent with the finding by Jinji
et al. (2015) from US patents. Therefore, we conclude that intra-industry trade plays
a significant role in technology spillovers.
In this chapter, we primarily focused on technology spillovers through interna-
tional trade but did not take the effects of FDI into account. As argued in the intro-
duction, however, a number of existing studies have empirically confirmed that FDI
is also a major channel of international technology spillovers. In our estimations,
we found that an increase in the share of OWT has a significantly positive effect on
technology spillovers in some cases, in particular in the cases of the JPO and EPO.
The positive effect of OWT with exporting the good in question even exceeds those
of HIIT and/or VIIT in some cases in Table5.7, which contradicts the predictions by
our theoretical model. This may be due to FDI. Thus, in the next chapter, we analyze
the effects of FDI on technology spillovers.
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Chapter 6
Vertical Versus Horizontal Foreign Direct
Investment and Technology Spillovers
6.1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) and international trade are two major channels of
international diffusion of technological knowledge (Keller 2004,2010).While a num-
ber of empirical studies confirm significant spillover effects of knowledge through
imports, the empirical findings on technology spillover effects through FDI are con-
flicting. In particular, there is relatively little evidence of spillovers of knowledge
from inward FDI to the host country’s firms in the same industry. For example,
Haskel et al. (2007) examine the situation in the United Kingdom and find signif-
icantly positive productivity spillovers from FDI. In addition, Keller and Yeaple
(2009) show similar results for the United States. By contrast, Aitken and Harrison
(1999) and Haddad and Harrison (1993) find no significant or weak productivity
spillovers from FDI for developing countries hosting FDI (the former and the latter
obtain results on Venezuela and Morocco, respectively).1 Addressing the endoge-
nous nature of the FDI decision, Lu et al. (2017) examine the spillover effects of FDI
in China and find that the presence of FDI in the same industry has a significantly
negative effect on the productivity levels of domestic firms due to the competition
effect, while it has no significant effect on the exporting performance and research
and development (R&D) investment of domestic firms. Todo (2006) and Todo and
Miyamoto (2006) derive that R&D activities play an important role in productivity
spillovers from FDI to local firms in the same industry: for example, a positive, sta-
tistically significant spillover effect is observed only for R&D-performing foreign
firms (in Indonesia) or foreign firms’ R&D stock (in Japan). In contrast, a number of
studies find significant productivity spillovers from inward FDI to the host country’s
upstreamfirms through backward linkages. These studies include Javorcik (2004) for
the case of Lithuania, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) for that of Romania, Blalock
and Gertler (2008) for that of Indonesia, and Newman et al. (2015) for that of Viet-
1 For example, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find negative spillover effects of FDI on the productivity
of domestically owned plants in Venezuela.
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nam.2 Moreover, Branstetter (2006) and Singh (2007) find evidence of technology
spillovers from outward FDI. That is, firms investing in foreign countries acquire
technological knowledge from other firms in the host countries.
When a firm establishes business enterprises in two or more countries through
FDI, it becomes amultinational enterprise (MNE). Canonical FDI theory defines two
types, namely horizontal and vertical, of FDI and an MNE’s activities.3 Horizontal
FDI (HFDI) replicates a subset of the production process in foreign countries to
serve local markets (Brainard, 1993, 1997; Helpman et al., 2004; Markusen, 1984,
1995; Markusen and Venables, 1998, 2000). It is often motivated by an intention to
reduce transportation costs. In contrast, vertical FDI (VFDI) involves geographical
fragmentation of the production process and is oftenmotivated by an intention to take
advantage of factor cost differentials (Helpman, 1984, 1985;Helpman andKrugman,
1985; Venables, 1999). However, the actual patterns of FDI and an MNE’s activities
are much more complex than the simple dichotomy of “horizontal” and “vertical”.
Yeaple (2003a) constructs a model in which horizontal, vertical, and complex (i.e.,
both horizontal and vertical) FDI arises endogenously. Grossman et al. (2006) also
analyze MNEs’ integration strategies that may simultaneously involve horizontal
and vertical FDI. Ekholm et al. (2007) propose the type of “export-platform FDI”
as another type of FDI. Moreover, utilizing the information on sales and sourcing
patterns of foreign affiliates ofMNEs, Baldwin andOkubo (2014) support the impor-
tance of “networked FDI.”
A number of empirical studies provide support to the predictions for HFDI. For
example, Brainard (1993, 1997) obtains evidence of HFDI but little evidence of
VFDI. Markusen andMaskus (2002) argue that a large proportion of FDI takes place
among developed countries and is characterized by the horizontal type of FDI. Look-
ing at the location decisions of MNEs, however, Yeaple (2003b) and Hanson et al.
(2005) find evidence consistent with comparative advantage. Moreover, Alfaro and
Charlton (2009) point out that the share of VFDI is much higher than previously
thought even within developed countries. They argue that a significant amount of
VFDI has been misclassified as horizontal in the previous studies and find that a sub-
stantial amount of VFDI between developed countries emerges in high-skill sectors,
because parent firms own the stages of production proximate to their final production
and source raw materials and inputs in low-skill production stages from outside of
the firms.
2 However, Keller (2010) argues that some issues such as a measurement problem in contractual
payment between theMNEsand local firmsmay lead to estimationbias.Besides,Barrios et al. (2011)
argue that the measures of backward linkages used in recent studies on spillovers are potentially
problematic. Using the standardmeasures employed in the literature, they fail to find robust evidence
for spillovers through backward linkages. On the other hand, they obtain robust evidence for positive
FDI backward spillover effects.
3 See Markusen (1995), Markusen (2002), Markusen and Maskus (2003), and Helpman (2006) for
the survey of the literature.
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A literature that is separated from studies on FDI has shown the importance of
international fragmentation of production and the involvement of firms in interna-
tional production networks (or global value chains (GVC)).4
Depending on the type of FDI or the degree of involvement in GVC, affiliates
of MNEs conduct different activities in their host economies, affecting the extent of
technology spillovers between MNEs and domestic firms in the host economies. For
example, when MNEs conduct VFDI, foreign affiliates engage in intra-firm trade
with their parent firms in the source country. On the other hand, in the case of net-
worked FDI, foreign affiliates are involved in GVC and are likely to trade with other
affiliates in the same region. Ramondo et al. (2016) document that intra-firm trade
is concentrated on a small group of large foreign affiliates of MNEs headquartered
in the United States. They find that the median manufacturing foreign affiliate of
the US MNEs has no transaction of goods with its parent in the United States. This
finding suggests that VFDI is concentrated on large firms and large affiliates.5 To the
best of our knowledge, no existing studies have investigated how the type of FDI or
the degree of involvement in GVC affects technology spillovers between MNEs and
their host economies.
An empirical work by Branstetter (2006) is closely related to the analysis in
this chapter. He defines the term “technology spillovers” as “the process by which
one inventor learns from the research outcomes of others’ research projects and is
able to enhance her own research productivity with this knowledge without fully
compensating the other inventors for the value of this learning” (pp. 327–328). In
this sense, technology spillovers must be distinguished from the term “productivity
spillovers” which measures how productivity of a firm is affected by other firms’ one
or R&D activities. Then, in the literature with respect to spillovers, patent citation
data have been used as a proxy of technology spillovers in the above definition
(Jaffe et al. 1993).6 Branstetter (2006) analyzes firm-level data on Japanese MNEs
in the United States and patent citations at the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) and obtains evidence that FDI facilitates technology spillovers both
from investing firms to local firms in the host country and from the local firms
to the investing firms. Although he examines whether different types of FDI, such
as acquisition, greenfield investment, and R&D facilities, have different effects on
spillovers, he does not distinguish various production activities of foreign affiliates.
4 SeeAntràs andChor (2013),Baldwin andVenables (2013), andCostinot et al. (2013) for theoretical
work and Alfaro et al. (2019) and Timmer et al. (2014) for empirical evidence. See Amador and
Cabral (2016) for the survey of the literature.
5 The finding by Ramondo et al. (2016) is related to the observation by Atalay et al. (2014) for
production chains within the United States. In particular, they show that the ownership of vertically
linked affiliates is not related to the transfer of goods within the boundaries of the firm. Ramondo
et al. (2016)) argue that the vertical ownership promotes efficient intra-firm transfers of intangible
inputs.
6 There are a number of existing empirical studies on technology spillovers based on patent citations
(Cappelli and Montobbio, 2020; Haruna et al., 2010; Hu and Jaffe, 2003; Jaffe and Trajtenberg,
1999; Jinji et al., 2013, 2015, 2019a; Li, 2014; MacGarvie, 2006; Mancusi, 2008; Murata et al.,
2014; Peri, 2005).
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In this chapter, we attempt to identify how the structure of MNEs’ activities in
terms of horizontal and vertical FDI affects technology spillovers betweenMNEs and
host countries. Then, we combine a comprehensive firm-level dataset of the business
activities of Japanese MNEs’ foreign affiliates and information on the patent cita-
tions betweenMNEsand their host countries. FollowingBranstetter (2006),wedefine
“technology spillovers” as the effects on the research productivity from the outcomes
of others’ research activities without full compensation for the value of research pro-
ductivity enhancement.7 Alternatively, we use firm-level data on Japanese firms’ FDI
and patent citations at the USPTO.8 Our firm-level dataset includes information on
the sales and purchases of the foreign affiliates, classified according to the destina-
tion and source countries. We exploit this information to construct new measures of
horizontal and vertical FDI based on the shares of the host and home countries in
their transactions. Now we define a measure of “pure horizontal FDI" as the extent
to which affiliates’ purchases of intermediate inputs and sales of final goods are con-
centrated in the local market. We also define a measure of “pure vertical FDI” as the
extent to which their affiliates’ purchases of intermediate inputs and sales of final
goods are linked to the home country. We, furthermore, define measures of “partially
horizontal” and “partially vertical” FDI. We then estimate how different types of
FDI affect technology spillovers from Japanese MNEs to the host country and from
the host country to Japanese MNEs. As for the empirical methodology, we follow
Branstetter (2006). Since the dependent variable (i.e., patent citations) is the count
data, we utilize a negative binomial model developed by Hausman et al. (1984).
Moreover, to deal with a potential endogeneity problem we employ an endogenous
switching model discussed by Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh (2006).
Our main findings are as follows. We find that an increase in the degree of pure
VFDI has significantly positive effects on technology spillovers captured by patent
citations when technologically advanced economies host Japanese MNEs. Technol-
ogy spillovers occur in both directions between the MNEs and their host countries.
These positive effects of pure VFDI on technology spillovers are robust for different
specifications as well. Partially VFDI (i.e., FDI with a higher share of purchase of
intermediate inputs in the local market and a higher share of sales of outputs to the
home country) also has significantly positive effects on technology spillovers from
the (high-income) host countries to theMNEs.9 By contrast, an increase in the degree
of pure HFDI has no significant effect or significantly negative effects on technology
spillovers between the MNEs and their host countries. Partially HFDI (i.e., FDI with
a higher share of purchases from the home country and a higher share of sales to
7 Therefore, our definition of technology spillovers is narrower than that used in studies on the
productivity change due to FDI or trade. However, it seems that our definition is useful, because
it focuses on direct effects and can still capture an important part of the effects in terms of the
contribution to the expansion of the world’s technology frontier.
8 We acknowledge that the range of technology spillovers measured in the data may be narrowed,
particularly for developing countries, by using patent citations, because many indigenous firms in
developing countries are not so active in the application of patents.
9 The positive effects of partially VFDI are not robust when we employ different specifications,
although we do not report the details of the estimated results in this chapter.
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the local market) has significantly positive effects on technology spillovers from the
MNEs to the (high-income) host countries, but the result is not robust for differ-
ent estimations. From these results, we conclude that pure VFDI plays a dominant
role in technology spillovers in both directions between Japanese MNEs and the
high-income host countries.
To explain the mechanism for the observed relationship between the structure of
FDI and technology spillovers, we develop a simple partial-equilibrium model of
FDI and technology spillovers among developed countries. A differentiated good
is produced in three stages.10 The product market is characterized by monopolistic
competition. Depending on parameter values, firms may have an incentive to engage
in horizontal or vertical FDI. Assuming that factor costs are the same in the two
countries, there is no possibility of VFDI in the usual sense. Nevertheless, VFDI
does occur if there are technology gaps in some production stages between the two
countries and/or if firms can take advantage of the superior technology by fragment-
ing their production process abroad. Technological differences in some production
stages are considered to be the source of technology spillovers through FDI. We
show that technology spillovers occur in one way or two ways if firms engage in
VFDI, depending on how the three production stages are located in the two coun-
tries. Besides, we show that HFDI does not necessarily induce technology spillovers,
because it is mainly motivated by saving transportation costs and hence appears even
in the absence of technological differences.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section6.2 describes the data
employed in our empirical analysis. Section6.3 introduces estimation methods.
Section6.4 provides empirical results. Section6.5 develops a simple theoretical
model of FDI and technology spillovers to explain the observed relationship in our
empirical study. Section6.6 concludes this chapter.
6.2 Data
In this section we describe the data employed in our empirical analysis.
6.2.1 Data on Patent Citations and Japanese Firms’ FDI
Following Jaffe et al. (1993), Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1999), and other studies, we
use patent citation data as a proxy for technology spillovers. The patent citations are
collected from the dataset compiled by the National Bureau of Economic Research
10 As the models of vertical production structure with multiple stages there are, for example, Bridg-
man (2012), Dixit and Grossman (1982), Kohler (2004), and Yi (2003). None of these papers,
however, consider the possibility of VFDI driven by cross-country technology gaps in production
stages. Baldwin and Venables (2013) consider more general structure of the GVC in production
processes.
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(NBER) patent database for patents at the USPTO.11 The dataset includes informa-
tion on the application date, the country name of the assignee, the main US patent
class, and citations made and received for each patent. From the dataset we extract
information on the patent applications and citations by JapaneseMNEs and their host
countries. Because of the truncated problems of citations in the NBER dataset, we
concentrate our analysis on the period before 2003, though the NBER patent dataset
includes data until 2006.
Our data on JapaneseMNEs’ activities abroad are obtained from the Basic Survey
on Overseas Business Activities (BSOBA) or Kaigai Jigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa
conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Economic, Trade and Industry (METI). This
data source provides detailed data on affiliate-level FDI activities such as the sales
and purchases of affiliates of Japanese MNEs, classified by their destinations and
sources, i.e., sales to (or purchases from) the local market or exports to (or imports
from) the home country and a third country.
The foreign affiliates listed in the BSOBA are either foreign affiliates with at least
10% of their capital held by a Japanese parent company or those with at least 50%
of their capital held by a foreign subsidiary, which in turn has at least 50% of its
capital held by a Japanese parent company. These affiliates exclude those that run
businesses in the financial and insurance industry or the real estate industry in host
countries. According to theMETI, therewere approximately 15,000 foreign affiliates
that responded to the survey in 2000.12 Table6.1 shows the top 30 host economies
for Japanese MNEs in 2000, based on the number of affiliates that had completed
the BSOBA.13 As shown in the table, the United States attracts the largest number of
Japanese firms’ affiliates, followed by China. Asian economies as well as developed
countries are popular host economies for Japanese MNEs.
Our sample covers the period between 1995 and 2003. All countries in which
Japanese MNEs have at least one affiliate are included in our sample. Since the
number of countries varies greatly depending on that of patent applications made,
we divide our sample of the countries into two groups, Groups I and II, according
to the number of USPTO patent applications made by the sample countries during
the period of 1995–2003. We call Group I countries/economies “Technologically
Advanced Economies,” which mainly include high income countries/economies. In
contrast, we call Group II countries/economies “Technologically Less Advanced
Economies,” which mainly include middle and low income countries. The number
of patent applications in Group I is larger than 1,000, while it is less than that in
Group II.14 All countries that are categorized into each group are listed in Table6.2.
11 See the BronwynHall’s website (www.nber.org/people/bronwyn_hall?page=1&perPage=50) for
the NBER patent database.
12 See theMETI website (www.meti.go.jp/english/statistics/tyo/kaigaizi/index.html) for the details
of the BSOBA.
13 About 10,100 affiliates reported full or partial information on their sales and purchases classified
by the destinations and the sources in 2000.
14 Although the number of USPTO patent applicationsmade by China, India, Russia, and Singapore
is more than 1,000 during the period, a large jump in the applications is observed after 2000,
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Table 6.1 Top 30 FDI host countries/economies in the year 2000
Economy No. of affiliates Economy No. of affiliates Economy No. of affiliates
United States 2,172 Australia 342 India 99
China 1,246 Korea 257 Vietnam 97
Thailand 692 Netherlands 248 Belgium 80
Singapore 613 France 216 New Zealand 74




Malaysia 477 Panama 138
Taiwan 460 Mexico 132
Indonesia 431 Italy 114
Germany 363 Spain 100
Note: The number of affiliates is those reported by respondents of the BSOBA in 2000
Table 6.2 List of countries/economies
Group I Group II
(Tech. Advanced Economies) (Technologically Less Advanced Economies)
Australia Argentina Ghana Niger Trinidad&Tobago
Austria Bahamas Greece Nigeria Tunisia
Belgium Bahrain Guatemala Pakistan Turkey
Canada Bangladesh Hong Kong Panama UAE
Denmark Bolivia Hungary Papua New
Guinea
Uruguay
Finland Brazil Iceland Paraguay Venezuela
France Brunei India Peru Vietnam
Germany Cambodia Indonesia Poland Zambia
Israel Cameroon Iran Portugal Zimbabwe
Italy Chile Ireland Qatar
Korea, Republic of China Jamaica Romania
Luxembourg Colombia Kenya Russia
Netherlands Costa Rica Kuwait Samoa
New Zealand Cyprus Laos Saudi Arabia
Norway Czech Lebanon Senegal
Spain Dominican Liberia Singapore
Sweden Ecuador Macao Slovak
Switzerland Egypt Madagascar South Africa
Taiwan El Salvador Malaysia Sri Lanka
United Kingdom Ethiopia Mexico Tanzania
United States Fiji Morocco Thailand
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We use theNikkei company code system to link the two data sources and collected
the data on 1,445 parent companies that run at least one affiliate during the sample
period. 279 parent companies out of 1,445 ones made at least one citation to USPTO
patent applications from 93 countries and, on the other hand, 301 ones received at
least one USPTO patent citation.
6.2.2 Types of FDI
In the literature, FDI and MNEs’ activities are usually categorized into horizontal
and vertical cases. In the empirical studies, there are a number of ways to measure
horizontal and vertical FDI. Hummels et al. (2001) and Alfaro and Charlton (2009)
use the industrial classifications to define the types of FDI. Hanson et al. (2001, 2005)
utilize the firm-level database of the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) to characterize VFDI as intra-firm flows of inputs that they observed flowing
fromparent companies in theUnitedStates to affiliates abroad.ThemethodofHanson
et al. (2001, 2005) enables them to measure one-way US bilateral intra-firm trade.
Using the same BSOBA dataset as in this chapter, Fukao andWei (2008) employ the
local sales ratio of the affiliates to classify vertical and horizontal FDI. In particular,
if a local sales ratio of a foreign affiliate is less than the average ratio in the sample,
then FDI to the affiliate is classified into VFDI. By contrast, if a local sales ratio is
larger than the average ratio, FDI to the affiliate is classified into HFDI.
An advantage of the BSOBA dataset is that it allows us to measure vertical and
horizontal FDI by using information on the sale of outputs and the purchase of inputs
by foreign affiliates.15 The local sales and local purchases ratios of foreign affiliates of
Japanese MNEs are denoted by ShSaHFDI and ShPuHFDI , respectively. Simi-
larly, the sales and purchases ratios to and from Japan for foreign affiliates of Japanese
MNEs are denoted by ShSaV FDI and ShPuV FDI , respectively. Table6.3 shows
the average values of both ratios during the sample period for the subsamples of
technologically advanced and less advanced economies. Looking at the ratios over
the years, no evident trend is observed during the sample period. Interestingly, the
table also shows that the values of ShSaV FDI , which indicates the vertical struc-
ture of sales from foreign affiliates, are around 10–12% in technologically advanced
economies and around 20–22% in technologically less advanced economies. If we
focus on ShPuV FDI (i.e., the vertical structure of purchases by foreign affiliates),
then the values climb up to around 40–42% in technologically advanced economies
and 37–40% in technologically less advanced economies. With respect to the pur-
compared with a very limited number in the early years for these countries. We therefore categorize
these four countries into the second group.
15 One limitation of the BSOBA dataset is, however, that it does not track transactions between
foreign affiliates or between foreign affiliates and the parent companies. As a result, there may exist
some biases for measuring the types of FDI by using information on sale and purchase because we
cannot examine flows within the boundary of a firm from our dataset.
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Table 6.3 Sales and purchases ratios of affiliates abroad
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Tech. advanced economies (Group I)
ShSaHFDI 0.761 0.747 0.735 0.757 0.761 0.759 0.751 0.752 0.745
ShSaVFDI 0.128 0.125 0.126 0.127 0.126 0.122 0.124 0.106 0.107
ShPuHFDI 0.530 0.493 0.474 0.501 0.481 0.481 0.490 0.464 0.462
ShPuVFDI 0.403 0.398 0.405 0.413 0.424 0.421 0.420 0.404 0.403
Tech. less advanced economies (Group II)
ShSaHFDI 0.655 0.649 0.612 0.639 0.644 0.636 0.630 0.631 0.631
ShSaVFDI 0.208 0.197 0.211 0.222 0.212 0.212 0.228 0.204 0.208
ShPuHFDI 0.524 0.482 0.464 0.512 0.494 0.493 0.509 0.530 0.536
ShPuVFDI 0.392 0.395 0.401 0.405 0.407 0.402 0.403 0.370 0.369
Source: Authors’ calculation from the BSOBA data from 1995 to 2003
chase of inputs, Japanese MNEs engage in VFDI more actively in technologically
advanced host countries than in technologically less advanced host countries. This
evidence is consistent with Alfaro and Charlton (2009), who showed that VFDI
emerges as far more prevalent between developed countries.
By exploiting information on the horizontal and vertical structures in sales and
purchases of foreign affiliates, we construct new indexes of horizontal and vertical
FDI, i.e., HFDI , V FDI , PHFDI , and PV FDI , in the following way:
HFDI = ShSaHFDI × ShPuHFDI
V FDI = ShSaV FDI × ShPuV FDI
PHFDI = ShSaHFDI × ShPuV FDI
PV FDI = ShSaV FDI × ShPuHFDI
As is evident from the definition of the index, HFDI measures the extent to which
affiliates’ purchases of intermediate inputs and sales of final goods are concentrated in
the local market. Now, HFDI captures the degree of “pure” HFDI. If HFDI = 1,
a foreign affiliate makes all purchases and sales in the local market, whereas, if
HFDI = 0, either or both of purchases and sales of the foreign affiliate become zero
in the local market. Note that HFDI = 0 does not necessarily mean that the foreign
affiliate engages in vertical activities because there is a possibility of transactions
with third countries. Next V FDI measures the extent to which affiliates’ purchases
of intermediate inputs and sales of final goods are linked to the home country (i.e.,
Japan), so that V FDI captures the degree of “pure” VFDI. On the other hand,
PHFDI and PV FDI capture “partially” horizontal and “partially” vertical FDI,
respectively. The value of PHFDI rises if an affiliate buys more intermediate goods
from the home country and sells more final goods to the local market. Since the
structure of sales is more important to distinguish the type of FDI than the structure
of purchases,we consider that PHFDI measures the degree of “partially” horizontal
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FDI in termsof its horizontal sales structure. Similarly, the value of PV FDI becomes
large if an affiliate buysmore intermediate goods from the localmarket and sellsmore
final goods to the home country. Since the structure of sales is vertical in PV FDI ,
we consider that it measures the degree of “partially” vertical FDI.
We then test whether there are any differences in the effects on technology
spillovers among these types of FDI.
6.3 The Empirical Model
In this section, let us explain our empirical model. Although the BSOBA is conducted
every year, there are many blanks in the data on a particular firm because in some
years certain respondents did not report to the METI. For this reason, we use only a
pooled data in our estimation. Consequently, we run the following specification as
in Branstetter (2006),
Ci = β1 + α1LPHosti + α2LPParenti + β2FDIi + ui , (6.1)
where i refers to the affiliate i , and Ci is the number of citations made (or received)
by USPTO patents of the Japanese parent company that owns affiliate i . Note that
Ci = Ci ′ holds for affiliate i and affiliate i ′ if the same parent company owns affiliates
i and i ′. We expect that citations made by Japanese parent companies capture the
technology spillovers flowing from the host countries to Japanese companies, while
the citations received by them reflect the flows from Japanese companies to host
countries. FDIi in Eq. (6.1) is one of the alternative measures of the FDI types, i.e.,
HFDI , V FDI , PHFDI , and PV FDI for affiliate i . In Eq. (6.1), β1 is a constant
term and ui is an error term.
As indicated in Branstetter (2006), patent citations may rise as the “citable” host
invention increases. At the same time, the higher absorptive capacity in the home
country may be associated with a higher ability to understand and exploit external
knowledge, and cite more external patents (Mancusi, 2008). Thus, for elucidation of
the assertions we use LPParenti and LPHosti , which refer to the logarithm of the
count of the USPTO patent applications made by affiliate i’s Japanese parent com-
pany and the host country where the affiliate i runs its business, respectively, to proxy
the home absorptive capacity and “citable” host invention. Note that LPParenti is
the same across affiliate i for the same parent company, and LPHosti is the same
across affiliate i for the same host country.
The focus of interest in Eq. (6.1) will be the coefficient β2. Hence, we examine
if the FDI types of Japanese firms in host countries have an influence on patent
citations made and received by the firm. We also investigate if there is a difference in
the magnitude and sign of the coefficients between the citations made and received
by the home and host countries and across the types of FDI that Japanese firms
implemented.
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Since the observations of a dependent variable (i.e., patent citations) are the count
data, we utilize a standard estimation technique, namely, a negative binomial model
discussed in Cameron and Trivedi (1998), where the data are Poisson process, but
more flexible modeling of the variance to account for overdispersion than the Pois-
son is allowed. We use this estimation technique to acquire our basic findings and
alternative estimation results.
The other challenge of estimating the effects of each of the FDI types on technol-
ogy spillovers arises from the fact that patent citations may be endogenous, because
unobservables in determining the types of FDI may be correlated with those in
determining the citations. Besides, certain geographic factors such as distance and
language may influence the citations as well as the types of FDI. Neglecting these
unobserved or endogenous factors may cause biased and inconsistent estimators.16
To address this issue, we employ an endogenous switching model.17 In that model,
the citation Ci follows a Poisson distribution, and the probability distribution for
count data is given by
Pr(Ci , μi ) = μi
Ci exp(−μi )
Ci ! , (6.2)
so that a log-linear model for the mean of Ci , μi , can be specified as
log(μi ) = β1 + α1LPHosti + α2LPParenti + α3LDisti + α4LGDPi
+α5LCosti + β2Di + εi , (6.3)
where LDisti is the logarithm of the distance (measured as kilometers) between
Japan and the host economy of affiliate i , LGDPi is the logarithm of GDP of affiliate
i’s host economy, LCosti is the logarithm of salary per employee of affiliate i , and εi
is an unobserved heterogeneity term. LGDPi measures the market size of the host
economy, and LCosti measures the labor cost of the affiliate. Instead of FDIi in Eq.
(6.1), here we use a dummy Di (DHFDIi , DV FDIi , DPHFDIi , or DPV FDIi ) for the
types of FDI, which equals one for a particular type, and zero otherwise. Following
Fukao and Wei (2008), we construct the dummy for a particular type of FDI such
that it equals one when the value of an FDI type’s index (HFDI , V FDI , PHFDI ,
or PV FDI ) for affiliate i is greater than the average value of the particular FDI
type’s index in the full sample, and zero otherwise. We then use a probit model to
examine how a parent firm determines its FDI type. The logic we use is that the type
decision on FDI depends on factors that favor a particular type of FDI or not. The
probit model can be formulated as
D∗i = z′iγ + λεi + ui , (6.4)
16 See Wooldridge (2010) for dealing with endogenous problems.
17 An estimation method of count data regression with endogenous switching is proposed by Terza
(1998). Kenkel and Terza (2001) discuss an application of the method suggested by Terza (1998).
See Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh (2006) for technical details of the endogenous switching model.




1, if D∗i > 0,
0, otherwise,
where D∗i is an auxiliary randomvariable, zi is a vector of factorswhichmay influence
the particular type of FDI. As usual, we have ui ∼ N (0, 1), and ui is independent of
εi . In the so-called endogenous switching model, Var(εi ) = σ 2, and total variance
is λ2σ 2 + 1. If λ = 0, then Di is considered to be exogenous. Although a Poisson
distribution is used, the variance of Ci is not necessarily equal to the conditional
mean, and overdispersion is allowed in this model. Using the normality assumption
for εi , we have
Var(Ci |xi , Di ) = E(Ci |εi , xi , Di )[1 + E(Ci |εi , xi , Di )(exp(σ 2) − 1)],
where xi is a vector of explanatory variables in Eq. (6.3) (i.e., LPHosti , LPParenti ,
LDisti , LGDPi , LCosti , and the constant term), which implies that if σ = 0, then
the model exhibits overdispersion, as we would expect from the negative binomial
model in Eq. (6.1).18
In the estimation, following Fukao andWei (2008), we include LDisti (distance),
LGDPi (market size), and LCosti (labor cost) in zi in Eq. (6.4). Among those
variables, the data on salaries and the number of employees of foreign affiliates are
obtained from the BSOBA. The data on distance are collected from the database of
the CEPII Research Center and the data on GDP in host countries are obtained from
the Penn World Table.19
6.4 Empirical Results
In this section, we report our estimation results. We first show the basic findings
obtained by the negative binomial model. We then report the results by the endoge-
nous switching model and discuss whether the endogeneity issue matters in our
analysis. Finally, we discuss the robustness of our findings by showing the results of
alternative estimations with additional explanatory variables.
6.4.1 Basic Findings
Wefirst estimateEq. (6.1) by the negative binomialmodel, and the results are reported
in Table6.4. The upper panel of Table6.4 shows the estimated results for the sub-
18 See Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh (2006) for more details.
19 CEPII: www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=6. PennWorld table: www.rug.
nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/.
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Table 6.4 Negative binomial estimates for patent citations








PV FDI 0.115∗ −0.120
(0.064) (0.092)
LPHost 0.982∗∗∗ 0.976∗∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗ 1.106∗∗∗ 1.087∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗∗ 1.081∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
LPParent 0.963∗∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
No. of Obs 14836 14568 15441 14026 14836 14568 15441 14026
Log
likelihood
−24646 −24059 −25682 −23157 −33957 −33306 −35403 −32028
Prob>chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00








PV FDI 1.087∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.17)
LPHost 1.095∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗ 1.082∗∗∗ 1.081∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗∗ 1.112∗∗∗ 1.109∗∗∗ 1.088∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
LPParent 1.021∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗∗ 1.022∗∗∗ 1.037∗∗∗ 0.932∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗ 0.949∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
No. of
Obs.
18928 18870 19345 18397 18928 18870 19345 18397
Log
likelihood
−3836 −3917 −3988 -3755 −5732 −5795 −5919 −5604
Prob>chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: (a) ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
(b) The values in the parentheses are standard errors
(c) A constant term is included in the estimations
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sample of technologically advanced economies. We observe from the results that
the estimates of HFDI are significant and negative, whereas they are significantly
positive for V FDI both for the citing and cited. As for PHFDI , the estimated coef-
ficient is insignificant for the citing, but significantly positive for the cited, whereas
the coefficient of PV FDI are significant and positive for the citing and insignificant
for the cited.
The lower panel of Table6.4 presents the estimated results for the subsample
of technologically less advanced economies. Unlike the case of the technologically
advanced economies, only the coefficients on PV FDI show significantly positive,
whereas the coefficients of the other types of FDI reveal negative or insignificant
effects on the citing as well as the cited.
These results show that an increase in the degree of the “pure” VFDI has a signif-
icantly positive effect on technology spillovers in both directions between Japanese
parent companies and their host countries if Japanese MNEs invest in high-income
countries. This implies that VFDI plays a dominant role in technology spillovers
with mutual effects in technologically advanced economies. When middle- and low-
income countries host Japanese MNEs, an increase in the “partially” vertical FDI
has a significantly positive effect on the number of patent citations in both directions
between the Japanese parent companies and firms in their host countries.
6.4.2 Estimating with an Endogenous Switching Model
To deal with endogeneity issues, we simultaneously estimate both an endogenous
switching model described by Eqs. (6.2) and (6.3) for technology spillovers and a
probit model based on Eq. (6.4) for the decision on FDI types. We focus on the
subsample of technologically advanced economies. The estimated results are sum-
marized in Table6.5. We first observe that the coefficient of LCost is significantly
positive for both “pure” VFDI (DV FDI ) and “partially” vertical FDI (DPV FDI ). This
implies that VFDI to technologically advanced economies is not motivated by wage
cost saving.
In terms of the endogeneity between technology spillovers and the decision onFDI
types, the estimates of ρ in Table6.5 show strong significance against the null hypoth-
esis in two cases out of eight estimations for technologically advanced economies and
in all cases for technologically less advanced economies.20 Consequently, neglect-
ing the endogenous issues may cause biased and inconsistent estimators (Miranda
and Rabe-Hesketh, 2006). The estimations in Table6.5 reveal that DV FDI based on
the endogenous switching model for both the citing and cited cases provides results
similar to those based on the negative binomial model. For DPV FDI , the two models
also provide similar results, suggesting that more local purchases and more sales in
Japan may favor Japanese parent companies with more technology spillovers from
20 Now ρ stands for the correlation between εi and λεi + ui in Eq. (6.3), and ρ = λ/
√
2(λ2 + 1)
where ρ is identified by λ.
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the host economies. As observed for DHFDI and DPHFDI , the estimates become
insignificant and significantly negative for citing, respectively.
Our findings imply that, for technologically advanced economies, “pure” VFDI is
associated with significant technology spillovers even if we control for endogenous
issues.
6.4.3 Alternative Estimations
To check the robustness of the basic findings in Sect. 6.4.1, we conduct alterna-
tive estimations for Group I countries by adding explanatory variables. We include
PROX (technological proximity), CapRatio (capital ratio), and Close (a dummy
for industrial classification, which is one for the same sector and zero otherwise). We
also include LDist (the logarithm of the distance between Japan and host countries)
and Year which captures the changes in citations.
Japanese parent companies and firms in their host countries may increase their
citations of each other just because Japanese parent companies and firms in their
host countries change the focus of their research activities in ways that bring them
“closer” to each other in the technology space (Branstetter, 2006). To control for this
issue, we include a measure of technological proximity (PROX ) in the regression.
As suggested by Jaffe (1986) and Branstetter (2006), PROX is constructed by
PROXi =
Fi F ′host,i




where Fi = ( f1i , · · · , fki ) is a vector of the cumulative count of patents obtained by
affiliate i’s parent firm in kth technical area21 and Fhost,i is a vector of the aggregate
count of patens obtained by all firms in the host country in which affiliate i is located.
The literature on the role of affiliate ownership in technology spillovers is limited.
There are a few studies focused on the correlation between productivity and the
ownership of affiliates. Javorcik (2004) and Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) found
that the correlation of productivity with FDI is stronger if the affiliate is only partially,
and not fully foreign owned, because joint ownership generates more technology
transfer, and wholly owned affiliates employ more sophisticated technology that
is out of reach of the average domestic supplier. As indicated by Keller (2010),
however, the technology gap may be a key reason for differential effects for wholly
versus partially owned affiliates. CapRatio, which is the share of affiliate capital
owned by Japanese parent companies, is included to test the effects of ownership of
affiliates on technology spillovers.
As in Sect. 6.4.1, we use patent citations at the USPTO as the dependent variable
and employ the negative binomial model for our estimation. The estimated results
21 We aggregate the US patent classes into 44 fields derived by Schmoch et al.(2003).
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are presented in Table6.6.22 The coefficients of PROX are significantly positive in
all cases of citing and cited. These results confirm the findings in Branstetter (2006).
The coefficients of Close are significantly positive in technology spillovers from
host economies to Japanese MNEs, which implies that Japanese parent companies
cite more patents of host economies when their affiliates run a business that is the
same as or close to that of the parents. However, this is not the case for technology
spillovers from JapaneseMNEs to host economies, since the coefficients ofClose are
significantly negative. The ownership variable, CapRatio, has positive coefficients
that are mostly significant, which implies that a higher share of ownership of foreign
affiliates by Japanese parent companies tends to facilitate technology spillovers in
both directions between Japanese MNEs and their host economies.
The estimates of HFDI , V FDI , PHFDI , and PV FDI for the USPTO give
similar results to those we observed in Table6.4, except for PHFDI and PV FDI
in the cited. Specifically, the significantly positive effect of PV FDI is not robust
for some combinations of explanatory variables.
6.5 A Simple Model of FDI and Technology Spillovers
To explain the observed relationship between the structure of FDI and technology
spillovers in the previous section, we develop a partial-equilibrium model of FDI
and technology spillovers among developed economies. We consider a world of two
countries, home and foreign. Foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk.
We focus on themarket for a differentiated good x . Consumers in the two countries
share the same preference. The preference of the representative consumer takes the










where x j is the consumption of a variety j of good x , α = 1 − 1/σ , σ > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution across varieties, and N is the total number of varieties
supplied in the home market. We also assume that the market size is the same in the
two countries.
The demand for a variety j of good x in the home country is given by
x j = (pcj )−σ Pσ−1E,
22 Here, we only report the estimated results with full sets of explanatory variables. The results
with various combinations of the explanatory variables are available from the corresponding author
upon request.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.5 A Simple Model of FDI and Technology Spillovers 117
where E is the total expenditure on good x in the home country (which is the same
for the foreign country), pcj is the CIF price of variety j produced by a home firm















where n and n∗ are the numbers of varieties produced by the home firms and the
foreign firms, respectively, with n + n∗ = N , and p∗ck is the CIF price of variety k
produced by a foreign firm.
In each country, there is one primary factor of production, labor, denoted by l. The
wage rate, w, is the same in the two countries, i.e., w = w∗ ≡ ω. Labor is immobile
across countries.
6.5.1 Production and Supply
Good x is differentiated by variety and is supplied by monopolistically competitive
firms. Each firm produces one variety. The nationality of a firm is identified by the
location of its headquarters.
Good x is produced in three sequential stages.23 Intermediate inputs for good x
are specific to varieties, and hence there is no market for its intermediate inputs. For
simplicity we assume away the possibility of outsourcing production of intermediate
inputs. All of the three production stages must be conducted in house, although firms
can offshore some or all of the production stages by establishing affiliates in the other
country.
The first stage of production is simply conducted by using only labor, so that one
unit of an intermediate inputm1 is produced by one unit of labor:m1 = l1. The quality
of the intermediate input may be differentiated. It is θ1 if the first stage is performed
in the home country and θ∗1 if it is in the foreign country, where 0 < θ1 ≤ 1 and 0 <
θ∗1 ≤ 1. The quality of m1 matters when it is used in the second stage of production.
The production function of an intermediate product is given by m2 = (θ1m1)γ l1−γ2 ,
where m2 stands for an intermediate product in the second stage and γ ∈ (0, 1). In
the production function of m2, θ1 is replaced by θ∗1 if m1 produced in the foreign
country is used. Moreover, in the final stage of production, m2 and labor are used to
produce a variety j of good x : x j = (θ2m2)γ l1−γ3 , where the quality of m2 is θ2 (θ∗2 )
if the second stage of production is performed in the home (foreign) country, where
0 < θ2 ≤ 1 and 0 < θ∗2 ≤ 1. A difference in the quality of intermediate inputsm1 and
m2 reflects the technology gap for the particular production stage between the two
23 Thismeans that we consider the “snake” type in the terminology of Baldwin andVenables (2013).
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countries.24 Note that the location of the production stage rather than the nationality
of firms determines the quality of intermediate inputs. This may be because the
information on the technology of producing intermediate inputs is locally spilled
over, while it is not spilled over across countries.25 Since the final good x is not
differentiated in quality, the location of the final production stage does not affect
characteristics of varieties.
Iceberg transportation costs apply to cross-country shipment of both intermediate
inputs and final goods. For one unit of an intermediate input and a final good to arrive
at a foreign destination, τ ≥ 1 units of an intermediate input and t ≥ 1 units of the
final good must be sent, respectively.
When a firm sets up a production stage in the country different from the country
in which its headquarters is located, it engages in FDI and incurs an extra fixed cost
of Φ/3 units of labor per stage, where Φ > 0 is exogenously given and constant.
Each monopolistically competitive firm chooses both the location of the three
production stages and the price for its own variety in each market, taking the price
index as given. As is well known, a monopolistically competitive firm charges a
constant mark-up over the unit cost of the final good, which is given by p j = C j/α,
where p j is the FOB price of variety j and C j is the unit cost of producing variety
j , which will be shown in detail below.
6.5.2 Technology Spillovers
We introduce the possibility of technology spillovers. Suppose that the quality of
intermediate inputs can be upgraded by R&D.We suppose that the outcome of R&D
is stochastic. Consequently, the difference in the quality of intermediate inputs arises,
depending on whether R&D was successful or not.26
We take up the effects of spillovers from one firm’s R&D outcome to other firms’
product stage. As is well known, technology spillovers occur from a firmwith higher
technology to a firmwith lower technology.We assume that when a firm uses a better
quality of an i th-stage intermediate input for the production of the (i + 1)th stage,
the information on the better quality of an i th-stage intermediate input is spilled over
to the (i + 1)th stage and improves the productivity of R&D for the (i + 1)th-stage
intermediate input.
Under the above assumptions, the following lemma on spillovers holds.
24 For our purpose of this chapter, we do not need to specify the cause of the technology gap between
the two countries. Then, we assume that there is a technology gap between the two countries.
25 This is different from technology spillovers that we will discuss below.
26 The purpose of our analysis in this section is to investigate the relationship between types of
FDI and technology spillovers. For this, we want to show how the technology gap between the two
countries is related to FDI types and how it is also related to technology spillovers. But, we do not
need to specify the details of R&D and the production in the next period after spillovers occur.
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Lemma 6.1 Technology spillovers occur only if the i th and the (i + 1)th stages are
located in different countries.
The reason is straightforward. If the i th and the (i + 1)th stages are located in the
same country, then all firms produce the same quality of the i th-stage intermediate
inputs and use them at the (i + 1)th stage. Thus, there is no scope for technology
spillovers.
Onemay think that technology spillovers in ourmodel are associatedwith imports
of intermediate inputs with better quality. However, since each intermediate input
is specialized to each variety in our model, inter-firm trade of intermediate inputs
does not occur. Moreover, we can argue that technology spillovers through FDI are
stronger than those through imports of intermediate inputs, because FDI involves
various activities more than just the transaction of intermediate inputs.
6.5.3 FDI and Technology Spillovers: HFDI
Wenext analyze howfirms locate production stages and how international technology
spillovers are associated with FDI.
We define horizontal and vertical FDI in the following way. If a firm conducts the
final stage in both the home and the foreign countries, it engages in HFDI. On the
other hand, if a firm conducts either or both of the first two stages in the country that
is different from the country in which its headquarters is located without conducting
the final stage in that country, it engages in VFDI.
We focus on the representative firm whose headquarters is located in the home
country. We call it “the home firm.” All firms with the same nationality behave in
the same way.
Wefirst look atHFDI.Wedenote the combination of locations for three production
stages by three capital letters. For example, if the first stage is located in the home
country, the second stage is in the foreign country, and the final stage is in the home
country, then we denote this combination by HFH . Then, the possible patterns of
HFDI for the home firm are {FFF, HFF, HHF, FHF}.
The unit cost function to serve the foreign market by the pattern of FFF is given
by





where B ≡ {γ γ (1 − γ )1−γ }−(1+γ ) is a constant. Similarly, the unit cost functions to
serve the foreign market by the patterns of HFF and HHF are given by, respec-
tively,










CHHF (ω, τ ; θ1, θ2) = B(τθ−γ1 θ−12 )γ ω. (6.7)
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Moreover, the unit cost function to serve the foreign market by exporting from the
home country is






where the transport costs for the shipment of the final good are not included.
In the analysis of the optimal configuration of production for the foreign market,
it turns out that the configuration for the home market does not matter. Thus, we just
focus on the profits from supplying to the foreign market. Given the demand for a
variety and pricing policy under monopolistic competition, profits of the home firm
from supplying a variety to the foreign market by the patterns FFF , HFF , HHF ,

























Note that since FHF is dominated by HHF and HFF for θi = θ∗i = 1 for i = 1, 2,
we can exclude FHF from our analysis. Then, the following lemma is obtained.
Lemma 6.2 Suppose that θi = θ∗i = 1, i = 1, 2. The home firm still has an incentive
to engage in HFDI if t > τγ and Φ is sufficiently low.
Proof It is sufficient to prove that
πHHH ≤ max
{
πFFF , πHFF , πHHF
}
(6.13)
holds when θi = θ∗i = 1, i = 1, 2. Since we focus on the incentive for one firm
to choose a particular production configuration and since an individual firm takes
the price index as given, we treat the price index as fixed. Then, define A ≡
ασ−1E(P∗)σ−1B1−σ /σ andφ ≡ Φω/A. Substitute Eqs. (6.9)–(6.12) andEqs. (6.5)–
(6.8) into Eq. (6.13) and rearrange terms to yield
φωσ−1 ≤ max
{(
1 − t1−σ ) ,
(
τ γ











defining the upper bound of Φ. Equation (6.14) is satisfied if
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2(1−σ) − t1−σ ), or
φωσ−1 ≤ 3(τ γ (1−σ) − t1−σ )
holds, which requires that Φ = φA/ω is sufficiently low for the above inequalities
to hold. Since γ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1, it holds that τ γ (1−σ) < τγ 2(1−σ) < 1 for τ > 1.
Thus, we need τ γ (1−σ) > t1−σ or t > τγ . Q.E.D.
This lemma implies that evenwithout technology differences, firms have an incen-
tive to engage in HFDI if transportation costs for the cross-border shipment of the
final goods are sufficiently high and the additional fixed costs for FDI are sufficiently
low. This is just the standard motive for the HFDI. Lemma 6.2 yields the following
proposition.
Proposition 6.1 HFDI does not necessarily induce technology spillovers.
Proof From Lemma 6.2, HFDI occurs even in the case of no technology difference.
If the technology level is the same across countries, then there is no possibility of
technology spillovers. Q.E.D.
When the production configuration is HFF , the first and the second stages are
located in different countries. Thus, Lemma 6.1 suggests that technology spillovers
may occur. However, the proof of Lemma 6.2 shows that HFF can be the optimal
configuration even in the absence of a technology gap. If this is the case, technology
spillovers do not occur in the case of HFF .
6.5.4 FDI and Technology Spillovers: VFDI
We turn to the case of VFDI. In this case, the home firm conducts the final stage only
in the home country, so that the possible patterns ofVFDI are {FHH, FFH, HFH}.
We obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 6.3 Suppose that θi = θ∗i = 1 for i = 1, 2. Then, the home firm has no
incentive to engage in VFDI as long as τ and Φ are positive.
Proof By definition, the home firm conducts the final stage in the home country
for any type of VFDI. We need to examine the supply to the home market. Then,
compared to the national integration (i.e., the pattern of HHH ), FDI in either or
both of the first two stages incurs additional transportation costs and fixed costs of
FDI. Thus, in the absence of technology advantage in the foreign production, VFDI
always increases production costs as long as τ and Φ are positive. Q.E.D.
This lemma implies that in the absence of a factor cost differential, firms have
no incentive to engage in VFDI without a technology difference as long as there
are positive transportation costs for intermediate inputs and FDI requires additional
fixed costs.
122 6 Vertical Versus Horizontal Foreign Direct Investment …
Now, the unit cost functions for the home firm in VFDI are given by
CHFH (ω, τ ; θ1, θ∗2 ) = B
(











CFHH (ω, τ ; θ∗1 , θ2) = B(τ γ (θ∗1 )−γ θ−12 )γ ω. (6.17)
In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that t = 1, so that firms have no
incentive to locate the final stage of production for the foreign market separately
from that for the home market. It is then shown that as long as the final stage is
performed in a single location, firms have no incentive to conduct either or both of
the first two stages at more than one location. Given this, profits of the home firm




























whereΠk denotes the home firm’s total profits when it engages in VFDI with config-
uration k. Then, we can prove the following proposition on the relationship between
VFDI and technology spillovers.27
Proposition 6.2 VFDI of the configuration HFH by the home firm may induce
technology spillovers in both directions. Other types of VFDI can induce technology
spillovers in one direction.
Proof First, we derive the conditions for HFH to be chosen. Define G ≡
ασ−1E{(P)σ−1 + (P∗)σ−1}B1−σ /σ and ψ ≡ Φω/G. It is shown from Eqs. (6.8),
(6.15), (6.18), and (6.21) that ΠHFH ≥ ΠHHH holds if and only if
(θ∗2 /τ




It is also shown from Eqs. (6.15), (6.16), (6.18), and (6.19) that ΠHFH ≥ ΠFFH
holds if and only if
27 To simplify the analysis, we assume that firms treat technology spillovers as pure externality
and do not take the effects of technology spillovers into account in their decision on production
locations. Including technology spillovers in firms’ profits will not alter the qualitative results.
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(θ∗1 )




and from Eqs. (6.15), (6.17), (6.18), and (6.20) that ΠHFH ≥ ΠFHH holds if and
only if
(θ1)
γ (θ∗2 /τ) ≥ (θ∗1 )γ θ2. (6.24)
Since θ2 < θ∗2 is necessary for Eq. (6.22) to hold, Lemma 6.1 implies that technology
spillovers in R&D occur for m2 from the foreign country to the home country. On
the other hand, θ1 < θ∗1 can be consistent with the inequality Eq. (6.23) if the gap
between θ1 and θ∗1 is sufficiently small, τ is sufficiently low, and ψ is sufficiently
high. Thus, the technology spillovers in R&D for m1 from the home country to the
foreign country may not occur. On the other hand, if θ1 > θ∗1 holds, however, they do
occur. It is easy to prove that θ1 > θ∗1 and θ2 < θ∗2 satisfy Eq. (6.24) and that θ1 < θ∗1
and θ2 < θ∗2 can satisfy Eq. (6.24) if θ∗1 ≤ (θ∗2 /τθ2)1/γ θ1 holds. Moreover, in order




)γ (σ−1) + ((θ1)γ θ2)γ (σ−1) ≤ 2 ((θ1/τ)γ (θ∗2 /τ))γ (σ−1) ,
which can be consistent with Eq. (6.24).
We next derive the conditions for FHH to be chosen. It is shown from Eqs. (6.8),
(6.17), (6.20), and (6.21) that ΠFHH ≥ ΠHHH holds if and only if
(θ∗1 /τ)




It is also shown from Eqs. (6.16), (6.17), (6.19), and (6.20) that ΠFHH ≥ ΠFFH
holds if and only if
(θ∗2 /τ)




and from Eqs. (6.15), (6.17), (6.18), and (6.20) that ΠFHH ≥ ΠHFH holds if and
only if
(θ1)
γ (θ∗2 /τ) ≤ (θ∗1 )γ θ2. (6.27)




)γ (σ−1) + ((θ1)γ θ2)γ (σ−1) ≤ 2 ((θ∗1 /τ)γ θ2)γ (σ−1) ,
which can be consistent with Eq. (6.27). Since θ1 < θ∗1 is necessary for Eq. (6.25) to
hold and satisfies Eq. (6.27), this implies from Lemma 6.1 that technology spillovers
in R&D occur for m1 from the foreign country to the home country.
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We finally derive the conditions for FFH to be chosen. It yields from Eqs. (6.8),








Also, from Eqs. (6.16), (6.17), (6.19), and (6.20) it holds that ΠFFH ≥ ΠFHH if and
only if
(θ∗2 /τ)




and from Eqs. (6.15), (6.16), (6.18), and (6.19) it holds that ΠFFH ≥ ΠHFH if and
only if
(θ∗1 )




Since θ2 < θ∗2 is necessary for Eq. (6.29) to hold and satisfies Eq. (6.28), this implies
from Lemma 6.1 that technology spillovers occur in R&D for m2 from the foreign
country to the home country. Q.E.D.
This proposition shows that if home firms engage in VFDI in the configuration of
HFH , technology spillovers occur from the foreign country to the home country.
Technology spillovers in the opposite directionmay also occur but do not necessarily.
For other types of VFDI, we expect that technology spillovers occur only in one
direction from the foreign country to the home country.
Note that if the wage rates between the two countries are sufficiently different,
then firms may have an incentive to engage in VFDI even in the absence of a technol-
ogy difference, but VFDI does not induce international technology spillovers. This
situation corresponds to the typical North-South VFDI rather than the North-North
VFDI. Then, this never undermines our argument on the relationship between VFDI
and technology spillovers. That is, North-South VFDI does not necessarily involve
international technology spillovers.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated how the structure of MNEs’ activities affects
technology spillovers betweenMNEs and their host countries by using detailed firm-
level data on JapaneseMNEs and patent citation data.We propose new specifications
of FDI by information on sales and purchases of foreign affiliates of MNEs. We
define pure HFDI as FDI with a high share of both purchases of intermediate inputs
and sales of outputs in the local market and pure VFDI as FDI with a high share of
transactions (i.e., both purchases of intermediate inputs and sales of outputs) with the
home country. In addition, partially horizontal and partially vertical FDI are defined.
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Our estimation results reveal that when a technologically advanced country hosts
Japanese MNEs, an increase in the degree of pure VFDI has a significantly positive
effect on technology spillovers as measured by patent citations in both directions
between the host country and Japanese MNEs. In contrast, pure HFDI has no sig-
nificant effect or significantly negative effects on technology spillovers in either
direction. We also find that VFDI by Japanese firms to technologically advanced
countries is not based on factor price differentials.
To explain the mechanism for the observed relationship between the structure
of FDI and technology spillovers, we have developed a simple model of FDI and
technology spillovers, in which a good is produced in multiple stages. Our model
reveals that VFDI among technologically advanced economies would be associated
with international technology spillovers, while HFDI does not necessarily induce
technology spillovers.
The results indicate that technology spillovers from FDI occur among technologi-
cally advanced economies. In particular, VFDI plays an important role in technology
spillovers. We come to the conclusion that technologically advanced countries can
gain knowledge flow from MNEs’ activities both as the home country and as the
host country when FDI involves the geographical fragmentation of the production
process.
Another finding of this chapter is that when the host country is a technologically
less advanced country, any types of FDI do not have positive effects on technology
spillovers. One possible explanation for this finding is that we have focused on tech-
nology spillovers measured by patent citations. Since patent applications are made to
be counted as “spillovers,” indigenous firms in technologically less advanced coun-
tries do not largely benefit from technology spillovers in our definition. Another
possible explanation for the finding is that it reflects the stringency of intellectual
property right (IPR) protection in host countries. Branstetter et al. (2006) and Waka-
sugi and Ito (2009) find that the stronger protection of IPR in host countries has a
positive effect on technology transfer from parent firms to their foreign affiliates.
Nagaoka (2009) also finds a positive effect of stronger patent protection on expand-
ing the scope of the recipients of technology transfer. Taking these empirical findings
into account, we notice that the weaker protection of IPR in developing countries
generally hinders technology spillovers from FDI in our measurement.
Since our findings are based on JapaneseMNEs’ data, we suggest testing whether
our findings could be applicable to other countries’ MNEs through examining
detailed data on MNEs in other countries.
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Chapter 7
Do Deep Regional Trade Agreements
Enhance International Technology
Spillovers? Depth, Breadth, and
Heterogeneity
7.1 Introduction
In Chap.5, we examine the relationship between bilateral trade patterns and inter-
national technology spillovers. In Chap. 6, we analyze how horizontal and vertical
foreign direct investment (FDI) of multinational enterprises (MNEs) affects tech-
nology spillovers between themselves and firms in host countries. Both chapters
analyze the issues from theoretical and empirical points of view. Each chapter shows
that international trade or FDI is an important channel of international technology
spillovers, but the effect on them is heterogeneous, depending on the type of trade
patterns or the structure of FDI. In both chapters we measure technology spillovers
using patent citation data.
In this chapter, we shed light on the role of deep regional trade agreements (RTAs)
in international technology spillovers. As is well known in the field of international
economics, trade creation and trade diversion are the most popular effects of signing
an RTA (Viner 1950). The dynamic effects of RTAs such as the effects on technology
adoption and technology diffusion have been examined by relatively recent studies
(e.g., Bustos 2011;Das andAndriamananjara 2006;Ederington andMcCalman2008;
Schiff and Wang 2003).
As Jinji et al. (2019a) argue, RTAs may facilitate cross-border technology
spillovers both directly and indirectly. The indirect effects of RTAs on cross-border
technology spillovers are through international trade in goods and FDI. Since RTAs,
particularly deep RTAs with investment provisions, stimulate international trade and
FDI, they can facilitate cross-border technology spillovers through an increase in
bilateral trade and FDI. A more direct link between RTAs and cross-border tech-
nology spillovers may arise from the deep nature of recent RTAs. As examined in
Chap.2, recent RTAs tend to be deeper than old ones. Many RTAs include provi-
sions related to technology, such as trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
(TRIPS), intellectual property right (IPR), innovation policy, and research and devel-
opment (R&D). Moreover, some RTAs explicitly include provisions that stimulate
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technology spillovers. For example, the United States-Peru Free Trade Agreement
includes a provision on the promotion of innovation and technological development
(Article 16.12), which encourages the engagement in collaborative scientific research
projects and transfer of technology.
Using patent citations as a proxy for technology spillovers, Jinji et al. (2019a)
empirically examine whether RTAs actually enhance international technology
spillovers. They use panel data on patent citations at the USPTO for 114 coun-
tries/economies for the period 1991–2007. The focus of their study is on whether
the depth of RTAs that is measured by the legal enforceability information on the
policy areas in the WTO-X group matters for technology spillovers among mem-
ber countries/economies of RTAs.1 They show that the depth of integration actually
influences technology spillovers. Interestingly, they find that deeper integration in a
broad sense has a greater impact on technology spillovers than do technology-related
policy areas. They classify 26 out of 38 policy areas in the WTO-X group into three
subsets by utilizing the technique of the factor analysis. Then, they construct a new
measure of the nature of deep RTAs by calculating the ratio of the sum of the points
of legally enforceable WTO-X policy areas included in each subset that are covered
by RTAs to the total points of all legally enforceableWTO-X policy areas covered by
the same RTAs. They interpret the first subset as the set of policy areas representing a
healthy economic environment in a general sense and the second subset as the set of
policy areas representing basic social and economic conditions. The WTO-X policy
areas included in these two subsets are not directly related to technology spillovers.
On the other hand, the third subset is interpreted as the set of policy areas directly
related to competition and technology. Their finding is that the estimated coefficients
of the indexes for the first two subsets tend to be larger than those for the third subset.
The analysis in this chapter extends and enriches the study by Jinji et al. (2019a)
in several ways. First, as in Jinji et al. (2019a) and Chaps. 5 and 6 of this book, we
use patent citations as a proxy of technology spillovers.2 We extend the observation
period until 2015. Thus, our observation period is 25years from 1991 to 2015. The
eight-year extension of the observation period from Jinji et al. (2019a) is important
because more recent RTAs tend to be much deeper. Second, when we estimate the
model, we include directional country-pair fixed effects, which are not included in
the analysis in Jinji et al. (2019a), as well as time-varying citing and cited countries
fixed effects. As we discuss below, the inclusion of country-pair fixed effects is
particularly important to address the endogeneity issue (Baier and Bergstrand 2007).
Third, we include intra-national citation data in the analysis, which are not included
in the estimations of Jinji et al. (2019a). This is essential to measure the effect of
RTAs, as argued by Dai et al. (2014). Finally, although Jinji et al. (2019a) restrict the
measurement of deep RTAs to the WTO-X policy areas, we include policy areas in
1 See Chap.2 for the details of the policy areas in WTO-extra (WTO-X) and WTO-plus (WTO+)
groups.
2 This approach was pioneered by Jaffe et al. (1993) and has been employed by a number of studies
(e.g., Branstetter 2006; Cappelli and Montobbio 2020; Hall et al. 2001; Haruna et al. 2010; Jaffe
and Trajtenberg 1999; Jinji et al. 2013, 2015; Li 2014; MacGarvie 2006; Maurseth and Verspagen
2002; Murata et al. 2014; Peri 2005).
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both WTO+ and WTO-X groups and employ the classification of the policy areas in
terms of the depth and breadth of RTAs proposed by Limão (2016).3
In this chapter, we first estimate the effects of the depth and breadth indexes of
RTAs on bilateral patent citations. With regard to the depth of RTAs, we use the
indexes in the fields of tariffs, non-tariff barriers (NTBs), the behind-the-border poli-
cies (BBPs), and other policies (OPs). On the other hand, as for the breadth of RTAs,
we construct indexes for services, technology, investment/capital, labor, and non-
economic policies (NEPs) fields. Throughout this chapter, we employ the Poisson
pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator with time-varying citing country
fixed effects, time-varying cited country fixed effects, and citing-cited-pair fixed
effects, which is recommended in the gravity literature (Anderson and van Wincoop
2003; Head and Mayer 2014; Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006, 2011; Yotov et al.
2016).
We next analyze the heterogeneous effects of individual RTAs. In the trade liter-
ature, a number of previous studies find the heterogeneous effects of RTAs on trade
in goods by the type of agreements (Roy 2010; Vicard 2009) and by the characteris-
tics of country-pairs and particular countries (Baier et al. 2019; Behar and Cirera-i
Crivillé 2013; Cheong et al. 2015; Vicard 2011). Although Jinji et al. (2019a) inves-
tigate the heterogeneous effects of RTAs on technology spillovers by the type of
agreements (i.e., customs union versus free trade agreement) and by the charac-
teristics of country-pairs (i.e., North and South combinations), the heterogeneous
effects of individual RTAs on technology spillovers have not been investigated. As
major sources of international technology spillovers, we focus on RTAs signed by
the United States and European countries, such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU), RTAs
with the United States, and FTAs with the EC/EU.
The main findings of this chapter are as follows. First, we find that the estimated
coefficient on the RTA dummy is positive and highly significant, which confirms the
finding by Jinji et al. (2019a) and even strengthens their finding by showing that the
significantly positive effect of the RTA dummy is kept even if directional country-
pair fixed effects are included. Second, we find that the coefficients on the depth
indexes other than the OP index are positive and highly significant, suggesting that
technology spillovers among signatories of RTAs are stronger as RTAs are deeper.
However, when each of the depth indexes is estimated together with the RTA dummy,
the coefficient on the depth index becomes insignificant, which suggests that the
additional effect of including the depth policy areas may be small or even negligible.
A possible reason for the insignificant additional effect of the depth policy areas is
that since most of the recent RTAs tend to become deeper and deeper, the estimated
average effect of the RTA dummy partly captures the impact of the depth policy areas
on technology spillovers. The problem of multicollinearity may affect the result.
Third, the estimated coefficients on the breadth indexes are all positive and sta-
tistically significant, suggesting that technology spillovers among members of RTAs
become stronger as RTAs cover more policy areas with legal enforceability in each of
3 See Chap.2 for the details of the depth and breadth of RTAs by Limão (2016).
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the breadth fields. However, similar to the depth indexes, when the breadth indexes
are estimated with the RTA dummy, all of them lose their significance. Therefore,
the additional effects of including legally enforceable provisions in services, technol-
ogy, investment/capital, labor, or NEP fields on cross-border technology spillovers
may be small or insignificant. Since some of the specific provisions in these fields
actually strengthen regulations, this result implies that the same level of the index in
each breadth field may include both the positive and negative effects on technology
spillovers.
Finally, with regard to the heterogeneous effects of the RTAs signed by the
United States and the EU, we find that the impact of NAFTA on bilateral tech-
nology spillovers is particularly strong. By contrast, the impacts of the EU and EU
enlargement on technology spillovers are weak or not positive. On the other hand,
both the RTAs with the United States and the FTAs with the EU enhance technology
spillovers. Thus, the results suggest that signing RTAswith technologically advanced
countries, such as the United States and major European countries, is effective in
stimulating cross-border technology spillovers.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Sect. 7.2, we explain the
empirical framework. In Sect. 7.3, we describe the data employed in our empirical
analysis. In Sect. 7.4, we present our empirical results. Section7.5 concludes the
chapter.
7.2 Empirical Framework
In this section, we explain our empirical framework to examine the effects of deep
RTAs on international technology spillovers.
7.2.1 The Depth and Breadth Indexes
Wefirst explain howwemeasure the contents of deep RTAs. As explained in Chap.2,
Horn et al. (2010) identify 52 policy areas covered by RTAs and classify them into
two groups:WTO-plus (WTO+) andWTO-extra (WTO-X) (See Table 2.1 in Chap.2
for the details of theWTO+ andWTO-X policy areas). Then, Limão (2016) proposes
recategorizing theWTO+ andWTO-X policy areas from the viewpoints of the depth
and breadth of RTAs. The depth of RTAs is measured by four fields: (a) import
tariffs, (b) NTBs, (c) BBPs, and (d) OPs. On the other hand, the breadth of RTAs
is measured by five fields: (a) services, (b) technology, (c) investment/capital, (d)
labor, and (e) NEPs. Which policy areas are classified into each field of the depth
and breadth measures is shown in Table 2.2 in Chap.2.
For each field of the depth measure, we construct the following index:
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where Depth_d ∈ {Tari f f, NT B, BBP, OP} indicates the fields of the depth
measure, d is the set of policy areas that consist of the field d ∈ {Tari f f, NT B,
BBP, OP}, Max_LE pi jt ∈ {0, 1, 2} is the maximum point of the LE index of
policy area p in all RTAs of which countries i and j are members in year t if they
sign any common RTAs, and Kd is the number of policy areas in field d. Note that
2Kd in the denominator of Eq. (7.1) is the total points of the LE index of policy areas
in field d if all LE indexes are equal to two in field d. Thus, RT A_Depth_d_indexi j t
takes the value between zero and one.
Similar to the depth measure, we construct the following index for each field of
the breadth measure:







where Breadth_c ∈ {GAT S, T ech, Cap, Lab, non−EP} indicates the fields
of the breadth measure, c is the set of policy areas that consist of the field c ∈
{GAT S, T ech, Cap, Lab, non−EP}, Max_LE pi jt ∈ {0, 1, 2} is the maximum
point of the LE index of policy area p in all RTAs of which countries i and j are
members in year t if they sign any common RTAs, and Kc is the number of policy
areas in field c.
7.2.2 RTA Dummies
Let us next explain our RTA dummies. In addition to the usual RTA dummy, we
use various dummies to capture the heterogeneous effects of individual RTAs by
decomposing the RTA dummy.
First of all, RT A dummyi jt is a dummy variable that takes the value of unity if
countries i and j both belong to the same RTA in t and zero otherwise. Next, we
decompose the RT A dummyi jt in two ways. The first decomposition is to take into
account the NAFTA and the EC/EU. That is, we set N AFT Ai jt , which is a dummy
variable that takes the value of unity if countries i and j both belong to the NAFTA
in t and zero otherwise. Similarly, EUi jt is a dummy variable that takes the value
of unity if they both belong to the EC/EU in t and zero otherwise. Furthermore, we
set Other_RT Ai jt , which is a dummy variable that takes the value of unity if they
both belong to the same RTA other than the NAFTA and the EC/EU in t and zero
otherwise.
Next, our second decomposition of the RTA dummy is to take into account RTAs
signed by the United States other than the NAFTA and EU enlargement from 1995.
We construct RT A_wi th_USi jt , which is a dummy variable that takes the value of
unity if either of countries i and j is the United States and the two countries belong
132 7 Do Deep Regional Trade Agreements Enhance International Technology …
to the same RTA other than the NAFTA in t and zero otherwise. EU_Enlargei j t
is a dummy variable that takes the value of unity if at least one of the two coun-
tries (i and j) becomes a member of the EU in or after 1995 and both they are
the members of the EU in year t and zero otherwise. Moreover, FT A_wi th_EUi jt
is a dummy variable that takes the value of unity if either of countries i and j
is a member of the EC/EU in t and the other country is not a member of the
EC/EU in t but countries i and j belong to the same FTA in t and zero otherwise.
Finally, non_US_EU_RT Ai jt is a dummy variable that takes the value of unity if
they belong to the same RTA in t and N AFT Ai jt = EUi jt = RT A_wi th_USi jt =
EU_Enlargei j t = FT A_wi th_EUi jt = 0 holds for them in t and zero otherwise.4
In addition, we use theGATT/WTOdummy. That is,WT O dummyi jt is a dummy
variable that takes the value of unity if both of countries i and j are GATT/WTO
members in t and zero otherwise.
7.2.3 Empirical Model and Strategy
We next specify a model of knowledge flows between countries and discuss our
empirical strategy to estimate the model.
We first measure technology spillovers from country j to country i at time t
by extending the framework proposed by Jaffe et al. (1993), Jaffe and Trajtenberg
(1999), and Peri (2005). Let Φi j t be the actual flow of knowledge from country j to
country i at time t in terms of the actual effects on the research output in country i .
Then, we assume that Φi j t depends on both the knowledge stock in country j at t ,
K jt , and the research ability of firms in country i at t , Qit , as follows:
Φi j t = (Qit )α1(φ̃i j t K jt )α2 , (7.3)
where φ̃i j t ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of accessibility for firms in country i to the knowl-
edge stock in country j at t . Thus, (φ̃i j t K jt ) is the effective unit of country j’s
knowledge stock from the perspective of firms in country i . Parameters α1 and α2
are both positive. For notational simplicity, we relabel φ̃i j t as φi j t ≡ (φ̃i j t )α2 .
The degree of accessibility for firms in country i to the knowledge stock in country
j at t , φi j t , depends on the economic distance between countries i and j , which is
affected by not only bilateral geographical distance but also other potential resistance
factors (Peri 2005, p. 310). The resistance factors include both time-invariant and
time-varying country-pair specific characteristics. The time-invariant country-pair
specific characteristics include bilateral geographical distance, the use of a common
4 Note that in the second decomposition we do not set a dummy variable for the country-pairs
of which both countries were the members of the EC/EU before 1995. However, with the use
of country-pair fixed effects in our estimations, this omission of the dummy variable for the old
members of the EC/EU does not affect the estimations, because this dummy always takes the value
of unity during our observation period.
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language, and so on. On the other hand, the time-varying country-pair specific char-
acteristics, which affect the economic distance between two countries, are typically
represented by the membership of the same RTA and that of GATT/WTO.
Let xi j t be a set of bilateral country characteristics. Then, we have
φi j t = φ(xi j t )
= eξi j eγ1(RT A dummiesi j t )eγ2(DRT A_indexi j t )
×eγ3(WT O dummyi jt ), (7.4)
where ξi j denotes the time-invariant country-pair specific characteristics and
DRT A_indexi j t denotes various indexes of the depth and breadth of RTAs.
Since Φi j t , Qit , and K jt in Eq. (7.3) are not directly observable, we need to use
some proxies for those variables in our analysis. We use Ci jt , the number of patent
citations made by the patents of country i to those of country j at time t , as a proxy
for Φi j t . Moreover, following the gravity literature (Head and Mayer 2014; Yotov
et al. 2016), we capture Qit by the time-varying citing country fixed effects, μ̃i t , and
K jt by the time-varying cited country fixed effects, ν̃ j t . According to Peri (2005),
we assume the following relationship between Ci jt and Φi j t :
Ci jt = λ̃i jΦi j t eεi j t , (7.5)
where λ̃i j denotes the time-invariant individual effect associated with patent citations
between the two countries and eεi j t is an error term with zero-mean distribution.
Substitute Eqs. (7.3) and (7.4), μ̃i t and ν̃ j t into Eq. (7.5) to obtain
Ci jt = λ̃i j (μ̃i t )α1(ν̃ j t )α2eξi j eγ1(RT A dummiesi j t )eγ2(DRT A_indexi j t )
×eγ3(WT O dummyi jt )eεi j t . (7.6)
This equation is quite similar to the standard gravity equation that specifies the
relationship between the volume of bilateral trade and the market sizes of the two
countries with bilateral geographical distance (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003;
Head and Mayer 2014; Yotov et al. 2016). By redefining the fixed effects variables,
Eq. (7.6) can be rewritten as
Ci jt = exp
(
γ1RT A dummiesi j t + γ2DRT A_indexi j t + γ3WT O dummyi jt
+ζi j + μi t + ν j t + εi j t
)
. (7.7)
Equation (7.7) is our estimation equation for the analysis in Sect. 7.4. In this equation,
we use the RTA dummy and the decomposed RTA dummies that we construct in
Sect. 7.2.2. We also use the depth and breadth indexes that we construct in Sect. 7.2.1
for DRT A_indexi j t . In the estimations, we make use of one-year lagged variables
for RT A dummiesi j t , DRT A_indexi j t , and WT O dummyi jt .
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In the estimations, we employ the PPML estimator with time-varying citing coun-
try fixed effects, time-varying cited country fixed effects, and directional country-
pair fixed effects, recommended in the gravity literature (Anderson and vanWincoop
2003; Head and Mayer 2014; Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006, 2011; Yotov et al.
2016). As is popularly argued in the gravity literature, the use of PPMLestimatorwith
time-varying country fixed effects can address the issues of many observations with
zero value for the dependent variable and unobservable multilateral resistance terms.
Now there is one important issue that we should address the potential endogeneity
of RTAs. Possible sources of such endogeneity are the existence of an omitted vari-
able bias and reverse causality (Baier and Bergstrand 2007). Baier and Bergstrand
(2007) and Yotov et al. (2016) recommend the use of country-pair fixed effects to
take “the unobservable linkages between the endogenous trade policy covariate and
the error term in gravity regressions” (Yotov et al. 2016, p.21) into account. We fol-
low their recommendation and include citing-cited-country-pair fixed effects in our
estimations to address the endogeneity issue.
7.3 Description of the Data
The data on patent citations are taken from the Global 2019 edition of the EPO
Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT).We extract the patent statistics of
the USPTO from the PATSTAT.5 This dataset includes information on the application
date, the country name of the assignee, the main US patent class, and citations made
and received for each patent. We use patent citation data from 1991 to 2015 for our
analysis.
The sample includes all countries and economies that are included in the USPTO
data during the observation period. Our sample covers 243 countries and economies,
which are listed in Table7.1. We then construct a panel of 11,667 pairs of the citing
and cited countries/economies for 25years from 1991 to 2015.
Data on RTAs are taken from the database provided by Mario Larch (Egger and
Larch 2008),6 and data on the content of RTAs are taken from the World Bank’s
website.7
Table7.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables.
7.4 Empirical Results
In this section, we report our estimation results.
5 We also extract the patent statistics of the EPO and use them for a robustness check.
6 www.ewf.uni-bayreuth.de/en/research/RTA-data/index.html.
7 This dataset was originally provided by Horn et al. (2010) and extended by Hofmann et al. (2019)
(datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/content-deep-trade-agreements).
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Table 7.1 Sampled countries/economies
No. Country/Economy No. Country/Economy No. Country/Economy No. Country/Economy
1 Afghanistan 64 Dominican Rep. 126 Liberia 187 Saint Kitts & Nevis
2 Aland Islands 65 Ecuador 127 Libya 188 Saint Lucia
3 Albania 66 Egypt 128 Liechtenstein 189 Saint Pierre and
4 Algeria 67 El Salvador 129 Lithuania Miquelon
5 American Samoa 68 Equatorial Guinea 130 Luxembourg 190 Saint Vincent &
6 Andorra 69 Eritrea 131 Macao the Grenadines
7 Angola 70 Estonia 132 Madagascar 191 Samoa
8 Anguilla 71 Eswatini 133 Malawi 192 San Marino
9 Antarctica 72 Ethiopia 134 Malaysia 193 Sao Tome &
Principe
10 Antigua and Barbuda 73 Falkland Islands 135 Maldives 194 Saudi Arabia
11 Argentina 74 Faroe Islands 136 Mali 195 Senegal
12 Armenia 75 Fiji 137 Malta 196 Serbia &
Montenegro
13 Aruba 76 Finland 138 Marshall Islands 197 Seychelles
14 Australia 77 France 139 Martinique 198 Sierra Leone
15 Austria 78 French Guiana 140 Mauritania 199 Singapore
16 Azerbaijan 79 French Polynesia 141 Mauritius 200 Sint Maarten
17 Bahamas 80 French Southern 142 Mexico 201 Slovakia
18 Bahrain Territories 143 Micronesia 202 Slovenia
19 Bangladesh 81 Gabon 144 Moldova 203 Solomon Islands
20 Barbados 82 Gambia 145 Monaco 204 Somalia
21 Belarus 83 Georgia 146 Mongolia 205 South Africa
22 Belgium 84 Germany 147 Montenegro 206 Spain
23 Belize 85 Ghana 148 Montserrat 207 Sri Lanka
24 Benin 86 Gibraltar 149 Morocco 208 Sudan (the)
25 Bermuda 87 Greece 150 Mozambique 209 Suriname
26 Bhutan 88 Greenland 151 Myanmar 210 Svalbard &
27 Bolivia 89 Grenada 152 Namibia Jan Mayen
28 Bonaire, Sint 90 Guadeloupe 153 Nauru 211 Sweden
Eustatius & Saba 91 Guam 154 Nepal 212 Switzerland
29 Bosnia and
Herzegovina
92 Guatemala 155 Netherlands 213 Syrian Arab Rep.
30 Botswana 93 Guernsey 156 Netherlands antilles 214 Taiwan
31 Bouvet Island 94 Guinea 157 New Caledonia 215 Tajikistan
32 Brazil 95 Guyana 158 New Zealand 216 Tanzania
33 British Indian Ocean 96 Haiti 159 Nicaragua 217 Thailand
Territory 97 Heard Islands & 160 Niger (the) 218 Togo
34 Brunei Darussalam McDonald Islands 161 Nigeria 219 Tokelau
35 Bulgaria 98 Holy See 162 Niue 220 Tonga
36 Burkina Faso 99 Honduras 163 Norfolk Island 221 Trinidad & Tobago
37 Burundi 100 Hong Kong 164 Northern Mariana 222 Tunisia
38 Cabo Verde 101 Hungary Islands 223 Turkey
39 Cambodia 102 Iceland 165 Norway 224 Turkmenistan
40 Cameroon 103 India 166 Oman 225 Turks & Caicos
(continued)
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Table 7.1 (continued)
No. Country/Economy No. Country/Economy No. Country/Economy No. Country/Economy
41 Canada 104 Indonesia 167 Pakistan Islands
42 Cayman Islands 105 Iran 168 Palau 226 Tuvalu
43 Central African 106 Iraq 169 Palestine, State of 227 Uganda
Republic 107 Ireland 170 Panama 228 Ukraine
44 Chad 108 Isle of Man 171 Papua New Guinea 229 UAE
45 Chile 109 Israel 172 Paraguay 230 United Kingdom
46 China 110 Italy 173 Peru 231 US Minor
47 Christmas Island 111 Jamaica 174 Philippines Outlying Islands
48 Cocos Islands 112 Japan 175 Pitcairn 232 United States
49 Colombia 113 Jersey 176 Poland 233 Uruguay
51 Congo 114 Jordan 177 Portugal 234 Uzbekistan
52 Congo, Dem. Rep. 115 Kazakhstan 178 Puerto Rico 235 Vanuatu
53 Cook Islands 116 Kenya 179 Qatar 236 Venezuela
54 Costa Rica 117 Kiribati 180 Rep. of North 237 Viet Nam
55 Cote d’Ivoire 118 Korea, Dem.
People’s Rep.
Macedonia 238 Virgin Islands,
British
56 Croatia 181 Reunion 239 Virgin Islands, US
57 Cuba 119 Korea, Rep. of 182 Romania 240 Wallis and Futuna
58 Curacao 120 Kuwait 183 Russian Federation 241 Yemen
59 Cyprus 121 Kyrgyzstan 184 Rwanda 242 Zambia
60 Czechia 122 Laos 185 Saint Barthelemy 243 Zimbabwe
61 Denmark 123 Latvia 186 Saint Helena,
62 Djibouti 124 Lebanon Ascension &
63 Dominica 125 Lesotho Tristan da Cunha
7.4.1 The Depth of RTAs
First, we estimate the impact of the depth of RTAs on bilateral technology spillovers.
The results obtained are reported in Table7.3. Column (1) shows that the estimated
coefficient on the RTA dummy is positive and highly significant. This result confirms
the finding by Jinji et al. (2019a) and strengthens their finding by showing that
the significantly positive effect of the RTA dummy remains even when directional
country-pair fixed effects are included. Signing an RTA increases bilateral citation
of patents by 4.8% on average.8
The effects of the four depth indexes are shown in columns (2)–(5). The coeffi-
cients on the first three depth indexes are positive and highly significant. The esti-
mated coefficient on RT A_Tari f f _index is 0.042. Since this index consists of
two policy areas with four points in total, an increase in one policy area from zero
points to two points (i.e., a change from no legal enforceability to legally enforceable
8 (e0.047 − 1) × 100 ≈ 4.8.
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Table 7.2 Descriptive statistics
Variable No. of Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Ci jt 291,675 527.023 28134.360 0 4,677,583
RT A dummyi j,t−1 291,675 0.206 0.405 0 1
RT A_Tari f f _indexi j,t−1 291,675 0.121 0.325 0 1
RT A_NT B_indexi j,t−1 291,675 0.095 0.272 0 1
RT A_BBP_indexi j,t−1 291,675 0.073 0.220 0 1
RT A_OP_indexi j,t−1 291,675 0.035 0.150 0 1
RT A_GAT S_indexi j,t−1 291,675 0.073 0.261 0 1
RT A_T ech_indexi j,t−1 291,675 0.045 0.147 0 0.667
RT A_Cap_indexi j,t−1 291,675 0.068 0.225 0 1
RT A_Lab_indexi j,t−1 291,675 0.049 0.194 0 1
RT A_nonE P_indexi j,t−1 291,675 0.022 0.095 0 0.556
WTO dummyi j,t−1 291,675 0.567 0.500 0 1
N AFT Ai j,t−1 291,675 0.0004 0.021 0 1
EUi j,t−1 291,675 0.035 0.185 0 1
RT A_wi th_USi j,t−1 291,675 0.001 0.032 0 1
EU_Enlargei j,t−1 291,675 0.005 0.070 0 1
FT A_wi th_EUi j,t−1 291,675 0.051 0.220 0 1
Other_RT Ai j,t−1 291,675 0.172 0.378 0 1
non_US_EU_RT Ai j,t−1 291,675 0.151 0.358 0 1
policy area) raises bilateral citation of patents by 2.1% on average.9 Similarly, the
estimated coefficients of the RT A_NT B_index and the RT A_BBP_index are
0.059 and 0.066, where RT A_NT B_index and RT A_BBP_index consist of five
policy areas and six policy areas, respectively. Thus, an increase in one policy area
from zero points to two points raises bilateral citation of patents by 1.0% for the NTB
index and 1.4% for the BBP index, respectively.10 Only the estimated coefficient on
the RT A_OP_index is insignificant.
Columns (6) and (8) show the results on estimations when the RTA dummy and
each of RT A_NT B_index , RT A_BBP_index , or RT A_OP_index are jointly
used as explanatory variables. The results may suffer from the problem of multi-
collinearity as the correlations among the RTA dummy and the depth indexes are
high. In column (6), both the RTA dummy and the RT A_NT B_index become
insignificant, whereas in columns (7) and (8) the coefficient on the RTA dummy is
positive and significant but that on the RT A_BBP_index or the RT A_OP_index
is insignificant. These results imply that the additional effect of including the depth
policy areas in the fields of NTB, BBP, and OP may be small or even insignificant.
A possible reason for the insignificant additional effect of the depth policy areas is
9 (e0.042 − 1) × (1/4) × 2 × 100 ≈ 2.1.
10 (e0.059 − 1) × (1/10) × 2 × 100 ≈ 1.0 and (e0.066 − 1) × (1/12) × 2 × 100 ≈ 1.4.
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that most of the RTAs that have recently been signed tend to be increasingly deeper.
Thus, we can conclude that the estimated average effect of the RTA dummy partly
captures the impact of the depth policy areas on technology spillovers.
By contrast, the estimated coefficient on theWT O dummy is positive and highly
significant in all columns, and its magnitude is large. If both countries are members
of GATT/WTO, then bilateral citations of patents are on average 30.2% higher than
those in other types of country-pairs.11
7.4.2 The Breadth of RTAs
Wenext estimate the impact of the breadth ofRTAs on bilateral technology spillovers.
Estimated results are shown in Table7.4. Columns (1)–(5) indicate the individ-
ual effect of the five breadth indexes: RT A_GAT S_index , RT A_T ech_index ,
RT A_Cap_index , RT A_Lab_index , and RT A_nonE P_index . The estimated
coefficients are positive and statistically significant for all of them. For example,
the estimated coefficient on the RT A_GAT S_index is 0.045 and the GATS field
consists of just one policy area, so that an increase in this index from zero points to
two points raises cross-border citations of patents by 4.6%.12 Since the coefficient
on the RT A_T ech_index is 0.084 and the technology field consists of six policy
areas, an increase in one technology-related policy area from zero points to two
points raises bilateral citations of patents by 1.5%.13 Similarly, since the coefficient
on the RT A_Cap_index is 0.045 and the investment/capital field is comprised of
three policy areas, an increase in one investment/capital policy area from zero points
to two points raises bilateral citations of patents by 1.5%.14 On the other hand, the
impact of the labor-related policy fields becomes much larger. The estimated coeffi-
cient on the RT A_Lab_index is 0.133. The labor field consists of four policy areas,
so that a rise in one labor-related policy area from zero point to two points causes
bilateral citations of patents by 3.6% to increase.15 The larger impact of the RTAs
with legally enforceable labor-related policy areas than those with technology and
investment/capital policy areas implies that the movement of workers across coun-
tries stimulated by signing RTAs is an important channel of technology spillovers.
In column (5), the coefficient on the RT A_nonE P_index is 0.189, where the NEP
field consists of nine policy areas, so an increase in one NEP policy area from zero
point to two points raises bilateral citations of patents by 2.3%.16
Compared with the results above, the results presented in columns (6)–(10) indi-
cate that all of them lose their statistical significance when the breadth indexes are
11 (e0.264 − 1) × 100 ≈ 30.2.
12 (e0.045 − 1) × (1/2) × 2 × 100 ≈ 4.6.
13 (e0.084 − 1) × (1/12) × 2 × 100 ≈ 1.5.
14 (e0.045 − 1) × (1/6) × 2 × 100 ≈ 1.5.
15 (e0.133 − 1) × (1/8) × 2 × 100 ≈ 3.6.
16 (e0.189 − 1) × (1/18) × 2 × 100 ≈ 2.3.
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estimated with the RT A dummy. This means that the additional effect of including
legally enforceable policy areas in services, technology, investment/capital, labor, or
NEP field on bilateral technology spillovers may be negligible. However, it should
be noted that the problem of multicollinearity may distort the estimated coefficients
of the breadth indexes. Moreover, the inclusion of legally enforceable policy areas
in services, technology, investment/capital, labor, or NEP field does not necessarily
increase bilateral citations of patents because some of the policy areas in these fields
actually strengthen regulations. The same level of the index in each breadth field
may include not only the positive effect but also the negative effect on technology
spillovers. Consequently, the positive impact of the breadth index may be weakened.
Note that the estimated coefficient on theWT O dummy in Table7.4 is almost the
same as that in Table7.3.
7.4.3 Heterogeneous Effects of RTAs by the United States
and the EU
Our next focus is on the heterogeneous effects of theRTAs signed by theUnited States
and the EU. Table7.5 shows the estimated results. Column (1) shows the effects of the
NAFTA and the EU. Interestingly, while the estimated coefficient on the N AFT A
dummy is positive and highly significant, that of the EU dummy is negative and
significant. NAFTA increases bilateral citations of patents among Canada, Mexico,
and the United States by 28.5% on average.17 The NAFTA membership is fairly
comparable in magnitude to the GATT/WTO membership.
Column (2) reports the effects of RTAs with the United States, EU enlargement,
and FTAswith the EU.RTAswith theUnited States, other thanNAFTA, have on aver-
age a positive and significant effect on bilateral patent citations. Moreover, although
the impact of EU enlargement is insignificant, FTAs with the EU affect positively
bilateral patent citations on average. These results suggest that the impact of NAFTA
is much larger than that of other RTAs.
7.4.4 Robustness Check
The large impact of NAFTA and the small one of the EU on bilateral citations of
patents shown in the previous subsection may be due to the use of the USPTO data.
In other words, one may suspect that the home bias may cause the heterogeneous
effects between NAFTA and the EU.
To check the robustness of the finding in the previous subsection, we employ the
EPO data and construct the dataset, so that the same country-pairs are included in
both the USPTO and the EPO citations. Then, we estimate the same specifications
17 (e0.251 − 1) × 100 ≈ 28.5.
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Table 7.5 Heterogeneous effects of RTAs by the United States and the EU
(1) (2)




Other_RT Ai j,t−1 0.040∗∗∗
(0.011)




FT A_wi th_EUi j,t−1 0.093∗∗∗
(0.023)
non_US_EU_RT Ai j,t−1 −0.009
(0.025)
WTO dummyi j,t−1 0.263∗∗ 0.264∗∗
(0.108) (0.108)
Citing country-year FE Yes Yes
Cited country-year FE Yes Yes
Directional country-pair FE Yes Yes
No. of observations 236,953 236,953
Notes: (a) Estimations were implemented using Stata command ppmlhdfe
(b) ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively
(c) Standard errors clustered by country-pair are in parentheses
(d) The regressions include a constant term
with those in Table7.5 for both the USPTO and the EPO citations. The results are
reported in Table7.6. Columns (1) and (2) show the results of the USPTO citations,
and columns (3) and (4) show those of the EPO citations.
Comparing the estimated coefficients on the N AFT A dummy in columns (1)–
(2) and columns (3)–(4), the coefficient is positive in both columns (3)–(4) and
significant in column (4), although the magnitude becomes smaller in columns (3)–
(4). By contrast, the coefficient on the EU dummy is negative and significant in both
columns (1) and (3). The estimated coefficient on the EU enlargement dummy is
insignificant in both columns (2) and (4). Moreover, whereas the coefficient on the
FT A_wi th_EU dummy is positive and significant in column (2), it is negative and
insignificant in column (4).
We conclude that the findings in Table7.5 are not due to the home bias and that
these findings are robust.
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Table 7.6 Robustness check: USPTO citations versus EPO citations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
USPTO USPTO EPO EPO
N AFT Ai j,t−1 0.251∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.128 0.196∗
(0.090) (0.092) (0.114) (0.115)
EUi j,t−1 −0.094∗ −0.149∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.043)
Other_RT Ai j,t−1 0.040∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.026)
RT A_wi th_USi j,t−1 0.054∗∗∗ −0.010
(0.011) (0.034)
EU_Enlargei j,t−1 0.078 −0.053
(0.075) (0.061)
FT A_wi th_EUi j,t−1 0.093∗∗∗ −0.039
(0.024) (0.032)
non_US_EU_RT Ai j,t−1 −0.010 −0.070∗
(0.026) (0.036)
WTO dummyi j,t−1 0.269∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.110) (0.207) (0.207)
Citing country-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cited country-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Directional country-pair
FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 98,546 98,546 84,578 84,578
Notes: (1) Estimations were implemented using Stata command ppmlhdfe
(2) ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
(3) Standard errors clustered by country-pair are in parentheses
(4) The regressions include a constant term
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigated the impact of deep RTAs on international technol-
ogy spillovers, employing patent citations as a proxy of technology spillovers. We
extended and enriched the research by Jinji et al. (2019a) in several ways. The focus
of our research is on the impacts of the depth and breadth of RTAs and the heteroge-
neous effects of individual RTAs on international technology spillovers.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we confirmed the finding by Jinji et al.
(2019a) that RTAs significantly enhance international technology spillovers mea-
sured by bilateral patent citations. We actually strengthened their finding by deriving
the one that the significantly positive coefficient on the RTA dummy is kept even
when the model is estimated with directional country-pair fixed effects.
Second, we found that deep RTAs with higher coverage of policy areas in the
depth fields such as tariffs, NTBs, and BBPs, and those with higher coverage of
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policy areas in the breadth fields such as services, technology, investment/capital,
labor, and NEPs at the legally enforceable level have positive effects on international
technology spillovers. The additional effects of including the depth or breadth policy
areas may be small or even negligible. This may be because the estimated average
effect of the RTA dummy partly captures the impact of the depth policy areas on
technology spillovers as recent RTAs tend to be increasingly deeper. Moreover, with
regard to the breadth fields, the same level of the breadth index may include both the
positive and negative effects on technology spillovers, as some policy areas actually
strengthen rather than relax regulations. Finally, we found that the NAFTA has a
strongly positive impact on international spillovers, whereas the impacts of the EU
and EU enlargement on technology spillovers are weak or not positive. However,
the RTAs with the United States and the FTAs with the EU both positively affect
technology spillovers.
Our empirical results imply that signing deep RTAs with higher coverage of
the depth or breadth policy areas is quite effective to enhance bilateral technology
spillovers. In addition, signing RTAs with technologically advanced countries, such
as the United States and major European countries, is also effective in stimulating
cross-border technology spillovers.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Policy Implications
After about a quarter century of countries having pursued deep regional integration
through negotiating on deep regional trade agreements (RTAs), we observed a num-
ber of historical events that symbolize the curbing of the trend of globalization in
2016. On June 24, 2016, the people of the United Kingdom voted to leave the Euro-
pean Union (EU) in a referendum. On November 8, 2016, Mr. Donald Trump, who
proposed the “America First” policy and a number of protectionist policies, such as
the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and the construction
of a substantial wall on the United States–Mexico border, during his presidential
campaign, won the US presidential election.
Since then, it seems that the world has been taking “a momentary pause” (Baier
et al. 2019), at least until 2020, in the trend toward deep integration. For example,
after the Brexit referendum in 2016, the United Kingdom struggled for more than
three years to decide whether and when it would actually leave the EU. Finally, it
withdrew from the EU on January 31, 2020. On the other hand, the Trump adminis-
tration of the United States implemented various unprecedented protectionist poli-
cies. It increased tariffs on imports from China, which was retaliated by China and
resulted in a trade war. As pledged in Mr. Trump’s election campaign, the United
States withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement on January 23, 2017,
and suspended negotiations with the EU for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership Agreement. Moreover, the Trump administration re-negotiated over the
NAFTA with Canada and Mexico and signed a new agreement called the United
States–Mexico–Canada Agreement, which entered into force on July 1, 2020. With
regard to trade negotiations, theTrump administration emphasized bilateralism rather
than multilateralism or pluralism.
In 2020, due to the spread of COVID-19, major countries closed national borders
and implemented lockdown policies to limit the movement of people both across and
within countries. Shortages of masks and other medical materials made it difficult to
© The Author(s) 2022
N. Jinji et al., Deep Integration, Global Firms, and Technology Spillovers,
Advances in Japanese Business and Economics 26,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5210-3_8
145
146 8 Conclusion and Policy Implications
maintain free trade in those goods. Moreover, there has been a surge in protectionism
for trade in COVID-19 vaccines. Like all other countries, the countries producing the
vaccines want to vaccinate their people against COVID-19 as quickly as possible.
For example, then US President Donald Trump signed an executive order to use US-
made vaccines to meet their domestic demand first in December 2020. The European
Commission announced in January 2021 that the EU was to introduce tighter rules
over the exports of COVID-19 vaccines to non-EU countries. In March 2021, those
tighter export measures were extended to June 2021.
In contrast to the waves of protectionism due to COVID-19, moves toward deep
integration were partially regained in 2020. For example, the Regional Comprehen-
sive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which has been negotiated by 10 Association of
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and six Asia-Pacific countries (Aus-
tralia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea) since 2012, was signed
by 15 countries excluding India on November 15, 2020. It is expected that RCEP
will enter into force by the end of 2021. Moreover, in a foreign policy speech in
February 2021, US President Joe Biden stated that the United States would work
with the international community to tackle global challenges, such as the COVID-19
pandemic and climate change, and to advance freedom and dignity for people in
the world. In spite of this US departure from unilateralism, the so-called “economic
decoupling” between the United States and China may be accelerated.
So, the world economy seems to be currently in the mixed situation of slowly
regaining the momentum of globalization and protectionism/nationalism. The main
topics in this book, namely, deep integration, global firms, and technology spillovers,
will continue to be important issues in economic research. In this chapter, we sum-
marize the findings from the analyses in the book and discuss the issues for future
research.
This final chapter of the book is organized as follows. In Sect. 8.1, we summarize
the main findings in this book. In Sect. 8.2, we discuss policy implications that are
obtained from our findings. Finally, the issues for future research are discussed in
Sect. 8.3.
8.1 Summary of the Main Findings
In this section, we summarize the main findings of the research outlined in
Chaps. 2–7.
8.1.1 The Trend of Deep Regional Integration in the
Asia-Pacific Region
In Chap. 2, we investigated the trend of deep regional integration in the Asia-Pacific
region from the perspective of the depth andbreadth of regional integration. The depth
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measure consists of four fields: import tariffs; non-tariff barriers (NTBs); behind the
border policies (BBPs); and other policies (OPs). Each of those fields includes a
number of policy areas. For example, the BBPs field includes five policy areas: state
trading enterprises; state aid; public procurement; anti-corruption; and competition
policy. On the other hand, the breadth measure consists of five fields: services; tech-
nology; investment/capital; labor; and non-economic policies (NEPs), each of which
includes a number of policy areas. For example, the field of technology includes six
policy areas: trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS); intellec-
tual property right (IPR); innovation policies; economic policy dialogue; information
society; and research and technology.
We found that the depth and breadth of RTAs signed by ASEAN countries, China,
and Japan are quite heterogeneous. Specifically, the heterogeneity is significant in
the fields of the NTBs and the BBPs in the depth measure and in the fields of invest-
ment/capital and labor in the breadth measure. Although RTAs signed by ASEAN
countries include more NTB policy areas in the 2000s, an improvement in the inclu-
sion of the BBP policy areas is small. Moreover, RTAs signed by China indicate
a large improvement in the inclusion of both NTBs and BBPs in the 2000s, but
the coverage of the legally enforceable BBP index is still low even in 2010–2015,
compared with RTAs signed by Japan, the United States, and European countries.
By contrast, RTAs signed by Japan in 2010–2015 show almost the same level of
the coverage of the NTB and BBP policy areas as those by the United States and
European countries. As for the breadth measure, on the other hand, the coverage
of the investment/capital policy areas is much narrower for RTAs signed by China
than those signed by ASEAN countries and Japan even in 2010–2015. Moreover,
the coverage of the labor policy areas is almost the same among ASEAN countries,
China, and Japan in 2000–2009,whereas the coverage becomesmuchwider for RTAs
signed by Japan than those signed by ASEAN countries and China in 2010–2015.
8.1.2 Firm Performance and the Choice of Globalization
Mode
In Chaps. 3 and 4, we examined how a firm’s choice of globalization mode, such as
export, foreign outsourcing (FO), and foreign direct investment (FDI), is associated
with firm performance.We use various measures of firm performance, which include
labor productivity (LP), total factor productivity (TFP), Tobin’s q, and the ratio of
patent stock to tangible fixed capital. The last measure is a proxy of the ratio of
intangible to tangible assets. With regard to the measure of globalization activities,
we employ the ratio of the size of a firm’s globalization activity to the size of its
domestic sales. The size of its activity is measured by the value of exports, sales of
foreign affiliates, and costs of FO. This measure can capture the relative importance
of a particular type of globalization activity (i.e., export, FDI, or FO) for a firm
in relation to the size of its domestic activity. In addition, we construct indexes to
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measure the relative choice of globalization modes, such as the ratio of export sales
to foreign affiliate sales and the ratio of outsourcing costs to foreign affiliate sales.
Our main findings in Chap. 3 are as follows. First, we found that an increase in LP
or Tobin’s q enhances the size of export or FDI relative to its domestic sales, whereas
it does not necessarily induce a firm to expand its FO relative to its domestic sales.
These results imply that exporters and multinational enterprises (MNEs) are likely
to be more productive and have higher Tobin’s q than non-globalized firms, but firms
that engage in FO are not necessarily superior in LP or Tobin’s q to non-globalized
firms. It seemed that our result does not clearly indicate a difference between LP and
Tobin’s q in terms of the effects on firms’ globalization. Second, we found important
differences between LP and Tobin’s q on a firm’s relative choice among modes of
globalization. Specifically, an increase in LP tends to motivate a firm to choose more
FDI and less exporting, but does not affect the choice between FDI and FO. By
contrast, an increase in Tobin’s q tends to motivate a firm to choose more FDI and
less FO, but does not affect the choice between exporting and FDI. Third, we also
found that Tobin’s q and intangible asset intensity work in a different way when one
tries to capture the importance of the knowledge capital in the choice of globalization
mode. Headquarters companies with relatively higher intangible assets tend to favor
FDI over exporting and outsourcing. In other words, a difference in the intangible
asset intensity is important to the choice between exporting and FDI as well as to the
choice between FDI and FO. In this way, we revealed the differences among various
measures of firm performance in the effects of globalization activity.
In Chap. 4, we further investigated the effects of Tobin’s q on a firm’s choice of
globalization mode. We distinguished between total FDI and horizontal FDI (HFDI)
through taking advantage of the feature of our dataset that allows us to observe
detailed information on sales of foreign affiliates of Japanese MNEs. We measure
total FDI by total sales of foreign affiliates and HFDI by sales of foreign affiliates
excluding exports to Japan. Then, employing a number of different estimation tech-
niques, we confirmed that Tobin’s q is negatively and significantly correlated with
the ratio of FO to the total FDI. This strongly supports the prediction by Chen et al.
(2012) that a higher Tobin’s q is associated with a higher FDI engagement relative
to FO by MNEs. In contrast, little evidence was found on a definite relationship
between Tobin’s q and the ratio of exports to HFDI. It implies that the imperfect
contractibility of knowledge capital and a higher technology transfer cost actually
matter for knowledge-capital intensive firms to choose between exports and FDI,
because these factors weaken the positive relationship between Tobin’s q and the
ratio of FDI to exports.
We also confirmed that the relationship between Tobin’s q and the firm’s choice of
globalization mode fairly differs from that of TFP. We found that TFP is negatively
and significantly correlated with the ratio of exports to HFDI, whereas no significant
relationship existed between TFP and the ratio of FO to the total FDI. The former
result is consistent with the theoretical prediction of Helpman et al. (2004), but the
latter result differs from the prediction of Antràs and Helpman (2004).
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8.1.3 The Impact of Trade/FDI on Technology Spillovers
We explored the impact of international trade and FDI on international technology
spillovers in Chaps. 5 and 6. To measure international technology spillovers we used
patent citation data throughout this book. Patent citations are references to existing
patents included in patent documents. The advantage of using patent citations as a
proxy of technology spillovers is that it is a direct measure of knowledge flows (Hall
et al. 2001).
In Chap. 5, we focused on the relationship between the bilateral trade structure
and technology spillovers. We first conducted a theoretical analysis using a two-
country model of monopolistic competition with quality differentiation, in which
inter- and intra-industry trade patterns endogenously arise. Our model predicted
that the bilateral trade pattern is horizontal intra-industry trade (HIIT) when the
two countries have access to a similar level of technology, while it is vertical intra-
industry trade (VIIT) when there is a technological difference between them. If the
technological difference is sufficiently large, then the bilateral trade pattern becomes
one-way (or inter-industry) trade. As for the relationship between trade patterns and
international technology spillovers, our model predicted that technology spillovers
are highest when the bilateral trade pattern is HIIT, followed by VIIT and one-way
trade. We tested these theoretical predictions using European and Japanese patent
data and found that the predictions are supported by empirical results. Specifically,
an increase in the share of intra-industry trade in the bilateral trade has a positive
effect on the number of patent citations between the two countries. HIIT has a larger
effect on spillovers than VIIT. On the other hand, the effects of one-way trade on the
number of citations are much weaker than those of IIT.
InChap. 6,we examinedhow the structure ofMNEs’ activity in termsof horizontal
and vertical FDI affects technology spillovers between MNEs and firms in their host
economies using firm-level data on Japanese MNEs and patent citation data. We
constructed new measures of FDI by exploiting information on sales and purchases
of foreign affiliates of MNEs. Pure vertical (horizontal) FDI was defined as FDI with
a high share of transactions (i.e., both purchases of inputs and sales of outputs) with
the source country (in the localmarket). Partially vertical and horizontal FDIwas also
defined. We then estimated the effects of these types of FDI on technology spillovers
captured by patent citations and found that pure vertical FDI plays a dominant role
in technology spillovers in both directions between Japanese MNEs and their high-
income host countries. More specifically, when technologically advanced economies
host Japanese MNEs, an increase in the degree of pure vertical FDI has significantly
positive effects on technology spillovers in both directions between the MNEs and
their host countries. Moreover, partially vertical FDI (i.e., FDI with a higher share
of purchase of intermediate inputs in the local market and a higher share of sales of
outputs to the home country) also has positive and significant effects on technology
spillovers from the high-income host countries to the MNEs. By contrast, we found
no evidence of a positive impact of pure horizontal FDI on technology spillovers
between the MNEs and their host countries.
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Although a number of previous studies have identified international trade and FDI
as important channels of international technology spillovers, the analyses in Chaps. 5
and 6 suggest that the degree of technology spillovers depends substantially on the
subdivided patterns or structure of bilateral trade or FDI.
8.1.4 Deep Regional Integration and Technology Spillovers
Finally, we analyzed the impact of regional integrations on international technology
spillovers in Chap. 7. The focus of our analysis was on the impacts of the depth and
breadth of RTAs and the heterogeneous effects of individual RTAs on international
technology spillovers measured by cross-country patent citations. With regard to the
depth of RTAs, we used the indexes in the areas of tariffs, NTBs, BBPs, and OPs.
On the other hand, as for the breadth of RTAs, we constructed indexes for services,
technology, investment/capital, labor, and NEPs areas. Moreover. we analyzed the
heterogeneous effects of individual RTAs. As major sources of international tech-
nology spillovers, we focused on RTAs signed by the United States and European
countries, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Euro-
pean Community (EC)/European Union (EU), RTAs with the United States, and
FTAs with the EC/EU.
Then, in addition to the positive effect of the RTA dummy, we found that deep
RTAs with a higher coverage ratio of policy areas in the depth fields such as tariffs,
NTBs, and BBPs, and those with a higher coverage ratio of policy areas in the
breadth fields such as services, technology, investment/capital, labor, and NEPs,
at the legally enforceable level have positive effects on international technology
spillovers. The additional effects of including the depth or breadth policy areas may
be small or even negligible. This may be because the estimated average effect of
the RTA dummy partly captures the impact of the depth policy areas on technology
spillovers as recent RTAs become deep. Moreover, with regard to the breadth fields,
the same level of the breadth index may have both positive and negative effects on
technology spillovers, as some specific policy areas in the breadth fields strengthen
rather than relax regulations. Finally, we found that the impact of NAFTA on bilateral
technology spillovers is particularly strong,whereas the impacts of theEUand theEU
enlargement on technology spillovers are weak or not positive. However, the RTAs
with the United States and the FTAs with the EU both positively affect technology
spillovers.
8.2 Policy Implications
We can obtain a number of important policy implications from our findings in
Chaps. 2–7. In this section, we discuss two areas of policy implications: policies
to support the globalization activities of firms; and policies to facilitate international
technology spillovers.
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8.2.1 Policies to Support the Globalization Activities of Firms
First important policy implications are obtained from the analysis of the effects of
firm performance on the choice of a firm’s globalization mode. Although existing
empirical studies have primarily focused on the relationship between a firm’s pro-
ductivity and its choice of globalization mode, our findings illuminate the potential
importance of Tobin’s q on firms’ globalization activities. In particular, we found
that a difference in Tobin’s q affects the choice of a firm between FDI and FO,
whereas that a difference in productivity is relatively less important to the firm’s
choice between those two activities.
Firmswith lower Tobin’s q are relativelymore active in FO than in FDI. Generally,
policies to facilitate FO will benefit the domestic economy, because FO contributes
to improving the competitiveness of outsourcers through reducing their production
costs. Since relatively lower values of Tobin’s q imply that the firms do not efficiently
utilize their capital, deregulation and expansion of supportive services to small and
medium enterprises may be helpful. For example, providing information on regu-
lations, business customs, and the law in foreign countries and helping to find a
potential outsourcing partner may also enhance gains from FO through reducing the
fixed costs of outsourcing.
On the other hand, firms with lower Tobin’s q may be reluctant to enhance FDI
because they have difficulties in financing costs of investment, as indicated by the
low value of Tobin’s q. Thus, policies to create a financing mechanism for FDI will
help those firms facilitate outward FDI.
In both cases, Tobin’s q of individual firms provides useful information for policy
makers of the firms’ home country about what kind of policy is required to support
their globalization activities. Since the ratio of intangible to tangible assets gives
similar information, it can be used as an alternative indicator of Tobin’s q. Therefore,
in addition to the indexes of productivities, such as LP and TFP, policymakers should
pay much attention to data on Tobin’s q and the ratio of intangible to tangible assets
when they consider policies to support the globalization activities of firms.
8.2.2 Policies to Facilitate International Technology
Spillovers
We next discuss policy implications for facilitating international technology
spillovers. As previous studies have shown, international trade and FDI are both
important channels of international technology spillovers (Keller, 2004). However,
our empirical findings suggest that the patterns of trade and the structure of FDI
matter for the flows of knowledge across countries. Therefore, to facilitate
international technology spillovers, it is not enough to merely increase the volume of
bilateral trade or the level of inward or outward FDI relative to GDP. Policy makers
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should also pay much attention to the patterns of bilateral trade and the structure of
MNEs’ activities.
More specifically, our findings indicate that IIT or VFDI is primarily associated
with international technology spillovers. With regard to international trade, HIIT
with technologically advanced countries may be effective in enhancing spillovers of
technological knowledge.On the other hand, as for FDI, both pureVFDI and partially
vertical FDI are positively associated with international technology spillovers. This
is true for not only the host economies of FDI but also the source economies of FDI.
Thus, information on the structure of outward FDI as well as that of inward FDI will
provide useful information on what extent of technology spillovers can be expected.
Furthermore, our research suggests that there is amore active role for governments
in facilitating international technology spillovers. That is, our empirical results imply
that signing deep RTAs with higher coverage of the depth or breadth policy areas is
quite effective in enhancing bilateral technology spillovers. A number of previous
studies have suggested that the stringency of the IPR protection in host countries
is important to technology spillovers. For example, Branstetter et al. (2006) and
Wakasugi and Ito (2009) find that stronger protection of IPR in host countries has
a positive effect on technology transfer from parent firms to their foreign affiliates.
Nagaoka (2009) also finds a positive effect of stronger patent protection on expanding
the scope of the recipients of technology transfer. In addition to the importance
of IPR protection, our research suggests that including other policy areas of the
depth and breadth fields in RTAs may play an important role in facilitating flows of
technological knowledge among members of the RTAs.
In addition, we found that the impact of RTAs on bilateral technology spillovers is
quite heterogeneous across RTAs. This finding is in line with previous studies on the
heterogeneous effects of RTAs on trade in goods (see, e.g., Baier et al. 2019; Behar
andCirera-iCrivillé 2013;Cheong et al. 2015;Vicard 2011). In the case of technology
spillovers, our analysis indicates that signing RTAs with technologically advanced
countries, such as the United States, is effective in stimulating cross-border technol-
ogy spillovers. RTAs with EU countries may also facilitate technology spillovers, but
it may be true only for RTAs between EU and non-EU countries. More analyses will
be required to identify the causes of the heterogeneous effects of RTAs on technology
spillovers.
8.3 Direction for Future Research
In this final section, we discuss the issues for future research.
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8.3.1 Political Trilemma of the World Economy
The first issue for future research is the potential incompatibility of deep integration
with the sovereignty of nation states and democracy. This issue was originally raised
by Rodrik (2000) as the “political trilemma of the world economy” as an analogy
of the trilemma of international finance. As is well known, the trilemma of interna-
tional finance tells us that countries cannot simultaneously maintain the following
three policy goals: independent monetary policies; fixed exchange rates; and an open
account to international flows of capital. Countries can pick at most any two of the
three policy goals.
Rodrik (2011) slightly revises his argument in Rodrik (2000) and states that
sovereign nation states, democratic politics, and deep international economic inte-
gration (or hyper-globalization) are mutually incompatible. Countries can choose at
most two of these three options. This is the “political trilemma of the world econ-
omy.” This argument implies that deep RTAs may possibly be incompatible with
national democracy. Only shallow RTAs can be compatible with the sovereignty of
nations and democracy.
Rodrik’s (2011) argument on the political trilemma of the world economy may
explain why many British people voted “Leave” at the Brexit referendum in 2016.
According to Sampson (2017), the “Leave” vote was an assertion of national identity.
He argues that Brexit is “a democratic response to the erosion of British sovereignty
caused by EU membership” (Sampson 2017, p. 180).
Thus, it is a significant issue for deep regional integrationwhether the hypothesis of
the political trilemma of the world economy proposed by Rodrik (2000, 2011) holds
both theoretically and empirically. Aizenman and Ito (2020) empirically address this
issue. They construct a set of indexes thatmeasure the levels of globalization, national
sovereignty, and democracy for 139 countries in the period 1975–2016. Using these
indexes, they empirically test the hypothesis of the political trilemma of the world
economy by examining whether the trilemma variables are linearly related. The
indexes indicate that developed and developing countries have gone through different
paths of development in pursuing these three policy goals. Specifically, they find that
there is a linear negative relationship between globalization and national sovereignty
for developed countries, while the democratization index stays constant during the
sample period, suggesting that those countries have faced a dilemma rather than
a trilemma. By contrast, all three variables are linearly correlated for developing
countries, indicating that they are indeed in a trilemma relationship.
The study by Aizenman and Ito (2020) is the first important attempt in this field.
More analyses on this topic by various approaches can be conducted. In particular,
studies focused on the post-2016 period will be important because of the possi-
ble regime changes. Moreover, interdisciplinary research from both theoretical and
empirical analyses will be required to uncover economic and non-economic impacts
of deep regional integration and people’s responses to deep regional integration.
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8.3.2 National Security and Non-trade Issues
The next issue for future research is national security and non-trade issues in relation
to international trade.
The relationship between national security and trade policy became a contro-
versial issue when the Trump Administration imposed tariffs on imports of steel
and aluminum in 2018. On March 8, 2018, then-President Donald Trump issued
two proclamations, imposing 25% ad valorem tariffs on steel products and 10% ad
valorem tariffs on aluminum products, which took effect on March 23, 2018.1 The
imposition of these tariffs was based on the Section 232 investigation report by the
U.S. Department of Commerce released on January 11, 2018 (U.S. Department of
Commerce 2018). The report concluded that certain types of steel and aluminum
products imported into the United States threaten to impair the national security
of the country, as defined in Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 as
amended, and recommended that the President take immediate action to adjust the
level of these imports through quotas or tariffs.
Against the restrictions on steel and aluminum imports by the United States,
disputes at the World Trade Organization (WTO) were initiated by a number of
countries including China, India, the European Union, Norway, Russia, Switzerland,
and Turkey. National security is a major issue in other recent WTO disputes as well,
such as disputes between Russia and Ukraine, between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and
between Japan and Korea.2
In the legal text of the WTO Agreements, the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT 1947) includes a provision on security exceptions (Article XXI).
Besides, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) include
a similar security exception.3 However, no panel report in the GATT/WTO dispute
settlement procedure invoking Article XXI has been adopted until 2019. In April
2019, the panel report on the case between Russia and Ukraine was adopted as
the first panel report involving Article XXI.4 In this dispute, Ukraine argued that
Russia’s restrictions on the transit of Ukrainian goods through Russian territory
violated various provisions of theGATT/WTO rules andRussia’sAccession Protocol
to the WTO. However, the panel decided that Article XXI justified the Russian
measures (Prazeres 2020).
Although the issue of trade restrictions for national security reasons has been
much debated in international economic law literature (e.g., Lester and Zhu 2019;
1 See the web site of the U.S. Department of Commerce (www.commerce.gov/section-232-
investigation-effect-imports-steel-us-national-security) for the details of the Section 232 report.
2 Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit (WT/DS512), Saudi Arabia – Measures con-
cerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (WT/DS567), Japan – Measures related to
the Exportation of Products and Technology to Korea (WT/DS590).
3 See Article XIV bis in GATS and Article 73 in TRIPS Agreement. With regard to the history of
the security exception in the GATT/WTO, see Lester and Zhu (2019) and Pinchis-Paulsen (2020).
4 Panel Report, Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WT/DS512/R.
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Pinchis-Paulsen 2020; Prazeres 2020), there are few economic studies on this issue.
Taking into account the importance of this issue from the economic point of view,
such economic research is worth conducting.
In addition to the issue of trade and national security, human rights and other non-
trade issues have also been discussed in relation to international trade. In particular,
as seen in Chap. 2, RTAs tend to include ever more provisions on non-trade issues,
as RTAs get deeper. Whereas the coverage of such provisions (e.g., provisions on
environmental law, health, and human rights) is still very low, it is argued that the role
of RTAs in governing countries’ compliancewith those non-trade issues is important.
For example, Spilker and Böhmelt (2013) show that RTAs including “hard” human
rights standards have a potential to reduce human rights violations substantially,
while most human rights treaties are ineffective in ensuring countries’ compliance
with human rights standards. Hafner-Burton (2005) shows a similar role of RTAs in
countries’ compliance with human rights standards. Although a number of studies on
the impact of RTAs on non-trade issues have been conducted in the fields of political
science and international relations (e.g., Hafner-Burton 2005; Milewicz et al. 2018;
Spilker and Böhmelt 2013), economic research on related issues will contribute to
understanding the role of RTAs in addressing those issues.
8.3.3 Network Dynamics of Deep RTAs from the Perspective
of Depth and Breadth in Relation to Technology
Spillovers
The final issue for future research is network dynamics of deep RTAs and their
implication for technology spillovers.
In Chaps. 2 and 7, we discussed the trend of RTAs and the effects of deep RTAs
on the technology spillovers. With respect to the trend of RTAs or the surge of deep
RTAs, a number of existing studies have focused more on the process of forming
RTAs, because this process has been becoming increasingly dynamic and compli-
cated (Bartesaghi et al. 2020; Sopranzetti 2018; Wonnacott 1996; Zhu et al. 2014).
In the hub-and-spoke system developed by Wonnacott (1975), a hub country
(e.g., the United States) has two overlapping bilateral agreements with two spoke
countries (e.g., Canada and Mexico), each of which has a bilateral relationship with
the hub country. In such a system, the hub country may hold its dominant position by
benefiting at the expense of its relatively poor neighbors (Wonnacott 1996). However,
this definition of the “hub” has changed, because we observe some cases in which a
group of countries (e.g., members of the EU) rather than a single hub country jointly
negotiates an RTA with a third country in looking for a better hub position. As a
result, the hub-and-spoke effects become multilayered, and the interaction becomes
even more complicated (Sopranzetti 2018). On the other hand, a number of studies
make challenges in detecting “communities” and “community cores” in international
trade networks. The main purpose of these challenges is to understand the evolution
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of the network and to find rich dynamics over time both inter- and intra-communities
(Bartesaghi et al. 2020;Zhu et al. 2014). Following these lines of the network analysis,
we provide a description of the evolution of the network to show the global dynamics
of RTA network and to reveal how communities appear, disappear, reemerge, and
converge.
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 present dynamic changes of the communities of network for
the depth and breadth indexes as to RTAs for the period 1990–2015, respectively. In
order to analyze the characteristics ofRTAs’ global dynamics,we use the definition of
the depth and breadth of RTAs byLimão (2016) and just focus onWTO-extra (WTO–
X) policy areas.5 We obtain 158 nodes and 5,102 edges for the undirected network
of the depth (Fig. 8.1) and 158 nodes and 4,974 edges for the undirected network of
the breadth (Fig. 8.2). In order to detect the communities we employ Gephi, network
analysis software,where theLouvain community detection algorithm is used to detect
communities with the modularity optimization method.6
As shown in Fig. 8.1a, only several limited communities are observed in 1990.
Those limited communities are related to Caribbean Community and CommonMar-
ket (CARICOM), EU enlargement, theCentral AmericanCommonMarket (CACM),
and the Agreement on Trade and Commercial Relations between the governments
of Australia and Papua New Guinea (PATCRA). In 1990, most countries, including
the United States, were scattered individually in the network of the depth of RTAs.
The number of communities increases and the network system of those communi-
ties becomes more complex through the 1990s and 2000s. In 2015 (Fig. 8.1d), by
contrast, many countries get involved in one or more RTAs. The network density
increased from 0.029 in 1990 to 0.398 in 2015. The Asia-Oceania community and
the community of the Gulf countries are also observed in 2015. Furthermore, EU
countries are still dominant and held the core position of the communities.
Figure 8.2 shows similar patterns in the network of the breadth. There are only
several limited communities in 1990, and the network system evolves in the 1990s
and 2000s. In 2015, the position of the communities for EU countries seems to be
strengthenedmore in the network of the breadth index (Fig. 8.2d) than in the network
of the depth index (Fig. 8.1d).
The network analysis approach is useful not only for illustrating the process of
network dynamics of RTAs but also for examining the effects of the evolution of the
RTA networks. For example, Sopranzetti (2018) analyzes the effect of the hub-and-
spoke nature of RTAs on bilateral trade. She considers the effects of the country’s
position in the RTA networks on the bilateral trade of the hub country. Interestingly,
she finds that an increase in the number of spoke countries has a negative effect on
the trade of the hub country. On the other hand, if signing new RTAsmakes a country
more central or less constrained in the network, then these new agreements have a
strongly positive impact on the country’s bilateral trade. Then, wemay be able to gain
some new insights from applying the network analysis approach to the analysis of the
relationship between the evolution of the RTA networks and technology spillovers.
5 See Table 2.1 in Chap. 2 for the details of the WTO–X policy areas.
6 See https://gephi.org/tutorials/gephi-tutorial-quick_start.pdf.
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(a) 1990 (b) 2000
(c) 2005 (d) 2015
Fig. 8.1 Dynamic changes of the communities of network for the depth indexes, 1990–2015. Note
Figures are depicted using theWTO–X policy areas in the depth indexes. We detect communities in
the network using the Louvain community detection algorithm by Gephi. Source Authors’ creation
from the Content of Deep Trade Agreement database
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(a) 1990 (b) 2000
(c) 2005 (d) 2015
Fig. 8.2 Dynamic changes of the communities of network for the breadth indexes, 1990–2015.Note
Figures are depicted using the WTO–X policy areas in the breadth indexes. We detect communities
in the network using the Louvain community detection algorithm by Gephi. Source Authors’
creation from the Content of Deep Trade Agreement database
8.3 Direction for Future Research 159
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
References
Abel AB, Blanchard OJ (1986) The present value of profits and cyclical movements in investment.
Econometrica 54(2):249–273
Abel AB, Eberly JC (1994) A unified model of investment under uncertainty. Am Econ Rev
84(5):1369–1384
Abel AB, Eberly JC (2011) How q and cash flow affect investment without frictions: An analytic
explanation. Rev Econ Stud 78(4):1179–1200
Acharya RC, Keller W (2009) Technology transfer through imports. Can J Econ 42(4):1411–1448
Aghion P, Howitt P (1992) A model of growth through creative destruction. Econometrica
60(2):323–351
Aghion P, Bloom N, Blundell R, Griffith R, Howitt P (2005) Competition and innovation: An
inverted-U relationship. Quart J Econ 120(2):701–728
Aghion P, Antràs P, Helpman E (2007) Negotiating free trade. J Int Econ 73(1):1–30
Aitken BJ, Harrison AE (1999) Do domestic firms benefit from direct foreign investment? Evidence
from Venezuela. Amer Econ Rev 89(3):605–618
Aizenman J, Ito H (2020) The political-economy trilemma. Open Econ Rev 31(5):945–975
Alfaro L, Charlton A (2009) Intra-industry foreign direct investment. Am Econ Rev 99(5):2096–
2119
Alfaro L, Chor D, Antras P, Conconi P (2019) Internalizing global value chains: A firm-level
analysis. J Polit Econ 127(2):508–559
Amador J, Cabral S (2016) Global value chains: A survey of drivers and measures. J Econ Surv
30(2):278–301
Anderson JE, van Wincoop E (2003) Gravity with gravitas: A solution to the border puzzle. Am
Econ Rev 93(1):170–192
Ando M (2021) Demand and supply shocks of COVID-19 and international production networks:
Evidence from Japan’s machinery trade, ERIA Discussion Paper Series No. 366
Ando M, Kimura F (2012) How did the Japanese exports respond to two crises in the international
production networks? The global financial crisis and the great East Japan earthquake. Asian Econ
J 26(3):261–287
Ando M, Kimura F (2013) Production linkage of Asia and Europe via Central and Eastern Europe.
J Econ Integr 28(2):204–240
AndoM, Kimura F (2014) Evolution of machinery production networks: Linkage of North America
with East Asia. Asian Econ Papers 13(3):121–160
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2022
N. Jinji et al., Deep Integration, Global Firms, and Technology Spillovers,




Antoniades A (2015) Heterogeneous firms, quality, and trade. J Int Econ 95(2):263–273
Antràs P (2003) Firms, contracts, and trade structure. Quart J Econ 118(4):1375–1418
Antràs P, Chor D (2013) Organizing the global value chain. Econometrica 81(6):2127–2204
Antràs P, Helpman E (2004) Global sourcing. J Polit Econ 112(3):552–580
Antràs P, Helpman E (2008) Contractual frictions and global sourcing. In: Marin D, Verdier T,
Helpman E (eds) The Organization of Firms in a Global Economy. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, pp 9–54
Arrow KJ (1962) Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. In: Nelson R
(ed) The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, pp
609–625
Atalay E, Hortaçsu A, Syverson C (2014) Vertical integration and input flows. Am Econ Rev
104(4):1120–1148
Atkeson A, Burstein AT (2010) Innovation, firm dynamics, and international trade. J Polit Econ
118(3):433–484
Aw BY, Roberts MJ, Xu DY (2011) R&D investment, exporting, and productivity dynamics. Am
Econ Rev 101(4):1312–1344
Bagwell K, Staiger RW (1999) An economic theory of GATT. Am Econ Rev 89(1):215–248
Bagwell K, Staiger RW (2002) The Economics of the World Trading System. The MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA
Bagwell K, Staiger RW (2005) Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules
of GATT/WTO. J Int Econ 67(2):268–294
Bagwell K, Staiger RW (2010) The world trade organization: Theory and practice. Ann Rev Econ
2(1):223–256
Baier SL, Bergstrand JH (2007) Do free trade agreements actually increase members’ international
trade? J Int Econ 71(1):72–95
Baier SL, Yotov YV, Zylkin T (2019) On the widely differing effects of free trade agreements:
Lessons from twenty years of trade integration. J Int Econ 116:206–226
Baldwin R (1995) A domino theory of regionalism. In: Baldwin R, Haapararanta P, Kiander J (eds)
Expanding Membership of the European Union. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK,
pp 25–47
Baldwin R (2006) Globalisation: The great unbundling(s). In: Globalisation Challenges for Europe:
Report by the Secretariat of the Economic Council – Part I. Finnish Prime Minister’s Office
Publications, Helsinki, pp 11–54
Baldwin R (2011) 21st century regionalism: Filling the gap between 21st century trade and 20th
century trade rules, World Trade Organization Staff Working Paper ERSD–2011–08
Baldwin R (2016) The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Baldwin R (2016) The world trade organization and the future of multilateralism. J Econ Perspect
30(1):95–116
Baldwin R (2019) The Globotics Upheaval: Globalization, Robotics, and the Future of Work.
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, UK
Baldwin R, Harrigan J (2011) Zeros, quality, and space: Trade theory and trade evidence. Am Econ
J: Microecon 3(2):60–88
Baldwin R, Okubo T (2014) Networked FDI: Sales and sourcing patterns of Japanese foreign
affiliates. World Econ 37(8):1051–1080
Baldwin R, Venables AJ (2013) Spiders and snakes: Offshoring and agglomeration in the global
economy. J Int Econ 90(2):245–254
Barrios S, Görg H, Strobl E (2011) Spillovers through backward linkages from multinationals:
Measurement matters! Eur Econ Rev 55(6):862–875
Bartesaghi P, Clemente GP, Grassi R (2020) Community structure in the world trade network based
on communicability distances. J Econ Inter Coord
Behar A, Cirera-i Crivillé L (2013) Does it matter who you sign with? Comparing the impacts of
North-South and South-South trade agreements on bilateral trade. Rev Int Econ 21(4):765–782
References 163
Bernard AB, Jensen JB (1995) Exporters, jobs, and wages in U.S. manufacturing: 1976–1987.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics 1995:67–112
Bernard AB, Jensen JB (1999) Exceptional exporter performance: Cause, effect, or both? J Int Econ
47(1):1–25
Bernard AB, Jensen JB, Redding SJ, Schott PK (2007) Firms in international trade. J Econ Perspect
21(3):105–130
Bernard AB, Jensen JB, Schott PK (2009) Importers, exporters, and multinationals: A portrait of
firms in the U.S. that trade goods. In: Dunne T, Jensen JB, Roberts MJ (eds) Producer Dynamics:
New Evidence from Micro Data, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL
Bernard AB, Jensen JB, Redding SJ, Schott PK (2012) The empirics of firm heterogeneity and
international trade. Ann Rev Econ 4(1):283–313
Bernard AB, Jensen JB, Redding SJ, Schott PK (2018) Global firms. J Econ Lit 56(2):565–619
Bhagwati J (1991) The World Trading System at Risk. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
Bhagwati J (1992) Regionalism versus multilateralism. World Econ 15(5):535–556
Bhagwati J (2004) In Defense of Globalization. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK
Blalock G, Gertler PJ (2008) Welfare gains from foreign direct investment through technology
transfer to local suppliers. J Int Econ 74(2):402–421
Blundell R, Griffith R, Van Reenen J (1999) Market share, market value and innovation in a panel
of British manufacturing firms. Rev Econ Stud 66(3):529–554
Boffa M, Jansen M, Solleder O (2019) Do we need deeper trade agreements for GVCs or just a
BIT? World Econ 42(6):1713–1739
Brainard SL (1993)A simple theory ofmultinational corporations and tradewith a trade-off between
proximity and concentration, NBER Working Paper No. 4269
Brainard SL (1997) An empirical assessment of the proximity-concentration trade-off between
multinational sales and trade. Am Econ Rev 87(4):520–544
Branstetter L (2006) Is foreign direct investment a channel of knowledge spillovers? Evidence from
Japan’s FDI in the United States. J Int Econ 68(2):325–344
Branstetter LG, Fisman R, Foley CF (2006) Do stronger intellectual property rights increase inter-
national technology transfer? Empirical evidence from U.S. firm-level panel data. Quart J Econ
121(1):321–349
Bridgman B (2012) The rise of vertical specialization trade. J Int Econ 86(1):133–140
Bustos P (2011) Trade liberalization, exports, and technology upgrading: Evidence on the impact
of MERCOSUR on Argentinian firms. Am Econ Rev 101(1):304–340
Cameron AC, Trivedi PK (1998) Regression Analysis of Count Data. Cambridge University Press,
New York, NY
Cameron AC, Trivedi PK (2009) Microeconometrics: Using Stata, 2nd Edn STATA Press, College
Station
Cappelli R, Montobbio F (2020) Geographical distance puzzle in patent citations: Intensive versus
extensive margins. Appl Econ Lett 27(10):771–777
Carvalho VM, Nirei M, Saito YU, Tahbaz-Salehi A (2021) Supply chain disruptions: Evidence
from the Great East Japan earthquake. Quart J Econ 136(2):1255–1321
Chen Y, Horstmann IJ, Markusen JR (2012) Physical capital, knowledge capital, and the choice
between FDI and outsourcing. Can J Econ 45(1):1–15
Cheong J, KwakDW, TangKK (2015) Heterogeneous effects of preferential trade agreements: How
does partner similarity matter? World Dev 66:222–236
Cherniwchan J, Copeland BR, Taylor MS (2017) Trade and the environment: New methods, mea-
surements, and results. Ann Rev Econ 9:59–85
Chernozhukov V, Hansen C (2008) Instrumental variable quantile regression: A robust inference
approach. J Econom 142(1):379–398
Chernozhukov V, Hong H (2002) Three-step censored quantile regression and extramarital affairs.
J Am Stat Assoc 97(459):872–882
Chernozhukov V, Fernández-Val I, Kowalski AE (2015) Quantile regression with censoring and
endogeneity. J Econom 186(1):201–221
164 References
Cipollina M, Salvatici L (2010) Reciprocal trade agreements in gravity models: A meta-analysis.
Rev Int Econ 18(1):63–80
Clerides SK, Lach S, Tybout JR (1998) Is learning by exporting important?Micro-dynamic evidence
from Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco. Quart J Econ 113(3):903–947
Coe DT, Helpman E (1995) International R&D spillovers. Eur Econ Rev 39(5):859–887
Cohen WM (2010) Fifty years of empirical studies of innovative activity and performance. In: Hall
BH, Rosenberg N (eds) Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, vol 1. Elsevier, Amsterdam,
The Netherlands, pp 129–213
Cooley TF, Greenwood J, YorukogluM (1997) The replacement problem. JMonet Econ 40(3):457–
499
Copeland BR, Taylor MS (2003) Trade and the Environment: Theory and Evidence. Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ
Copeland BR, Taylor MS (2004) Trade, growth, and the environment. J Econ Lit 42(1):7–71
Costantini J, Melitz M (2008) The dynamics of firm-level adjustment to trade liberalization. In:
Marin D, Verdier T, Helpman E (eds) The Organization of Firms in a Global Economy. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 107–141
Costinot A, Vogel J, Wang S (2013) An elementary theory of global supply chains. Rev Econ Stud
80(1):109–144
DaDalt PJ, Donaldson JR, Garner JL (2003) Will any q do? J Finan Res 26(4):535–551
Dai M, Yotov YV, Zylkin T (2014) On the trade-diversion effects of free trade agreements. Econ
Lett 122(2):321–325
Das GG, Andriamananjara S (2006) Hub-and-spokes free trade agreements in the presence of
technology spillovers: An application to the western hemisphere. Rev World Econ 142(1):33–66
d’Aspremont C, Jacquemin A (1988) Cooperative and noncooperative R & D in duopoly with
spillovers. Am Econ Rev 78(5):1133–1137
Deardorff AV (2001) Fragmentation in simple trade models. N Am J Econ Finance 12(2):121–137
Deardorff AV, Stern RM (2002) What you should know about globalization and the world trade
organization. Rev Int Econ 10(3):404–423
Defever F, Toubal F (2013) Productivity, relationship-specific inputs and the sourcing modes of
multinationals. J Econ Behav Organ 94:345–357
Diamond J (1997) Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies.W.W. Norton&Company
Inc, New York, NY
Dixit A, Norman V (1980) Theory of International Trade. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
UK
Dixit AK, Grossman GM (1982) Trade and protection with multistage production. Rev Econ Stud
49(4):583–594
Dixit AK, Stiglitz JE (1977) Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity. Am Econ
Rev 67(3):297–308
Dufrenot G, Mignon V, Tsangarides C (2010) The trade-growth nexus in the developing countries:
A quantile regression approach. Rev World Econ 146(4):731–761
Dür A, Baccini L, Elsig M (2014) The design of international trade agreements: Introducing a new
dataset. Rev Int Org 9(3):353–375
Dwyer DW (2001) Plant-level productivity and the market value of a firm, Center for Economic
Research, U.S. Census Bureau. Working Paper 01–03
Eaton J, Kierzkowski H (1984) Oligopolistic competition, product variety and international trade.
In: Kierzkowski H (ed) Monopolistic Competition and International Trade. Oxford University
Press, Oxford, pp 69–83
Eaton J, Kortum S (1996) Trade in ideas: Patenting and productivity in the OECD. J Int Econ
40(3–4):251–278
Eaton J, Kortum S (1999) International technology diffusion: Theory and measurement. Int Econ
Rev 40(3):537–570
Eckel C, Neary JP (2010) Multi-product firms and flexible manufacturing in the global economy.
Rev Econ Stud 77(1):188–217
References 165
Ederington J, McCalman P (2008) Endogenous firm heterogeneity and the dynamics of trade lib-
eralization. J Int Econ 74(2):422–440
Egger P, Larch M (2008) Interdependent preferential trade agreement memberships: An empirical
analysis. J Int Econ 76(2):384–399
Ekholm K, Forslid R, Markusen JR (2007) Export-platform foreign direct investment. J Eur Econ
Assoc 5(4):776–795
Espitia A, Mattoo A, Rocha N, Ruta M, Winkler D (2021) Pandemic trade: COVID-19, remote
work and global value chains. World Econ Early View Article
Falvey RE (1981) Commercial policy and intra-industry trade. J Int Econ 11(4):495–511
Falvey RE, Kierzkowski H (1987) Product quality, intra-industry trade and (im)perfect competition.
In: Kierzkowski H (ed) Protection and Competition in International Trade. Basil Blackwell,
Oxford, pp 143–161
Farzanegan MR, Feizi M, Gholipour HF (2021) Globalization and the outbreak of COVID-19: An
empirical analysis. J Risk Finan Manag 14(3):105
Federico S (2010) Outsourcing versus integration at home or abroad and firm heterogeneity. Empir-
ica 37(1):47–63
Feenstra RC (2016) Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence, 2nd Edn Princeton Uni-
versity Press, Princeton, NJ
Figueiredo E, Lima LR, Schaur G (2016) The effect of the Euro on the bilateral trade distribution.
Emp Econ 50(1):17–29
Flam H, Helpman E (1987) Vertical product differentiation and North-South trade. Am Econ Rev
77(5):810–822
Fontagné L, FreudenbergM (1997) Intra-industry trade:Methodological issues reconsidered, CEPII
Working papers, No. 1997-01
Fontagné L, Mayer T, Zignago S (2005) Trade in the triad: How easy is the access to large markets?
Can J Econ 38(4):1401–1430
Fontagné L, Freudenberg M, Gaulier G (2006) A systematic decomposition of world trade into
horizontal and vertical IIT. Rev World Econ 142(3):459–475
Fosfuri A, Motta M, Rønde T (2001) Foreign direct investment and spillovers through workers’
mobility. J Int Econ 53(1):205–222
Freund C (2000) Multilateralism and the endogenous formation of preferential trade agreements. J
Int Econ 52(2):359–376
Freund C, Ornelas E (2010) Regional trade agreements. Ann Rev Econ 2(1):139–166
Fukao K, Wei Y (2008) How do the location determinants of vertical FDI and horizontal FDI
differ? Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series No. 233. Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi
University
Fukao K, Ishido H, Ito K (2003) Vertical intra-industry trade and foreign direct investment in East
Asia. J Jpn Int Econ 17(4):468–506
Fukuda S, Cong J, OkuiM, Okuda K (1999) Long term loans and investment in Japan: An empirical
analysis based on the panel data of Japanese firms, Discussion Paper No. 1999–08. Japanese
Institute for Posts and Telecommunications Policy (in Japanese)
Furusawa T, Konishi H (2007) Free trade networks. J Int Econ 72(2):310–335
Gala VD, Julio B (2012) Convergence in corporate investments, Unpublished manuscript, London
Business School
Gaulier G, Zignago S (2008) BACI: a world database of international trade at the product-level: the
1995–2004 Version, CEPII Working Paper
Gervais A (2015) Product quality and firm heterogeneity in international trade. Can J Econ
48(3):1152–1174
Gilbert R (2006) Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where are we in the competition-innovation debate?
In: Jaffe AB, Lerner J, Stern S (eds) Innovation Policy and the Economy, vol 6. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA, pp 159–215
Goel RK, Haruna S (2011) Cost-reducing R&D with spillovers and trade. J Inst Theor Econ
167(2):314–326
166 References
Görg H, Strobl E (2001) Multinational companies and productivity spillovers: A meta-analysis.
Econ J 111(475):F723–F739
Goto A, Motohashi K (2007) Construction of a Japanese patent database and a first look at Japanese
patenting activities. Res Policy 36(9):1431–1442
Greenaway D, Kneller R (2007) Firm heterogeneity, exporting and foreign direct investment. Econ
J 117(517):F134–F161
Greenaway D, Hine R, Milner C (1994) Country-specific factors and the pattern of horizontal and
vertical intra-industry trade in the UK. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv/Rev World Econ 130(1):77–
100
GreenawayD,Hine R,Milner C (1995) Vertical and horizontal intra-industry trade: A cross industry
analysis for the United Kingdom. Econ J 105(433):1505–1518
Grossman GM, Helpman E (1990) Comparative advantage and long-run growth. Am Econ Rev
80(4):796–815
Grossman GM, Helpman E (1991) Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy. The MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA
Grossman GM, Helpman E, Szeidl A (2005) Complementarities between outsourcing and foreign
sourcing. Am Econ Rev 95(2):19–24
Grossman GM, Helpman E, Szeidl A (2006) Optimal integration strategies for the multinational
firm. J Int Econ 70(1):216–238
Grossman SJ, Hart OD (1986) The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral
integration. J Polit Econ 94(4):691–719
Häckner J (2000) A note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies. J Econ
Theory 93(2):233–239
Haddad M, Harrison A (1993) Are there positive spillovers from direct foreign investment?: Evi-
dence from panel data for Morocco. J Dev Econ 42(1):51–74
Hafner-Burton EM (2005) Trading human rights: How preferential trade agreements influence
government repression. Int Organ 59(3):593–629
Hall BH, Jaffe AB, Trajtenberg M (2001) The NBER patent citation data file: Lessons, insights and
methodological tools. In: Jaffe AB, Trajtenberg M (eds) Patents, Citations, and Innovations. The
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 403–460
Hall BH, Jaffe A, TrajtenbergM (2005)Market value and patent citations. Rand J Econ 36(1):16–38
Hall BH, ThomaG, Torrisi S (2007) Themarket value of patents andR&D:Evidence fromEuropean
firms, NBER Working Paper No. 13426
Hanson GH,Mataloni RJ, SlaughterMJ (2001) Expansion strategies of U.S. multinational firms. In:
Collins S, Rodrik D (eds) Brookings trade forum 2001. Brookings Institution Press, Washington,
DC, pp 245–282
Hanson GH, Mataloni RJ Jr, Slaughter MJ (2005) Vertical production networks in multinational
firms. Rev Econ Stat 87(4):664–678
Hao L, Naiman DQ (2007) Quantile Regression. SAGE Publications, Thousand Island
Hart O, Moore J (1990) Property rights and the nature of the firm. J Polit Econ 98(6):1119–1158
Haruna S, Goel RK (2015) R&D strategy in international mixed duopoly with research spillovers.
Aust Econ Pap 54(2):88–103
Haruna S, Goel RK (2017) Output subsidies in mixed oligopoly with research spillovers. J Econ
Finance 41(2):235–256
Haruna S, Jinji N, Zhang X (2010) Patent citations, technology diffusion, and international trade:
Evidence from Asian countries. J Econ Finance 34(4):365–390
Hashmi AR (2013) Competition and innovation: The inverted-U relationship revisited. Rev Econ
Stat 95(5):1653–1668
Haskel JE, Pereira SC, Slaughter MJ (2007) Does inward foreign direct investment boost the pro-
ductivity of domestic firms? Rev Econ Stat 89(3):482–496
Hausman JA, Hall BH, Griliches Z (1984) Econometric models for count data with an application
to the patents-R&D relationship. Econometrica 52(4):909–938
References 167
Havránek T, Iršová Z (2011) Estimating vertical spillovers from FDI: Why results vary and what
the true effect is. J Int Econ 85(2):234–244
Hayakawa K, Mukunoki H (2021) Impacts of COVID-19 on global value chains. Dev Econ
59(2):154–177
Hayakawa K, Machikita T, Kimura F (2012) Globalization and productivity: A survey of firm-level
analysis. J Econ Surv 26(2):332–350
Hayashi F, Inoue T (1991) The relation between firm growth and q with multiple capital goods:
Theory and evidence from panel data on Japanese firms. Econometrica 59(3):731–753
Head K, Mayer T (2014) Gravity equations: Workhorse, toolkit, and cookbook. In: Gopinath G,
Helpman E, Rogoff K (eds) Handbook of International Economics, vol 4. Elsevier, Amsterdam,
The Netherlands, pp 131–195
HeadK, Ries J (2003) Heterogeneity and the FDI versus export decision of Japanese manufacturers.
J Jpn Int Econ 17(4):448–467
HelbleM,OkuboT (2008)Heterogeneous quality firms and trade costs,WorldBankPolicyResearch
Working Paper No. 4550
Helpman E (1981) International trade in the presence of product differentiation, economies of scale
and monopolistic competition. J Int Econ 11(3):305–340
Helpman E (1984) A simple theory of international trade with multinational corporations. J Polit
Econ 92(3):451–471
Helpman E (1985) Multinational corporations and trade structure. Rev Econ Stud 52(3):443–457
Helpman E (2006) Trade, FDI, and the organization of firms. J Econ Lit 44(3):589–630
Helpman E, Krugman PR (1985) Market structure and foreign trade: Increasing returns, imperfect
competition, and the international economy. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Helpman E, Melitz MJ, Yeaple SR (2004) Export versus FDI with heterogeneous firms. Am Econ
Rev 94(1):300–316
Hennessy CA (2004) Tobin’s q, debt overhang, and investment. J Finance 59(4):1717–1742
Herguera I, Lutz S (1998) Oligopoly and quality leapfrogging. World Econ 21(1):75–94
Hofmann C, Osnago A, Ruta M (2019) The content of preferential trade agreements. World Trade
Rev 18(3):365–398
Honoré BE (1992) Trimmed LAD and least squares estimation of truncated and censored regression
models with fixed effects. Econometrica 60(3):533–565
Hopenhayn HA (1992) Entry, exit, and firm dynamics in long run equilibrium. Econometrica
60(5):1127–1150
Horn H, Mavroidis PC, Sapir A (2010) Beyond the WTO? An anatomy of EU and US preferential
trade agreements. World Econ 33(11):1565–1588
Horstmann I, Markusen JR (1987) Licensing versus direct investment: A model of internalization
by the multinational enterprise. Can J Econ 20(3):464–481
Horstmann IJ, Markusen JR (1992) Endogenous market structures in international trade (natura
facit saltum). J Int Econ 32(1–2):109–129
Hu AG, Jaffe AB (2003) Patent citations and international knowledge flow: The cases of Korea and
Taiwan. Int J Ind Organ 21(6):849–880
Huber PJ (1981) Robust Statistics. Wiley, New York, NY
Hummels D, Ishii J, Yi KM (2001) The nature and growth of vertical specialization in world trade.
J Int Econ 54(1):75–96
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2021) World Economic Outlook: Managing Divergent Recov-
eries, April 2021. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. www.imf.org/en/Publications
Iršová Z, Havránek T (2013) Determinants of horizontal spillovers from FDI: Evidence from a large
meta-analysis. World Dev 42:1–15
Jaffe AB (1986) Technological opportunity and spillovers of R&D: Evidence from firms’ patents,
profits and market value. Am Econ Rev 76(5):984–1001
Jaffe AB, Trajtenberg M (1996) Flows of knowledge from universities and federal laboratories:
Modeling the flowof patent citations over time and across institutional and geographic boundaries.
Proc Natl Acad Sci 93(23):12671–12677
168 References
Jaffe AB, Trajtenberg M (1999) International knowledge flows: Evidence from patent citations.
Econ Innov New Technol 8(1–2):105–136
Jaffe AB, Trajtenberg M, Henderson R (1993) Geographic localization of knowledge spillovers as
evidenced by patent citations. Quart J Econ 108(3):577–598
Jaffe AB, Trajtenberg M, Fogarty MS (2000) Knowledge spillovers and patent citations: Evidence
from a survey of inventors. Am Econ Rev Pap Proc 90(2):215–218
Javorcik BS (2004) Does foreign direct investment increase the productivity of domestic firms? In
search of spillovers through backward linkages. Am Econ Rev 94(3):605–627
Javorcik BS, Spatareanu M (2008) To share or not to share: Does local participation matter for
spillovers from foreign direct investment? J Dev Econ 85(1–2):194–217
Jinji N (2021) What does regional economic integration deliver? Int Econ Adv Artic
Jinji N, Zhang X, Haruna S (2013) The effect of regional trade agreements on technology spillovers
through international trade. In: Egashira S (ed) Globalism and Regional Economy. Routledge,
Abingdon, UK, pp 83–100
Jinji N, Zhang X, Haruna S (2015) Trade patterns and international technology spillovers: Evidence
from patent citations. Rev World Econ 151(4):635–658
Jinji N, Zhang X, Haruna S (2019) Do deeper regional trade agreements enhance international
technology spillovers? World Econ 42(8):2326–2363
Jinji N, ZhangX,Haruna S (2019) Does a firmwith higher Tobin’s q prefer foreign direct investment
to foreign outsourcing? N Am J Econ Finance 50:101044
Jinji N, Sawada Y, Zhang X, Haruna S (2021) Deep regional trade agreements and cross-border
technology transfer: Theory and evidence, Kyoto University, Graduate School of Economics
Discussion Paper Series No. E–20–008
Johnson RC (2012) Trade and prices with heterogeneous firms. J Int Econ 86(1):43–56
Jones RW, Kierzkowski H (1990) The role of services in production and international trade: A
theoretical framework. In: Jones RW, Krueger AO (eds) The Political Economy of International
Trade: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Baldwin. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, UK, pp 31–48
Jovanovic B (1982) Selection and the evolution of industry. Econometrica 50(3):649–670
Kamien MI, Muller E, Zang I (1992) Research joint ventures and R&D cartels. Am Econ Rev
82(5):1293–1306
Keller W (1998) Are international R&D spillovers trade-related?: Analyzing spillovers among
randomly matched trade partners. Eur Econ Rev 42(8):1469–1481
Keller W (2004) International technology diffusion. J Econ Lit 42(3):752–782
Keller W (2010) International trade, foreign direct investment, and technology spillovers. In: Hall
BH, Rosenberg N (eds) Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, vol 2. Elsevier, Amsterdam,
The Netherlands, pp 793–829
Keller W, Yeaple SR (2009) Multinational enterprises, international trade, and productivity growth:
Firm-level evidence from the United States. Rev Econ Stat 91(4):821–831
Keller W, Yeaple SR (2013) The gravity of knowledge. Am Econ Rev 103(4):1414–1444
Kemp MC, Wan HYJ (1976) An elementary proposition concerning the formation of customs
unions. J Int Econ 6(1):95–97
Kenkel DS, Terza JV (2001) The effect of physician advice on alcohol consumption: Count regres-
sion with an endogenous treatment effect. J Appl Economet 16(2):165–184
Kimura F, Ando M (2003) Fragmentation and agglomeration matter: Japanese multinationals in
Latin America and East Asia. N Am J Econ Finance 14(3):287–317
Kimura F, Ando M (2005) Two-dimensional fragmentation in East Asia: Conceptual framework
and empirics. Int Rev Econ & Finance 14(3):317–348
Kimura F, Kiyota K (2006) Exports, FDI, and productivity: Dynamic evidence from Japanese firms.
Rev World Econ 142(4):695–719
Koenker R (2005) Quantile Regression. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
Koenker R, Bassett GJ (1978) Regression quantiles. Econometrica 46(1):33–50
Kohler WK (2004) International outsourcing and factor prices with multistage production. Econ J
114(494):C166–C185
References 169
Kohler WK, Smolka M (2012) Global sourcing: Evidence from Spanish firm-level data. In: Stern
RM (ed)QuantitativeAnalysis ofNewlyEvolving Patterns of International Trade: Fragmentation,
Offshoring ofActivities, andVertical Intra-industry Trade.World Scientific, Hackensack, pp 139–
193
Krishna P (1998) Regionalism and multilateralism: A political economy approach. Quart J Econ
113(1):227–251
Krugman PR (1979) Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and international trade. J Int
Econ 9(4):469–479
Krugman PR (1980) Scale economies, product differentiation, and the pattern of trade. Am Econ
Rev 70(5):950–959
KuglerM,VerhoogenE (2012) Prices, plant size, and product quality. RevEcon Stud 79(1):307–339
KwakDW(2010) Instrumental variable quantile regressionmethod for endogenous treatment effect,
Unpublished manuscript
Laget E, Osnago A, Rocha N, Ruta M (2020) Deep trade agreements and global value chains. Rev
Ind Org 57:379–410
Lambertini L (1997) Intraindustry trade under vertical product differentiation. Keio Econ Stud
34(2):51–69
Lawrence RZ (1996) Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration. Brookings Institution,
Washington, DC
Leahy D, Neary JP (1997) Public policy towards R&D in oligopolistic industries. Am Econ Rev
87(4):642–662
Leahy D, Neary JP (1999) R&D spillovers and the case for industrial policy in an open economy.
Oxf Econ Pap 51(1):40–59
Lee S (2007) Endogeneity in quantile regression models: A control function approach. J Econ
141(2):1131–1158
Lester S, ZhuH (2019)Aproposal for ‘rebalancing’ to dealwith ‘national security’ trade restrictions.
Fordham Int Law J 42:1451–1474
Li YA (2014) Borders and distance in knowledge spillovers: Dying over time or dying with age? –
Evidence from patent citations. Eur Econ Rev 71:152–172
Limão N (2016) Preferential trade agreements. In: Bagwell K, Staiger RW (eds) Handbook of
Commercial Policy, vol 1B. Elsevier, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, pp 279–367
Liu Z, Ma H (2021) Input trade liberalization and markup distribution: Evidence from China. Econ
Inq 59(1):344–360
Lu Y, Tao Z, Zhu L (2017) Identifying FDI spillovers. J Int Econ 107(1):75–90
MacGarvie M (2006) Do firms learn from international trade? Rev Econ Stat 88(1):46–60
Maggi G (2014) International trade agreements. In: Gopinath G, Helpman E, Rogoff K (eds) Hand-
book of International Economics, vol 4. Elsevier, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, pp 317–390
Mancusi ML (2008) International spillovers and absorptive capacity: A cross-country cross-sector
analysis based on patents and citations. J Int Econ 76(2):155–165
Mandel BR (2010) Heterogeneous firms and import quality: Evidence from transaction-level prices,
International Finance Discussion Papers No. 991, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System
Markusen JR (1984) Multinationals, multi-plant economies, and the gains from trade. J Int Econ
16(3–4):205–226
Markusen JR (1995) The boundaries of multinational enterprises and the theory of international
trade. J Econ Perspect 9(2):169–189
Markusen JR (2002) Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade. The MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA
Markusen JR, Maskus KE (2002) Discriminating among alternative theories of the multinational
enterprise. Rev Int Econ 10(4):694–707
Markusen JR, Maskus KE (2003) General-equilibrium approaches to the multinational enterprise:
A review of theory and evidence. In: Choi EK, Hartigan JC (eds) Handbook of International
Trade. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, UK, pp 320–349
170 References
Markusen JR, Venables AJ (1998) Multinational firms and the new trade theory. J Int Econ
46(2):183–203
Markusen JR, Venables AJ (2000) The theory of endowment, intra-industry and multi-national
trade. J Int Econ 52(2):209–234
Mattoo A, Rocha N, Ruta M (eds) (2020) Handbook of Deep Trade Agreements. World Bank,
Washington, DC
Maurseth PB, Verspagen B (2002) Knowledge spillovers in Europe: A patent citations analysis.
Scand J Econ 104(4):531–545
Mayer T, Ottaviano GI (2007) The Happy Few: The Internationalisation of European Firms. New
facts based on firm-level evidence, Bruegel Blueprint Series
Melitz MJ (2003) The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry pro-
ductivity. Econometrica 71(6):1695–1725
Melitz MJ, Ottaviano GI (2008) Market size, trade, and productivity. Rev Econ Stud 75(1):295–316
Meyer KE, Sinani E (2009) When and where does foreign direct investment generate positive
spillovers? A meta-analysis. J Int Bus Stud 40(7):1075–1094
Milewicz K, Hollway J, Peacock C, Snidal D (2018) Beyond trade: The expanding scope of the
nontrade agenda in trade agreements. J Conflict Resolut 62(4):743–773
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) (2019) White Paper on International Economy
and Trade 2019. www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/wp2019/wp2019.html
Miranda A, Rabe-Hesketh S (2006) Maximum likelihood estimation of endogenous switching and
sample selectionmodels for binary, ordinal, and count variables. StandGenomic Sci 6(3):285–308
Morck R, Yeung B (1991) Why investors value multinationality. J Bus 64(2):165–187
Motta M, Thisse JF, Cabrales A (1997) On the persistence of leadership or leapfrogging in interna-
tional trade. Int Econ Rev 38(4):809–824
Mukunoki H, Tachi K (2006) Multilateralism and hub-and-spoke bilateralism. Rev Int Econ
14(4):658–674
Murakami Y, Otsuka K (2020) Governance, information spillovers, and productivity of local firms:
Toward an integrated approach to foreign direct investment and global value chains. Dev Econ
58(2):134–174
Murata Y, Nakajima R, Okamoto R, Tamura R (2014) Localized knowledge spillovers and patent
citations: A distance-based approach. Rev Econ Stat 96(5):967–985
Nagaoka S (2009) Does strong patent protection facilitate international technology transfer? Some
evidence from licensing contracts of Japanese firms. J Technol Transf 34(2):128–144
Neary JP (2003) Globalization and market structure. J Eur Econ Assoc 1(2–3):245–271
Neary JP, Leahy D (2000) Strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies. Econ
J 110(463):484–508
Neary JP, O’Sullivan P (1999) Beat ‘em or join ‘em? export subsidies versus international research
joint ventures in oligopolistic markets. Scandinavian J Econ 101(4):577–596
Neves PC, Sequeira TN (2018) Spillovers in the production of knowledge: A meta-regression
analysis. Res Policy 47(4):750–767
Newman C, Rand J, Talbot T, Tarp F (2015) Technology transfers, foreign investment and produc-
tivity spillovers. Eur Econ Rev 76:168–187
Nicholas T (2003) Why Schumpeter was right: Innovation, market power, and creative destruction
in 1920s America. J Econ Hist 63(4):1023–1058
Norbäck PJ (2001) Multinational firms, technology and location. J Int Econ 54(2):449–469
Obashi A (2011) Resiliency of production networks in Asia: Evidence from the Asian Crisis. In:
Evenett SJ, Mikic M, Ratnyake R (eds) Trade-led Growth: A Sound Strategy for Asia. United
Nations Publication, New York, NY, pp 29–52
Ohyama M (1972) Trade and welfare in general equilibrium. Keio Econ Stud 9(2):37–73
Olley GS, Pakes A (1996) The dynamics of productivity in the telecommunications equipment
industry. Econometrica 64(6):1263–1297
Olper A, Raimondi V (2009) Patterns and determinants of international trade costs in the food
industry. J Agric Econ 60(2):273–297
References 171
OreficeG, RochaN (2014) Deep integration and production networks: An empirical analysis.World
Econ 37(1):106–136
Ornelas E (2005) Endogenous free trade agreements and the multilateral trading system. J Int Econ
67(2):471–497
Osnago A, Rocha N, Ruta M (2017) Do deep trade agreements boost vertical FDI? World Bank
Econ Rev 30(Supplement_1):S119–S125
Osnago A, Rocha N, Ruta M (2019) Deep trade agreements and vertical FDI: The devil is in the
details. Can J Econ 52(4):1558–1599
Ottaviano G, Tabuchi T, Thisse JF (2002) Agglomeration and trade revisited. Int Econ Rev
43(2):409–435
Palia D, Lichtenberg F (1999)Managerial ownership and firm performance: A re-examination using
productivity measurement. J Corp Finan 5(4):323–339
Panagariya A (1999) The regionalism debate: An overview. World Econ 22(4):455–476
Panagariya A (2000) Preferential trade liberalization: The traditional theory and new developments.
J Econ Lit 38(2):287–331
Perfect SB, Wiles KW (1994) Alternative constructions of Tobin’s q: An empirical comparison. J
Empir Financ 1(3–4):313–341
Peri G (2005) Determinants of knowledge flows and their effect on innovation. Rev Econ Stat
87(2):308–322
Pinchis-Paulsen M (2020) Trade multilateralism and U.S. national security: The making of the
GATT security exceptions. Michigan J Int Law 41(1):109–193
Prazeres TL (2020) Trade and national security: Rising risks for the WTO. World Trade Rev
19(1):137–148
Qiu LD, Tao Z (1998) Policy on international R&D cooperation: Subsidy or tax? Eur Econ Rev
42(9):1727–1750
Ramondo N, Rappoport V, Ruhl KJ (2016) Intrafirm trade and vertical fragmentation in US multi-
national corporations. J Int Econ 98(1):51–59
Rodrik D (1997) Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Institute for International Economics, Washing-
ton, DC
RodrikD (2000)How farwill international economic integration go? JEconPerspect 14(1):177–186
Rodrik D (2011) The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy.
W.W. Norton & Company, New York, NY
Rodrik D (2018) What do trade agreements really do? J Econ Perspect 32(2):73–90
Romer PM (1990) Endogenous technological change. J Polit Econ 98(5, pt. 2):S71–S102
Rousseeuw P, Yohai V (1984) Robust regression by means of S-estimators. In: Franke J, Härdle
W, Martin RD (eds) Robust and Nonlinear Time Series Analysis. Springer, New York, NY, pp
256–272
Rousseeuw PJ, Leroy AM (1987) Robust Regression and Outlier Detection. Wiley, New York, NY
Roy J (2010) Do customs union members engage in more bilateral trade than free-trade agreement
members? Rev Int Econ 18(4):663–681
Saggi K, Yildiz HM (2010) Bilateralism, multilateralism, and the quest for global free trade. J Int
Econ 81(1):26–37
Sampson T (2016) Dynamic selection: An idea flows theory of entry, trade, and growth. Quart J
Econ 131(1):315–380
SampsonT (2017)Brexit: The economics of international disintegration. JEconPerspect 31(4):163–
184
Samuelson PA (2004) Where Ricardo and Mill rebut and confirm arguments of mainstream
economists supporting globalization. J Econ Perspect 18(3):135–146
Santos Silva J, Tenreyro S (2006) The log of gravity. Rev Econ Stat 88(4):641–658
Santos Silva J, Tenreyro S (2011) Further simulation evidence on the performance of the Poisson
pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator. Econ Lett 112(2):220–222
Saunders-Hastings PR, Krewski D (2016) Reviewing the history of pandemic influenza: Under-
standing patterns of emergence and transmission. Pathogens 5(4):66
172 References
Schiff M, Wang Y (2003) NAFTA, technology diffusion and productivity in Mexico. Cuadernos de
Economía 40(121):469–476
Schmoch U, Laville F, Patel P, Frietsch R (2003) Linking technology areas to industrial sectors.
DG Research, Final Report to the European Commission
Schumpeter JA (1942) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Harper & Brothers Publishers, New
York, NY
Shaked A, Sutton J (1984) Natural oligopolies and international trade. In: Kierzkowski H (ed)
Monopolistic Competition and International Trade. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 34–50
Shrestha N, Shad MY, Ulvi O, Khan MH, Karamehic-Muratovic A, Nguyen USD, Baghbanzadeh
M,Wardrup R, Aghamohammadi N, Cervantes D, NahiduzzamanKM, Zaki RA, HaqueU (2020)
The impact of COVID-19 on globalization. One Health 11:100180
Singh J (2007) Asymmetry of knowledge spillovers between MNCs and host country firms. J Int
Bus Stud 38(5):764–786
Sopranzetti S (2018) Overlapping free trade agreements and international trade: A network
approach. World Econ 41(6):1549–1566
Spilker G, Böhmelt T (2013) The impact of preferential trade agreements on governmental repres-
sion revisited. Rev Int Org 8(3):343–361
Stiglitz JE (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents. W.W. Norton & Company, New York, NY
Stiglitz JE (2006) Making Globalization Work. W.W. Norton & Company, New York, NY
Stiglitz JE (2018) Globalization and Its Discontents Revisited: Anti Globalization in the Era of
Trump. W.W. Norton & Company, New York, NY
Suzumura K (1992) Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in an oligopoly with spillovers. Am
Econ Rev 82(5):1307–1320
Sveikauskas L (2007) R&D and productivity growth: A review of the literature, U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics Working Papers 408
Terza JV (1998) Estimating count data models with endogenous switching: Sample selection and
endogenous treatment effects. J Economet 84(1):129–154
Timmer MP, Erumban AA, Los B, Stehrer R, De Vries GJ (2014) Slicing up global value chains. J
Econ Perspect 28(2):99–118
Tobin J (1969)A general equilibrium approach tomonetary theory. JMoneyCredit Bank 1(1):15–29
Todo Y (2006) Knowledge spillovers from foreign direct investment in R&D: Evidence from
Japanese firm-level data. J Asian Econ 17(6):996–1013
Todo Y (2011) Quantitative evaluation of the determinants of export and FDI: Firm-level evidence
from Japan. World Econ 34(3):355–381
Todo Y, Miyamoto K (2006) Knowledge spillovers from foreign direct investment and the role of
local R&D activities: Evidence from Indonesia. Econ Dev Cult Change 55(1):173–200
Todo Y, Nakajima K, Matous P (2015) How do supply chain networks affect the resilience of firms
to natural disasters? Evidence from the Great East Japan Earthquake. J Reg Sci 55(2):209–229
Tomiura E (2007) Foreign outsourcing, exporting, and FDI: A productivity comparison at the firm
level. J Int Econ 72(1):113–127
UgurM,Churchill SA,LuongHM(2020)What doweknowaboutR&Dspillovers and productivity?
Meta-analysis evidence on heterogeneity and statistical power. Res Policy 49(1):103866
US Department of Commerce (2018) The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National Security: An
Investigation Conducted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, As Amended.
www.commerce.gov/section-232-investigation-effect-imports-steel-us-national-security
Venables AJ (1999) Fragmentation and multinational production. Eur Econ Rev 43(4–6):935–945
Verardi V, Croux C (2009) Robust regression in Stata. Stand Genomic Sci 9(3):439–453
Vicard V (2009) On trade creation and regional trade agreements: Does depth matter? Rev World
Econ 145(2):167–187
Vicard V (2011) Determinants of successful regional trade agreements. Econ Lett 111(3):188–190
Viner J (1950) The Customs Union Issue. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York,
NY
References 173
Wagner J (2006) Export intensity and plant characteristics: What can we learn from quantile regres-
sion? Rev World Econ 142(1):195–203
Wagner J (2007) Exports and productivity: A survey of the evidence from firm-level data. World
Econ 30(1):60–82
Wagner J (2012) International trade and firm performance: A survey of empirical studies since
2006. Rev World Econ 148(2):235–267
Wakasugi R (ed) (2014) Internationalization of Japanese Firms: Evidence from Firm-level Data.
Springer, New York, NY
Wakasugi R, Ito B (2009) The effects of stronger intellectual property rights on technology transfer:
Evidence from Japanese firm-level data. J Technol Transf 34(2):145–158
Wakasugi R (2010) Tanaka A (2010) Activities of Japanese multinationals with productivity het-
erogeneity. Int Econ 14:128–142
Wakasugi R, Tanaka A (2012) Productivity heterogeneity and internationalization: Evidence from
Japanese firms. Millennial Asia 3(1):45–70
Wonnacott RJ (1975) Canada’s future in a world of trade blocs: A proposal. Can Public Policy
1(1):118–130
Wonnacott RJ (1996) Trade and investment in a hub-and-spoke system versus a free trade area.
World Econ 19(3):237–252
Wooldridge JM (2010) Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, 2nd Edn The MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (2020) World Intellectual Property Indicators
2020. World Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva
World Trade Organization (WTO) (2011) World Trade Report 2011: The WTO and Preferen-
tial Trade Agreements: From Co-existence to Coherence. World Trade Organization, Geneva,
Switzerland
XuB,Wang J (1999) Capital goods trade and R&D spillovers in the OECD. Can J Econ 32(5):1258–
1274
Yeaple SR (2003) The complex integration strategies of multinationals and cross country depen-
dencies in the structure of foreign direct investment. J Int Econ 60(2):293–314
Yeaple SR (2003b) The role of skill endowments in the structure of U.S. outward foreign direct
investment. Rev Econ Stat 85(3):726–734
Yeaple SR (2009) Firm heterogeneity and the structure of U.S. multinational activity. J Int Econ
78(2):206–215
YiKM (2003) Can vertical specialization explain the growth ofworld trade? J Polit Econ 111(1):52–
102
Yohai VJ (1987) High breakdown-point and high efficiency robust estimates for regression. Ann
Stat 15(2):642–656
Yomogida M (2004) Vertical intra-industry trade and factor proportions. Hitotsubashi J Econ
45(1):67–79
Yotov YV, Piermartini R, Monteiro JA, Larch M (2016) An Advanced Guide to Trade Policy
Analysis: The Structural Gravity Model, Online Revised Version. World Trade Organization,
Geneva, Switzerland
Zhu Z, Cerina F, Chessa A, Caldarelli G, Riccaboni M (2014) The rise of China in the international




technologically-, 82, 125, 130, 144, 152
technologically less-, 82, 125
Affiliate
foreign-, 13, 15–17, 24, 39–42, 48, 50,
54, 55, 62, 100–102, 104, 106, 107,
110, 115, 124, 125, 147–149, 152
Japanese firms’-, 104
Asian currency crisis, 9
Asia-Pacific region, 14, 22, 27, 31, 34, 37,
146
Asset
intangible, 15, 40, 43, 45–47, 49, 148
tangible, 15, 40, 43, 56, 147, 151
Association of South-East Asian Nations




Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure
and Activities (BSJBSA), 41, 42, 54,
55, 59
Basic Survey of Overseas Business Activi-
ties (BSOBA)
dataset, 106
Behind-the-Border Policy (BBP), 14, 19, 26,
30, 32–34, 129, 130, 143, 147, 150





Capital intensity physical, 40, 52
Case Fatality Rate (CFR), 1
Chamberlain, 63, 64, 68
Communication Technology (CT), 3, 24
Content of Deep Trade Agreement
database-, 157, 158
COVID-19, 1, 8, 21, 145, 146
Cross-border licensing, 35, 36
Custom Union (CU), 6
D
Design of Trade Agreement, 28
Distance
economic-, 18, 19, 132, 133
geographical-, 18, 19, 132, 133
E
East Asian region, 5, 6




Endogenous switching model, 17, 102, 109,
110, 112
EuropeanCommunity (EC), 19, 36, 129, 150
European Economic Community (EEC), 36
European Patent Office (EPO)
-citation, 17
European Union (EU)
-enlargement, 8, 19, 130, 131, 141, 142,
144, 150, 156
see alsoEU’sClassification of Economic
Activities
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2022
N. Jinji et al., Deep Integration, Global Firms, and Technology Spillovers,





Financial crisis, 1, 8
Firm heterogeneity, 6
Firm-level data
Japanese-, 14–17, 39, 47, 50, 68, 101,
102, 124
Fixed effects
Company pair-, 129, 133, 134
country-, 129, 133, 134
-negative binominal model, 102




partially horizontal-, 18, 102, 124
partially vertical-, 18, 102, 124, 149, 152
pure horizontal-, 17, 18, 102, 149
pure vertical-, 17, 18, 102, 149
vertical-, 100–103, 106–108, 112, 114,
115, 119, 121, 122, 124, 125, 127, 152
Foreign Outsourcing (FO), 13, 39, 49, 50,
147
Foreign subsidiary, 52–54, 104
Free-entry equilibrium condition, 78, 80–83





General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT or GATT/WTO), 5, 21, 154
Global firm, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 22, 34, 37, 146
Globalization
-activity, 15, 16, 39–41, 47, 50, 55, 61,
62, 147, 148
economic-, 2
-index, 2, 44, 51, 60–65, 67
-mode, 13–16, 39–42, 45–48, 50–52, 55,
60, 61, 63–65, 67, 68, 147, 148, 151




Global Value Chain (GVC), 8, 28, 35, 101
Great East Japan Earthquake, 8
Grubel–Lloyd index, 85
H
Headquarters company, 15, 16, 50, 54–56,
61, 62
Huber M-estimator, 51, 60, 63, 64, 67, 68
I
ICT revolution, 24
Information and Communication Technol-
ogy (ICT), 3, 24
Innovation
-policy, 127
Institute of Intellectual Property (IIP), 41,
42, 88
Instrumental Variable (IV), 35, 51
Intangible asset
-intensity, 15, 40, 46, 47, 49, 148
Integration
deep-, 12–14, 22, 23, 34, 37, 145, 146,
153
deep regional-, 13, 14, 22–24, 28, 34, 36,
37, 145, 146, 150, 153
regional trade-, 13, 14
shallow-, 14, 23, 34
Intellectual Property Right (IPR)
-protection, 18, 21, 24, 125, 152
trade-related aspects of- (TRIPS), 127,
147, 154
International Patent Classification (IPC), 88,
89
International Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion (ISIC)
The United Nations’-, 89
Intra-Industry Trade (IIT), 13, 17, 72, 74,
84–86, 94, 96, 149
J
Japan, 2, 5, 8, 10, 14, 16, 28–34, 39, 41, 50,
55, 56, 71–74, 89, 91, 93, 99, 106,
107, 109, 112, 114, 136, 146–148,
154
Japanese
-firm, 7, 14, 15, 17, 39, 44, 47, 50, 68,
102–104, 108, 125
-parent company, 54, 104, 108




-capital, 15, 16, 40, 50, 52, 53, 68, 148
-capital intensity, 15, 16, 40, 50, 52, 53,
68
diffusion of-, 2, 9–12, 18, 71
flows of, 12, 13, 151
-spillovers, 11, 82
spillovers of-, 11, 12, 99
Index 177
L
Labor Productivity (LP), 15, 40, 43, 45, 47,
147, 148, 151
Least Absolute Deviations (LAD), 45
Least-Absolute Value model (LAV), 45, 46
Legal Enforceability (LE)
-index, 25, 27, 29, 31, 131
M
Measure
breadth-, 27, 33, 34, 37, 130, 131, 147
depth-, 14, 25, 31–34, 130, 131, 147
Micro data, 7, 13
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
(METI), 4, 5, 7, 41, 54, 57, 104, 108
MM-estimator, 51, 60, 63, 64, 67, 68
Monopolistic competition, 17, 18, 72, 74, 76,
95, 103, 120, 149
Multinational Enterprise (MNE)
Japanese, 7, 13, 17, 18, 68, 101–104, 106,
107, 112, 115, 124, 125, 148, 149
N
Nati1onal Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER), 103, 104
National security, 154, 155
Negative binominal model, 17, 87, 92, 102,




production-, 6–9, 35, 101
supply-, 7, 9
supply chain-, 8
Nikkei Economic Electronic Database Sys-
tems (NEEDS)
company financial reports, 41, 54
Non-Economic Policy (NEP), 14, 19, 27, 31,
33, 34, 129, 130, 139, 141, 144, 147,
150
Non-tariff barriers, 5, 14, 18, 26, 129, 147
North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), 19, 36, 129, 150
O
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
robust (ROLS), 60, 63, 64, 67, 68
Organization for Economic Co-operation





-data, 13, 18, 36, 73, 84, 88, 93, 101, 103,
124, 127, 134, 149





European-, 88, 91, 93, 94, 96, 134, 141–
143
Japanese, 41, 74, 88
Patent(s)
-application, 10, 15, 19, 40, 41, 43, 87,
88, 104, 106, 108, 125
-database, 104
European-, 16, 17, 72–74, 88, 96
Japanese-, 149
US-, 17, 19, 73, 74, 86, 88, 91, 96, 104,
114, 134
Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT)
EPO worldwide, 88














Regional Trade Agreement (RTA)
breadth indexes of, 33, 129
deep-, 18, 23, 127, 145
depth and breadth-, 14, 19, 26, 27, 30,
129, 130, 143, 150, 152, 155, 156
depth indexes of-, 32
–network, 156
Research and development (R&D)
product-, 73, 76, 87, 95
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA),
74
Rules of origin (RoO), 23, 27
178 Index
S
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS),
25–28
Skewed distribution, 40, 44, 45, 60, 64
Social return, 11
Spillover
cross-border technology-, 127, 130, 144,
152
horizontal-, 11, 12
international technology-, 12, 16–19, 37,
73, 82, 84, 95, 96, 119, 124, 125, 127–
130, 143, 144, 149–152
technology-, 12, 13, 16–19, 22, 36, 37,
72–74, 81–84, 86, 87, 94–96, 99–103,
108, 109, 112, 114, 115, 118, 119, 121–
125, 127–130, 132, 136, 138–141, 143,
144, 146, 149–152, 155, 156
vertical-, 12, 17
Structural gravity model, 35, 36
T
Tariffs
import-, 5, 6, 14, 26, 30, 130, 147
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), 22, 26,
27
Technology gap, 10, 12, 18, 82–84, 96, 103,
117, 118, 121
The European Union (EU), 5, 36, 89, 145,
154
The United Kingdom (UK), 10, 71, 72, 89,
93, 99, 105, 136, 145
The United States
Patent and trademark office (USPTO),
88, 101
Tobin’s q, 13, 15, 16, 39, 40, 43, 45–54, 56–




Tobit regression, 60, 62
Total Factor Productivity (TFP), 16, 50–52,
54, 57–62, 67–69, 72, 147, 148
Trade
horizontal intra-industry-(HIIT), 13, 72,
85, 94, 149
inter-industry-, 13, 17, 72
intra-industry- (IIT)
horizontal intra-industry- (HIIT), 13,
72, 85, 95, 149
vertical intra-industry- (VIIT), 13,
72, 85, 86, 94, 96
liberalization, 5, 6, 14, 23, 37
one-way trade (OWT), 13, 85, 149
vertical intra-industry- (VIIT), 13, 72,
85, 86, 94, 96, 149
Trump
-administration, 21, 145, 154
Donald-, 145, 146, 154
U




–patent, 104, 108, 114
-patent application, 104
-patent citation, 106
US firm, 7, 44
W
World economy, 1, 3, 6, 11, 146, 153
World trade, 1, 5, 21, 22, 28, 154
World Trade Organization (WTO or
GATT/WTO), 5, 21, 22, 28, 154
WTO-extra (WTO-X)
-policy areas, 24, 27–29, 128, 130
WTO-plus (WTO+)
-policy areas, 14, 25, 27, 29, 128
